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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters which explore the usefulness of partial identification
methods for estimating treatment effects in applied health economics research. Each one
applies the methodology to different settings in which establishing causality has traditionally
been difficult, and seeks to demonstrate when a bounding approach can—and cannot—aid
researchers in learning about causal relationships.
The first chapter studies the Housing Choice Voucher program in the United States and
estimates bounds on the effect that receiving this form of housing assistance has on self-reported
health status and the likelihood of hospitalization within the eligible population of renters. The
second chapter aims to understand the relationship between mental health and labor market
outcomes. We bound the impact depressive symptom severity has on both the probability of
employment and on earnings. The third chapter provides a thorough exposition of the bounding
strategy used throughout the dissertation and examines how genetic data might be used in the
framework to study questions of public health interest. We demonstrate the latter by estimating
bounds on the causal effect of both education and body mass index on mental health.
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Chapter 1
A Voucher a Day Keeps the Doctor Away:
Bounding the Effect of Housing Assistance
on Recipients’ Health
Giuseppe Germinario†

1.1

Introduction

The Housing Choice Voucher program is the largest housing assistance program offered by
the US federal government for low-to-moderate income renters on the private market. In 2018,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reported that expenditures on the
program totaled $21 billion and 2.5 million households received support via a housing voucher.
Despite these figures, the supply of vouchers remains limited, and only around one quarter
of eligible households receive benefits (Rosen, 2020). Given recent interest in expanding the
voucher program—the American Rescue Plan of 2021 has so far led to an influx of $1.1 billion (or
70,000 vouchers) for Emergency Housing Vouchers targeting those most at risk of homelessness,
and President Biden’s proposed Build Back Better Framework included $15 billion in funding
for additional vouchers—it is of critical interest to understand how recipients are impacted
† Department

of Economics, Syracuse University
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by receiving a voucher. This chapter focuses on how receipt of a housing voucher affects the
health status of individuals in the household relative to a counterfactual in which they receive
place-based rental assistance (e.g., residing in public housing, project-based Section 8, or Low
Income Housing Tax Credit units), or rent in the unsubsidized private market.
This question is motivated by the strong link between housing and public health. Currently,
the World Health Organization Housing and Health Guidelines (WHO) cite five key priorities
in this area: inadequate living space (crowding), both low and high indoor temperatures, injury
hazards in the home, and accessibility of housing for people with functional impairments.
The first of these is associated with the spread of close-contact infectious diseases. The latter
four focus on physical qualities of housing and how these can be harmful to the health of
residents. For example, the report notes that cold indoor temperatures are correlated with high
blood pressure and asthma symptoms, high indoor temperatures can be linked to dehydration
and sleep disorders, and, to cite a more well-known example, exposure to lead carries a host
of negative health consequences (anemia, kidney damage, brain damage), particularly among
children. Finally, the guidelines also emphasize neighborhood characteristics such as air quality,
crime rates, or noise levels. Persistent throughout is a WHO recommendation that governments
address these issues, in part, by improving access to affordable housing.
My goal is to look specifically at one means of increasing affordability—vouchers—and
assess its effectiveness as a public health intervention. In this chapter, I consider that the causal
path between receiving a housing voucher and experiencing better health operates through at
least three potential mechanisms. First, receiving a voucher improves stability in the housing
situation, which may help to reduce stress or anxiety. The second I call a “housing choice effect”
that the voucher may allow households to relocate into housing that performs better with
respect to the WHO priorities. The third is an income effect that arises from the fact that the
voucher program is implemented as an economic transfer: a housing voucher limits the recipient
household’s rent to 30% of its monthly income, with the federal government subsidizing the
remaining balance, up to a payment standard set by the local public housing authority. When
this is a reduction in monthly expenditures on housing, the household’s budget constraint for
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non-housing goods is relaxed, freeing up resources that can be devoted to improving health.
To my knowledge, this is the first study attempting to answer this question for adults in
voucher households using data representative at the national level. Elsewhere in the literature,
Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001) do include adult health as an outcome in their study of
the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment in Boston in 1998. The main idea of MTO
was to randomly assign housing vouchers to households living in public housing or projectbased Section 8 units in high-poverty neighborhoods, which would allow for identification of
treatment effects. The place-based rental assistance counterfactuals for voucher holders are
meant to emulate this setting. I am ultimately interested in a broader question of how vouchers
compare when the counterfactual includes unsubsidized renting, and my analysis differs in two
other key ways. First, there was one-sided non-compliance in the MTO treatment groups (in
the sense that not all households assigned a voucher ended up using it), such that the estimate
of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in Katz et al. (2001) identifies a local average
treatment effect (LATE) on health. In contrast, my strategy in this paper allows me to identify a
population average treatment effect (ATE). In addition, the previous specificity to Boston leaves
the distinction that I am identifying an effect for a broader population, even if the parameters
identified were equivalent.
Outside of the random assignment as part of Moving to Opportunity, several aspects of
the voucher program make it difficult to develop a compelling strategy for point identification
of effects, particularly in public datasets. First, the primary structure of the program has
not undergone any substantial changes since its inception in 1974 (Olsen, 2003; Zhang, 2021),
leaving little room for natural experiments or IV/RDD approaches. Second, long waiting
lists for vouchers induce an issue of negative selection. Previous empirical work has relied
on administrative panel data and fixed effects strategies (Horn et al., 2014; Ellen et al., 2016;
Schwartz et al., 2020) or on estimation of structural models (Zhang, 2021) to overcome these
difficulties. In general, the first of these relies on within-person variation in voucher status
and in the outcomes of interest. If this variation is random throughout the population, then
the fixed effects strategies identify a population average treatment effect. If the variation is
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instead specific to certain subgroups, then a more local (and perhaps less policy relevant) effect
is identified. A structural approach, on the other hand, relies on the validity of the parametric
modeling choices, which could potentially be in question for applications.
My primary contribution in this chapter is that I take a different approach which allows me
to identify the causal effect of housing voucher receipt on individual health using only a single
cross-section of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Specifically, I employ
the partial identification method of Manski and Pepper (2000) to obtain nonparametric bounds
on the average treatment effect in the population of low-income renter households who meet
the HCV eligibility requirements. To do so, I make three key monotonicity assumptions: (1)
there is negative monotone treatment selection (MTS), (2) total reported personal income serves
as a valid monotone instrumental variable (MIV), and (3) there is monotone treatment response
(MTR). The first assumption of MTS formalizes the above intuition that voucher recipients are
negatively selected based on potential health outcomes, such that observed voucher recipients
would, on average, have weakly worse potential health outcomes in any state of the world. The
second assumption that total personal income is a valid MIV requires that, on average, potential
health outcomes are non-decreasing in this reported income; this is supported, for example, by
a consistent empirical finding of a health gradient with respect to income. The third assumption
of MTR posits that an individual’s potential health outcome under voucher receipt is no worse
than without a voucher, and relies upon what I call the housing choice and income effects of
voucher receipt above. I assess the plausibility of these assumptions in detail below. While they
are relatively mild restrictions and are reasonable in this context, they do come at the price that
I can only estimate bounds on the ATE. I argue, however, that the price is worth it: by relaxing
the stronger assumptions that I would need to obtain point identification (e.g., an exclusion
restriction for a traditional IV strategy or parametric assumptions), I can estimate a credible
range of values for the average causal effect of vouchers on health.
I am able to statistically rule out a null effect, estimating that the probability of good or
better self-reported health is increased by at least 4.8 percentage points (9.2%) when receiving a
voucher. The same effect has an upper bound of 21.3 percentage points (59.5%). Additionally,
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the effect on the probability of zero nights spent in the hospital over the previous year is bounded
below by a 0.1 percentage point (0.1%) increase and bounded above by an 18.4 percentage point
(29.7%) increase, though the ATE cannot be statistically distinguished from zero at conventional
levels. Together, these suggest that the health benefit of this form of housing assistance has
a non-negligible magnitude. From analysis of demographic subgroups, I also find that Black
members of voucher households are at least 11.7 percentage points (19.6%) and up to 26.9
percentage points (60.3%) more likely to self-report good health, and that the ATE is positive
and statistically significant. If this suggests that the true effect is larger for Black voucher
holders, then housing vouchers may also be a policy tool that can be leveraged to combat health
disparities in the US.
With my primary outcome being a self-reported (and thus subjective) health status, it is
important to be thoughtful with respect to the interpretation of the results.

One way to

understand self-reported health is as an imperfect—yet positively correlated—measure of true
underlying physical health (Miilunpalo et al., 1997; Idler and Benyamini, 1997; Crossley and
Kennedy, 2002; Wilson et al., 2007). This is the primary interpretation I take here, such that the
effect on subjective health reflects a change in objective health. Alternatively, the self-reported
status may more so capture an individual’s perception of a given level of underlying health
(Jürges, 2007; Lima-Costa et al., 2012). In this sense, the effects I bound represent changes to
the “frameworks of evaluations” (Jylhä, 2009) after a housing voucher is received and recipients
have the potential to improve the quality of their housing. While the former interpretation is
more straightforward, the latter would still imply that my estimates demonstrate a meaningful
improvement for voucher holders: a more positive perception of one’s own health may indicate
improved mental health.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides institutional details
for the voucher program and reviews the relevant empirical literature on the impacts of housing
vouchers. Section 1.3 describes my use of the SIPP and provides summary statistics. Section
1.4 provides a brief conceptual framework for my setting. Section 1.5 delves into the three main
identifying assumptions and describes my procedure for estimation of and inference on the
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bounds, and the results are presented in Section 1.6. I conclude with Section 1.7.

1.2
1.2.1

Background
The Housing Choice Voucher Program

The use of housing vouchers in the United States originates from the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, and was a policy response to concerns that public housing was causing
“concentrations of poverty,” where participants were located in low-income geographic areas
(Massey and Kanaiaupuni, 1993). The legislation amended Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937
to create a Section 8 Certificates (or Section 8 Existing) program. This awarded a Certificate to
eligible households that was a subsidy for renting in the private market that would limit rent to
30% of income, under the conditions that properties met housing quality conditions and rent
limitations established by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Later, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 created the Section 8 Voucher
program, which was largely similar to the Certificate program but allowed recipients to spend
more than 30% of income on rent payments. Finally, the Certificate and Voucher programs
were merged in 1998 via the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act to create the modern
Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program.
The basic eligibility for a voucher under the HCV program is based on the household’s
total family income relative to the median income for the corresponding family size in the local
county or metro area. The specific income thresholds are determined annually by HUD, and, in
general, a recipient household’s income may not exceed 50% of the median income for its size.
Additionally, the Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) who administer the program locally are
required to assign 75% of its available vouchers to households with income at or below 30% of
the corresponding median.
Once an eligible household is selected (typically from a waiting list due to limited supply),
the voucher works in the following way. First, a potential housing unit must be inspected by
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the PHA to ensure that it meets an “acceptable level of health and safety.”1 Next, the PHA sets
a payment standard based on HUD’s calculation of the local Fair Market Rent (FMR), which
is typically equal to the 40th percentile of local rents, adjusted for the number of bedrooms
required for the household size. The FMR represents the maximum permitted rent for voucher
holders participating in the HCV program.
If the housing unit passes the PHA inspection and meets the FMR payment standard (and
the property owner agrees to participate in the program),2 then the voucher holder is required
to pay 30% of household income towards the rent and utilities for the unit. The remaining
difference between this amount and the payment standard is the subsidy amount the PHA pays
directly to the landlord each month.3
Each party—the voucher holder, the landlord, and the PHA—retains obligations after the
approved lease is signed. The voucher holder agrees to maintain the lease for at least one year,
refrain from damaging the unit, limit the stays of guests who were not reported as household
members when the application was submitted to the PHA, as well as follow other terms of
the lease. Landlords are expected to provide “decent, safe, and sanitary” housing at the rental
rate agreed upon in the lease and approved by the PHA. The PHA is responsible for ensuring
the landlord receives the subsidy amount in a timely manner and for verifying annually that
households remain income-eligible for the voucher and that the property continues to meet the
minimum quality standard.

1.2.2

Related Literature

A great deal of the empirical literature on housing vouchers has come from analysis of the
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment begun by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development in 1994. From 1994 to 1998, HUD recruited 4600 low-income families with children
1 Much

of the information here comes directly from the HUD website.
law does not force landlords to accept tenants who have a voucher. However, some states and
municipalities have instituted protections for tenants that prohibit discrimination based on source of income (SOI),
which includes housing vouchers (Han, 2021).
3 In some cases, a PHA may allow a recipient household to select a unit with rent exceeding the FMR, with the
household having the responsibility of paying the excess. Overall, any excess payment cannot cause the proportion
of income spent towards rent to rise above 40%.
2 Federal
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and living in public housing across five major cities (Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles,
and New York City) to participate in the experiment. The participants were then randomized
into one of three treatment arms: (1) an experimental group offered a housing voucher that
could only be used in a sufficiently low-poverty (a poverty rate below 10%) census tract as
of 1990, (2) a comparison group offered a traditional housing voucher, or (3) a control group.
Comparisons between groups (2) and (3) would then identify average treatment effects for the
population included in the experiment.
Most highly relevant to the current paper is an early study of the MTO experiment in Boston
by Katz, Kling, and Liebman (2001). The authors conducted follow-up surveys in 1997-1998
of 520 participant families. One question in the survey asked the heads of household for selfreported health status, with possible answers identical to the variable I use from the SIPP.
Randomization allows for identification of both the effect of being offered a housing voucher
(an intent-to-treat effect, or ITT) and of eventually receiving one (an effect of treatment on the
treated, or ATT). They estimate the former as a 16.2 percentage point increase in the probability
of good health, and the latter as a 26.4 percentage point increase. Although the ATT and ATE
may differ due to one-sided non-compliance, this provides a useful benchmark for my analysis
as a local average treatment effect (LATE): the experimental estimate lies near or slightly above
all of my estimated bounds on the ATE, indicating that the magnitudes of my range of estimates
are reasonable for the effect on a broader population.
Relatedly, Ludwig et al. (2011) conducted follow-up surveys with MTO participants from
2008 to 2010, collecting measures of body mass index (BMI) and glycated hemoglobin. They
are thus able to identify the ITT of assignment to the voucher groups on the probability of
obesity and diabetes. The estimates indicate that assignment to the traditional voucher group
led to a statistically-significant (at the 10% level) 5.3 percentage point decrease in the likelihood
of obesity and a 0.8 percentage point decline in the likelihood of diabetes (not significant at
conventional levels). While, again, I am bounding a different parameter, the fact that effects on
specific health conditions may be at the lower end of my identified sets for the ATE on overall
self-reported health appears reasonable. Obesity and diabetes are only two components that
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an individual may consider when evaluating her own health, so it is possible that the effects on
particular conditions accumulate into a total effect.
Apart from studies of MTO, other strands of the empirical vouchers literature seek to identify
impacts using non-experimental data. This work has primarily focused on the effects on
neighborhood or labor supply choices, the former of which can be informative for my MTR
assumption. That is, the attributes of the neighborhood in which a voucher holder locates is a
critical part of what I have called the housing choice effect of the voucher on health. Studies can
generally be placed into one of two categories.
First are approaches which have relied on panel data or other fixed effects strategies to
identify causal effects. Horn, Ellen, and Schwartz (2014) take one such approach by combining
administrative HUD data with school district information to estimate the effect of voucher
receipt on neighborhood choice through the lens of school quality. They find that voucher
households locate near schools with 3 percentage point higher proficiency rates than for schools
near households in public housing. On the other hand, schools near voucher households have
slightly lower proficiency rates than schools near non-subsidized low-income households or
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) recipients. They explain that this is likely due to
the demographics of voucher holders, which is similar to my negative MTS assumption in
that voucher holders have average characteristics potentially related to a lower demand for
education quality. In addition to estimates that voucher holders locate in neighborhoods with
greater amenities, Schwartz et al. (2020) provide evidence using data from New York City over
the 2002-2012 period that voucher recipients also move into higher quality structures. Although
not intended as causal estimates, they find that students in voucher households are 20% less
likely to live in a building with a hazardous code violation. This indicates that, at least on
average, the effect of voucher receipt through the direct effect on housing choice is positive.
However, as I emphasize below, the MTR assumption is at the individual level, and so this
evidence is merely suggestive.
The second approach common in the literature is to calibrate and estimate structural models.
Leung, Sarpça, and Yilmaz (2012) set up a model with two household types (skilled/high-
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income and unskilled/low-income) and two neighborhoods. They compare equilibria reached
under public housing versus a voucher program. Relative to the public housing equilibrium,
their model predicts voucher holders end up with higher average lot sizes and locate in a higher
quality neighborhood (measured by school quality) than public housing participants. Inside the
voucher equilbrium, the voucher holders also reside on larger average lot sizes than the other
low-income households without a voucher. Like the results cited in the previous paragraph,
this suggests that the housing choice effect of the voucher on health is positive for at least some
portion of the population.

1.3

Data

I utilize Wave 1 of the 2018 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for my analysis.
Administered by the U.S. Census Bureau, the SIPP is a nationally-representative survey begun
in 1983 of households’ income and government program participation in the United States. The
survey is designed as a continuous series of panels that last between 2.5 and 4 years, where,
beginning with the 2018 SIPP, a new panel begins each year so that there is overlap at each wave.
Wave 1 of the 2018 SIPP therefore contains responses for the first panel in its first year. To focus
on annual data, I use the month 12 response and the corresponding annual person weights in
the analysis.4
A major advantage of using the SIPP is that, to the best of my knowledge, it is the only
publicly-available dataset with information on both participation in the Housing Choice Voucher
program and on individuals’ health. My primary outcome of health status is measured by the
respondent’s answer to a question asking about her current health. Possible answers are on a
scale including Poor, Fair, Good, Very Good, and Excellent health. I construct my main outcome
of interest as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the self-reported health status is Good, Very
Good, or Excellent, and equal to zero otherwise. My secondary outcome is the response to a
question which asks how many nights the individual spent in the hospital over the previous
year. I binarize this variable such that it is equal to 1 if zero nights were spent in the hospital,
4 This

follows the guidance in the Users’ Guide to Selecting Weights published on the SIPP website.
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and equal to zero otherwise.
Information on voucher status comes from the following series of questions. First, the
respondent is asked if her living quarters are owned, rented, or “occupied without payment of
rent.” Those who report the latter two tenure statuses are then asked if their rent is lower because
of participation in a federal, state, or local government housing program. Respondents who
answer affirmatively to this question are then asked if their household has a housing voucher.
Thus, the “treated” group in my sample consists of individuals in renter households possessing
a housing voucher. The “control” or comparison group is made up of renters who (i) have their
rent lowered by a government program which is not a housing voucher (e.g., public housing,
project-based Section 8, or LIHTC), or (ii) do not receive any government rental assistance. The
former makes up 13% of my sample, and the latter 87%.
Unfortunately, the SIPP does not allow me to directly identify which non-voucher housing
assistance is received by those receiving place-based subsidies in the comparison group.5 To
better understand the composition of this group, I perform the following back-of-the-envelope
calculation. Using the figures available in the United States Federal Rental Assistance Fact
Sheet from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities for 2018,6 3 million households receive
assistance due to a program other than HCV. This includes nearly 1 million households residing
in public housing and 1.2 million in project-based Section 8 units. It is also relevant to consider
households who may be living in units whose construction was subsidized by the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit. Available data from HUD indicates that there were between 2.2 and 2.7
million LIHTC units in 2018. Only 80% of the households in these units have family incomes
low enough to qualify for HCV.7 Further, O’Regan and Horn (2013) provide evidence that 53%
of these households also receive rental assistance, half of which are voucher recipients. Putting
this together, I can conjecture that there are between 466,000 and 572,000 households residing in
LIHTC units with no other assistance. Thus, I conclude that approximately 33% of this portion
5 In

a follow-up to a conversation with Census Bureau economists about this limitation, I was informed that
specific questions about public housing and project-based Section 8 had been asked in the SIPP panel covering
2008-2013. The conjecture was that these were likely dropped due to concerns for respondent burden or disclosure
risk.
6 The fact sheet is available here.
7 These figures are obtained from Tables 1 and 11 in the HUD document here.
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of my control group resides in public housing, 40% in project-based Section 8 housing, and 20%
in LIHTC units.
Finally, I also use the individual’s report of her total personal income. This variable is
defined in the SIPP as including earnings from all jobs, total personal investment/property
income, total personal means-tested transfer income, total personal social insurance payments,
and total personal ‘other’ income (for example, survivor’s benefits, government pensions, child
support payments, or life insurance policy payouts). This income measure is reported monthly,
so I sum over the 12 months of the SIPP to obtain my measure of total annual personal income.
I further restrict the sample by focusing on adults aged 18 to 65 and on those with a family
income-to-poverty ratio below 1. The latter choice is a compromise. Public Housing Authorities
establish eligibility for the voucher program based on thresholds relative to the local median
family income. The geographic information available in the SIPP is limited to census region, so I
use the federal poverty line adjusted for family size as a proxy for the main eligibility threshold
of 50% of local median family income. With a national median family income in 2018 of $78,646
and a poverty guideline of $25,100 for a family of four, this is a decent proxy, if a bit overly
restrictive. However, due to variation in median income over areas, I find it preferable to be
on the restrictive side rather than including individuals in ineligible households. I am thus
left with 3529 observations of individuals with non-missing data on health outcomes, voucher
status, and total annual personal income.
Table 1.1 describes key objects of interest in the sample. Overall, 76.4% of individuals report
good or better health. In my sample, 7.7% of individuals are in a household having a housing
voucher. Among these voucher holders, 57.1% report good or better health, versus 78.1% among
the non-voucher holders. This unadjusted gap is indicative of the negative selection I describe
in Section 1.5.
Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics for my sample. Overall, the sample is 58.7% female,
22.8% Black, 45.2% white, and 22.2% Hispanic.8 The average age is 35.34 with 12.36 years of
schooling, 19.3% of the sample is married, and 36.5% reported having been employed for the
8 My

sample is also 5.8% Asian and 3.9% are categorized as “residual.” These are an insufficient number of
observations for the racial/ethnic subgroup analyses in Section 1.6, and so I exclude them from Table 2.
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Table 1.1: Observed Probabilities of Good or Better Health and Distribution of Vouchers
𝑡

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

Voucher

0.571
(0.033)

0.077
(0.006)

279
-

No Voucher

0.781
(0.008)

0.923
(0.006)

3250
-

Total

0.764
(0.008)

1.000
-

3529
-

Estimates use the annual SIPP weights for individuallevel analysis. Standard errors in parentheses are based
on 240 BRR replications with the SIPP replicate weights.

entire previous month. The average total personal income is $4,853 and 26.3% are food insecure,
while 9.9% report a plumbing problem in the home and 20.8% report a problem related to pests.

1.4

Conceptual Framework

Before proceeding to my key identifying assumptions, I first offer a simple framework to better
understand the behavior of two main parties in this setting: the public housing authorities and
the households.
Consider first a generic PHA which receives HCV funding from HUD and must decide
how to allocate the corresponding housing vouchers. I remain agnostic on the preferences and
objectives of the PHA in fulfilling this task. Rather, I take as given the empirical fact that housing
authorities ration their limited supply of vouchers by creating a take-it-or-leave-it waiting list
(Thakral, 2016).
For each household, let 𝑈 𝑖 (1) denote potential utility obtained with a voucher, and let
𝑈 𝑖 (0) denote potential utility from place-based rental assistance or renting without a subsidy.
Households that join an HCV waiting list would incur a waitlist cost denoted 𝜃𝑖 . I suppose that
this generates self-selection into voucher receipt à la a simple Roy model (Roy, 1951), based on
the gains from the voucher relative to the waiting cost. Concretely, observed voucher status can
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
By Treatment Status

By Subpopulation

Overall

Voucher

No Voucher

Female

Male

Black

White

Hispanic

Female

0.587
(0.492)

0.695
(0.461)

0.578
(0.494)

·
·

·
·

0.649
(0.477)

0.557
(0.497)

0.608
(0.489)

Black

0.228
(0.419)

0.456
(0.499)

0.209
(0.406)

0.252
(0.434)

0.193
(0.395)

·
·

·
·

·
·

White

0.452
(0.498)

0.237
(0.424)

0.471
(0.499)

0.429
(0.495)

0.485
(0.500)

·
·

·
·

·
·

Hispanic

0.222
(0.415)

0.228
(0.421)

0.222
(0.416)

0.230
(0.421)

0.211
(0.408)

·
·

·
·

·
·

Age

35.34
(13.93)

41.25
(14.66)

34.85
(13.76)

35.32
(13.71)

35.39
(14.26)

36.81
(13.87)

35.08
(14.57)

35.35
(12.52)

4761.26
(11,014.83)

5359.54
(8763.46)

4132.07
(12,952.79)

5152.40
(10,785.74)

4670.93
(10,896.73)

5460.13
(8879.13)

Total Personal Income

4852.50
5945.01
(10,710.11) (5856.08)

Education (years)

12.36
(2.52)

11.70
(2.00)

12.42
(2.55)

12.29
(2.49)

12.47
(2.55)

12.37
(1.83)

12.77
(2.17)

11.03
(3.14)

Married

0.193
(0.395)

0.150
(0.357)

0.197
(0.398)

0.178
(0.382)

0.216
(0.411)

0.151
(0.358)

0.154
(0.361)

0.291
(0.454)

Employed

0.365
(0.481)

0.221
(0.415)

0.377
(0.485)

0.358
(0.480)

0.374
(0.484)

0.327
(0.469)

0.368
(0.482)

0.419
(0.494)

Food Security

0.737
(0.440)

0.611
(0.489)

0.748
(0.434)

0.719
(0.449)

0.762
(0.426)

0.712
(0.453)

0.726
(0.446)

0.751
(0.433)

Plumbing Prob

0.099
(0.298)

0.081
(0.273)

0.100
(0.300)

0.097
(0.296)

0.101
(0.302)

0.094
(0.292)

0.104
(0.306)

0.089
(0.285)

Pest Prob

0.208
(0.406)

0.208
(0.407)

0.208
(0.406)

0.221
(0.415)

0.191
(0.393)

0.227
(0.419)

0.206
(0.404)

0.208
(0.406)

3529

279

3250

2094

1435

757

1591

834

Observations

Standard deviations in parentheses are computed using 240 BRR replications with the SIPP replicate weights. Sample means
are weighted with the annual person weights.

be written

𝑉𝑖 =




 1 , if 𝑈 𝑖 (1) − 𝑈 𝑖 (0) > 𝜃𝑖



 0 , if 𝑈 𝑖 (1) − 𝑈 𝑖 (0) ≤ 𝜃𝑖


Thus, voucher holders are those for whom the benefit of receiving a voucher exceeds the cost
of entering the waiting list. Those observed with non-HCV place-based rental assistance or no
government assistance are those with either a lower benefit from a voucher, a larger waiting
cost, or both. For simplicity below, I assume that households have either a low or high waitlist
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cost type, such that 𝜃𝑖 ∈ {𝜃𝐿 , 𝜃𝐻 }. For the low-cost types with 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 , the Roy selection can be
approximately described as saying those who would benefit from a voucher receive one, and
those who would not benefit are observed in place-based assistance programs or do not receive
any subsidies (i.e., close to a scenario for an assistance program without a waiting list, such as
SNAP).
Upon reaching the top of the waiting list, voucher holders obtain the utility level 𝑈 𝑖 (1)
by maximizing utility through choices of housing services ℎ and non-housing consumption
𝑏. I follow a simplified version of the housing choice model of Geyer (2017) and suppose
that households have Stone-Geary preferences over these consumption levels. Amenities 𝐴 𝑗 in
neighborhood 𝑗 also enter the utility function additively with a preference parameter 𝛾𝑖 . I make
˜ 𝐴 𝑗 ), which is an increasing function
a further addition that utility depends on health 𝐺 𝑖 (ℎ, 𝑏,
of housing services, a subset 𝑏˜ of non-housing consumption that is beneficial to health, and
neighborhood amenities. The function 𝐺 𝑖 (·) simply maps these choices into an indicator for
good or better health. Thus, voucher holders have an objective function
˜ 𝐴𝑗) ,
𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 ln(ℎ − 𝐻) + (1 − 𝛼) ln(𝑏 − 𝐵 𝑖𝑗 ) + 𝛾𝑖 𝐴 𝑗 + 𝐺 𝑖 (ℎ, 𝑏,
where 𝐻 is a minimum level of housing services and 𝐵 𝑖𝑗 a minimum level of non-housing
consumption, which may depend on neighborhood 𝑗 amenities. This is subject to a budget
constraint 𝑤 = 𝑝 𝑗ℎ ℎ + 𝑏. With the voucher, households pay 30% of income on housing, meaning
that 𝑝 𝑗ℎ ℎ = 0.3𝑤, and the expenditure on non-housing consumption is equal to 0.7𝑤.
Immediately, it is evident that voucher receipt may generate an income effect on nonhousing consumption (and thus indirectly on health)9 by changing the household’s budget
9 The

positive indirect effect on health can be conceived as suggesting that health is a normal good with
respect to post-transfer income. Such a result would be consistent with the human capital model of demand
for health (Grossman, 1972). To summarize the intuition, let 𝑝 ≡ Pr [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) = 1] denote the probability of good
or better potential health outcomes, so that Δ𝑝 > 0 represents the change in this probability when the health
stock is increased. Let 𝑤 𝑖 and 𝐼 𝑖 denote an individual’s income and total expenditure on health investments,
respectively. Then, the optimality conditions for an individual choosing over a consumption good and health
capital (Cropper, 1977; Grossman, 1999) yield an expression for the marginal benefit of increasing the health stock,
written Δ𝑝 · 𝑢(𝑤 𝑖 − 𝐼 𝑖 ), where 𝑢(·) is a utility function with 𝑢 ′(·) > 0. Inspection of this quantity reveals that an
increase in 𝑤 𝑖 raises the marginal benefit of increasing the health stock, such that increased income will prompt a
greater demand for health.
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constraint (Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009). The extent of this effect depends upon the
relevant counterfactual for the household. For the public housing and project-based Section
8 counterfactuals, where housing expenditures are also equal to 30% of income, the available
budget share for non-housing consumption is unchanged. There is subsequently no income
effect for total expenditure relative to these alternative states of the world. For the LIHTC
counterfactual, on the other hand, housing expenditures would instead be equal to 30% of
the local adjusted median income, rather than the individual household’s income.

Since

the income eligibility limit for HCV is 50% of median income, voucher holders pay at most
0.3 × 0.5 = 15% of the local median. Thus, the post-voucher budget constraint can allow
for potentially significant increases in non-housing expenditures when the counterfactual is
a LIHTC unit. Similar reasoning applies when the relevant counterfactual is unsubsidized
renting. In any case, the basic setup of the housing choice model indicates a non-negative effect
on the budget constraint.
Finally, receiving a voucher has a direct effect on the specific bundle of housing services,
non-housing consumption, and neighborhood amenities.10 While the Roy selection places a
restriction that the ultimate utility level 𝑈 𝑖 (1) is greater than the sum of the counterfactual
utility 𝑈 𝑖 (0) and waiting list costs 𝜃𝑖 , there are a number of allocations consistent with this
outcome. Thus, my identifying assumptions in the next section are additional restrictions on
the behavior or characteristics of low-income renters eligible for housing assistance—they are
not directly implied by this framework.

1.5

Identification and Estimation

Let the health outcome 𝑌𝑖 be an indicator function for an individual being in good health.
For the self-reported health status (hospitalization outcome), 𝑌𝑖 = 1 if good or better health is
reported (zero nights spent in the hospital are reported), and 𝑌𝑖 = 0 otherwise. The treatment
10 Note

that, even if the total expenditure on consumption other than housing is unchanged (e.g., remains at 70%
of income for the public housing and project-based Section 8 counterfactuals), the choice of 𝑏 can be influenced
by the new level of amenities 𝐴 𝑗 . For example, if a new neighborhood is closer to work, then some spending on
transportation can be reallocated to other uses.
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variable denoted 𝑉𝑖 takes the value of 1 if the individual is in a voucher household, and
the value of zero if she is not. In potential outcomes notation (Rubin, 2005), the potential
health outcome for individual 𝑖 under voucher receipt is denoted 𝑌𝑖 (1), and the potential health
outcome under place-based assistance or unsubsidized renting is denoted 𝑌𝑖 (0). The observed
health outcome (either the self-reported status or no-hospitalizations status) can thus be written
𝑌𝑖 ≡ 𝑉𝑖 · 𝑌𝑖 (1) + (1 − 𝑉𝑖 ) · 𝑌𝑖 (0). My object of interest is the population average treatment effect of
voucher receipt on health status, written as11
ATE(1, 0) = E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] − E [𝑌𝑖 (0)]

(1.1)

ATE(1, 0) = Pr [𝑌𝑖 (1) = 1] − Pr [𝑌𝑖 (0) = 1] ,

(1.2)

or, equivalently,

since the outcome is binary in nature. I will use the expectation form of Equation (1.1) for
notational convenience.
Identification of the ATE is not straightforward due to the fundamental problem of causal
inference: 𝑌𝑖 (1) is observed only for those with 𝑉𝑖 = 1, and 𝑌𝑖 (0) is likewise only observed for
those with 𝑉𝑖 = 0. To see this explicitly, iterate expectations over voucher status for the mean
potential outcome E [𝑌𝑖 (1)]:

E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] = E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 1] + E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 0]

(1.3)

Each of the above terms is identified by the data, apart from E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0], which is a
counterfactual object; a similar expansion of the expectation of 𝑌𝑖 (0) shows the other key
counterfactual object to be E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1].

To make progress, I must therefore consider

assumptions on such counterfactuals.
11 It

may also be of interest to consider the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT); that is, policymakers
could be interested in the effect of voucher receipt specific to those actually observed with a voucher. The same
assumptions used here to partially identify the ATE can also be used to bound the ATT. I return to this in Section
1.6.3 below.

17

One basic assumption from Manski (1989) is to impose that the support of the outcome
variable is bounded. In the present chapter with a binary outcome, this assumption is trivial:
𝑌𝑖 is either equal to 0 or to 1. Despite this triviality, the assumption of bounded support
for the outcome allows for the conclusion that the counterfactual conditional expectation

E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] lies between 0 and 1. Returning to the iterated expectations expansion in
Equation (1.3), I can write “worst-case” bounds12 on E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] (Manski, 1989):

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 1]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] ≤

(1.4)

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 1] + Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 0] ,
where I have made use of the fact that E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] is identified by E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] in the data.
Similarly, E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] can be bounded with

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 0]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] ≤

(1.5)

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 0] + Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 1]
The worst-case lower bound on the ATE is then obtained by subtracting the upper bound on

E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] in (1.5) from the lower bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] in (1.4). The worst-case upper bound is equal
to the upper bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] minus the lower bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (0)]. Note that, in applications,
these worst-case bounds are not able to identify the sign of the ATE and are also generally wide—
with a binary treatment and a binary outcome, the width of the identified set will always be
equal to 1. Despite this, the worst-case bounds do give the possibility of ruling out moderateto-large magnitudes of the treatment effect in one direction. Nevertheless, assumptions beyond
bounded support of the outcome are necessary to draw more meaningful conclusions on the
causal effect of housing vouchers on health.
12 Some

of the expressions for the bounds are greatly simplified due to the setting of a binary treatment variable
and a binary outcome. For a more general treatment with multiple treatment levels and continuous outcomes, see
the original Manski and Pepper (2000) discussion, as well as the third chapter of this dissertation.
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1.5.1

Assumptions

I turn to three key assumptions—monotone treatment selection (MTS), a monotone instrumental
variable (MIV), and monotone treatment response (MTR)—originally proposed by Manski and
Pepper (2000) to aid in tightening the worst-case bounds on the ATE. Overall, these are fairly
mild assumptions that I argue are plausible in the present context. They lead to nonparametric
bounds on the effect of interest.
Monotone Treatment Selection
The first assumption captures the idea that households receiving vouchers (and thus the
individuals within them) are negatively selected into the voucher program based on potential
health outcomes. In other words, I assume that, on average, individuals observed in voucher
households have weakly poorer potential health outcomes in any state of the world versus
individuals observed in public housing, project-based Section 8, LIHTC, or unsubsidized units.
This is stated formally in Assumption 1.5.1, which follows Manski and Pepper (2000).
Assumption 1.5.1 (Monotone Treatment Selection). Suppose that

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0]
for each treatment status 𝑣 ∈ 𝒱 = {0, 1}.
Notice that this inequality holds for potential outcomes under both treatment arms. The
probability of good health under voucher receipt for those observed in a voucher household is no
greater than the same probability for those observed in a non-voucher household. At the same
time, those observed with a voucher also have a weakly lower probability of good health under
no voucher receipt than those observed without a voucher. Thus, MTS is an assumption about the
inherent characteristics of the individuals observed in voucher and non-voucher households
rather than an assumption about the impact of vouchers.
In this chapter, I argue that the limited supply of housing vouchers which leads to lengthy
waiting lists induces self-selection by low-income renters into voucher receipt, as summarized in
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the Roy model of the previous section. Note here that the Roy selection is based on overall utility
benefit, while MTS is an assumption specific to potential health outcomes. In principle, then, the
self-selection at play is consistent with either negative or positive MTS. However, if characteristics
associated with larger potential gains from receiving a voucher (e.g., low educational attainment,
food insecurity) are also correlated with poor health, then a negative MTS assumption would
hold: on average, those observed with a voucher would have had weakly worse health outcomes,
regardless of realized voucher status.
A primary concern with this is that the ordeal (Black et al., 2003) of the voucher waiting list
is particularly costly for individuals who have these same characteristics associated with worse
health. With many wait times spanning multiple years, high-cost types having the poorest
potential health outcomes may never make it to the top of the waiting list. In less extreme cases,
individuals with high waiting costs and relatively poor potential health outcomes may have
difficulty verifying their eligibility when they reach the top of the list and subsequently lose out
on the voucher. Each of these scenarios would leave the possibility of some positive selection
into HCV based on health.
It may indeed be true that this type of positive selection is present among some subset of
my population of interest. This, however, need not contradict non-positive MTS. The key point
here is that MTS is a mean-level assumption that needs only to hold for the expected potential
health outcomes conditional on voucher status. Thus, it is permissible that the sample is a mix
of positively- and negatively-selected individuals, as long as the size of the positively-selected
subset or the magnitude of the positive selection is sufficiently small, such that the overall
direction of selection remains non-positive.
To make this more precise, I iterate expectations over the Roy model waiting costs 𝜃𝑖 ∈
{𝜃𝐿 , 𝜃𝐻 } on the terms from Assumption 1.5.1 above. This yields

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] = E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐻 ] · Pr [𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐻 ]
+ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ] · Pr [𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ]
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(1.6)

and

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] = E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐻 ] · Pr [𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐻 ]
+ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ] · Pr [𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ]

(1.7)

The sign of the difference between Equation (1.6) and Equation (1.7) is the sign for the selection
present; for non-positive MTS this difference must be non-positive. Carrying out this subtraction
and grouping terms by the waiting cost type probabilities, I obtain



Pr [𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐻 ] · E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐻 ] − E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐻 ]






+ Pr [𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ] · E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ] − E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ] .

(1.8)

The overall selection is therefore a weighted average of the selection specific to the high-cost and
low-cost waiting types. I assume that the bottom term in parentheses—the selection term for
the subset with low waiting list costs—is weakly negative. This reflects that, when waiting costs
are more negligible, individuals with poorer potential health outcomes (who have a stronger
incentive to improve their housing and join a waiting list) are able to reach the top of the waiting
lists and receive a housing voucher.
The selection term for those with a high waiting list cost, on the other hand, is the source
of the potential concern for the MTS assumption. Here, one could argue that individuals who
have a high waiting cost and yet still receive a voucher have better potential health outcomes
on average, versus those receiving place-based assistance or renting without a subsidy. If the
magnitude of either this selection term or the proportion of high-cost types is large enough,
then this may dominate the negative selection among low-cost types.
To get a sense of what this means for my sample, consider the following exercise. First,
while the waiting costs 𝜃𝐿 and 𝜃𝐻 are unobservable characteristics, suppose that I can proxy
the high waiting cost type with an indicator for both fewer than 12 years of education and low
food security. In my sample, this produces a rough estimate of 0.06 for Pr [𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐻 ]. Second, I
assume the largest possible magnitude for the positive selection among high-cost types: every
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individual observed to have a voucher has 𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) = 1 (good health, regardless of voucher status),
and every individual observed without one has 𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) = 0 (less than good health, regardless of
voucher status). In this worst case for the MTS assumption, the high-cost selection term is equal
to 1.
Substituting the above parameters into expression (1.8), I find that MTS would hold in the
case that





0.06 · 1 + 0.94 · E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ] − E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ] ≤ 0 ,
or





E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ] − E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0, 𝜃𝑖 = 𝜃𝐿 ] ≤ −0.06

This says that, even with the strongest possible positive selection in the subset of individuals with
high waiting list costs, the MTS assumption requires only a mild degree of negative selection
among those with low waiting list costs. While my proxy for waiting-cost type is clearly far from
perfect, this exercise is suggestive that my assumption is robust to this concern about possible
positive selection.
The fact that MTS is an assumption about inherent characteristics of individuals in the sample
suggests an additional means of assessing its plausibility.13 If those with poorer potential
health outcomes are selected into the voucher program, then it should be the case that voucher
recipients have other average characteristics which are also linked to worse health. Returning
to Table 1.2, compare the average values in the SIPP sample for a set of baseline characteristics
between voucher recipients and non-recipients. Individuals in households with a voucher are
more likely to be female, Black, and are on average older than those in households without a
voucher. They also have slightly less schooling (and are on the opposite sides of high school
graduation), are less likely to have been employed for the entire previous month, and are less
likely to be food secure; each of these three are statistically significant at the 1% level.
13 This

type of exercise has been used elsewhere in the empirical partial identification literature to assess similar
monotonicity assumptions (Flores and Flores-Lagunes, 2010, 2013; Germinario et al., 2021b).
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The presence of negative selection is also hinted at by other findings in the empirical literature
on housing vouchers. Zhang (2021) also uses SIPP data to study the voucher program and
reports several “stylized facts” that voucher holders have lower average employment and
earnings, a lower marriage rate, and a higher divorce rate. While these are only suggestive
comparisons for assessing MTS—receiving a voucher may influence labor supply decisions, for
example—the differences are consistent with poorer underlying health of voucher recipients.
Elsewhere, Schwartz et al. (2020) argue in the context of studying student performance of
children in voucher households that waiting lists may induce negative selection on educational
outcomes, such that cross-sectional comparisons between those with and without vouchers
would yield spurious negative relationships, as I find in my SIPP sample for health outcomes.
Under MTS, the worst-case bounds on the mean potential outcomes are tightened in the
following way. Returning to the counterfactual conditional expectations E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] and

E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] from expansions as in Equation (1.3), MTS implies
E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] ≤ 1
and
0 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] .
The first inequality bounds the counterfactual conditional expectation for those observed
without a voucher. The upper bound continues to reflect that, because the health outcome is
binary, this mean cannot exceed one. The lower bound uses the content of MTS: health outcomes
under a voucher would be weakly better on average for those observed in place-based assistance
or renting without a subsidy. The second inequality is similar: the counterfactual conditional
expectation for those observed with a voucher cannot be less than zero, and negative MTS
entails that, on average, health outcomes in the absence of a voucher would be no better for
observed voucher holders than for non-voucher holders. Plugging these two inequalities into
the iterated expectations expansions allows for bounds on the mean potential outcomes E [𝑌𝑖 (1)]
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and E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] due to Manski and Pepper (2000):

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] ≤

(1.9)

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 1] + Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 0] ,
and

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 0]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] ≤

(1.10)

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] ,
where I have again used the result that E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] and E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] are identified by
the data. The identified set for the ATE is obtained by subtracting the upper bound in (1.10)
from the lower bound in (1.9) for its lower bound, and by taking the difference between the
upper bound in (1.9) and the lower bound in (1.10) for the upper bound. In this setting with
a binary treatment and outcome, the lower bound is equal to the observed difference in mean
health status between voucher holders and those without a housing voucher. The upper bound
remains identical to that of the worst-case bounds. Thus, the identifying power of MTS comes
from narrowing the ATE bounds from below.
Monotone Instrumental Variable
The second assumption is that an individual’s self-report of total personal income serves as a
valid monotone instrumental variable (MIV), denoted 𝑍 𝑖 . Despite the similarity in name, using
total personal income as an MIV relies on a weaker assumption than if it were to be used as a
traditional instrument. This comes with the advantage that it is plausible in a wider array of
situations. Following Manski and Pepper (2000), I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1.5.2 (Monotone Instrumental Variable). For any two values 𝑧1 and 𝑧 2 of total personal
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income 𝑍 𝑖 such that 𝑧1 ≥ 𝑧2 , it is the case that

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑍 𝑖 = 𝑧1 ] ≥ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) | 𝑍 𝑖 = 𝑧2 ]
for each treatment status 𝑣 ∈ 𝒱 = {0, 1}.
It is worth expanding further upon how Assumption 1.5.2 differs from the more familiar IV
assumptions. First are the objects identified when the assumptions hold. With a valid IV, this
is a local average treatment effect (LATE) for a subpopulation of “compliers” whose treatment
statuses are affected by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). For example, if I were to
possess a valid IV for housing voucher receipt (say, something that influences eligibility for
households) and effects are heterogeneous, then I would point identify an average causal effect
for those households impacted by the instrument. With a valid MIV, on the other hand, (partial)
identification of the ATE for the full population of interest is obtained. For this reason, an MIV
may allow conclusions of wider policy relevance in many cases.
Another important distinction lies in the content of the assumptions themselves. In the LATE
framework of Imbens and Angrist (1994), a valid instrument relies heavily on an exclusion
restriction, which would replace the weak inequality in the MIV assumption with a strict
equality. This conditional mean independence would yield the intuition that an IV affects the
outcome only through its effect on the treatment.
A valid MIV, on the other hand, is not required to satisfy anything beyond Assumption 1.5.2:
on average, a higher self-reported income is associated with weakly better potential health
outcomes, regardless of voucher status. Note that no restrictions are placed on the relationship
between the MIV and the treatment variable. This means that total personal income is allowed
to be endogenous with respect to voucher status, or to have a non-monotonic impact on voucher
status.
Although the MIV assumption is considerably weaker than the IV assumptions, it is still a
substantive statement about potential outcomes that cannot be tested in the data. It is therefore
crucial to carefully assess the plausibility of a candidate MIV in the context of its application.
Here, it is useful to note that, in economic terms, the assumed relationship between potential
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health outcomes and self-reported total personal income would be implied by the normality
of health as a good for the low-income population I study in this chapter. This condition is
reasonable in light of the Grossman (1972) model of health demand which is consistent with
the framework of Section 1.4. Since an increase in total personal income increases full income
(unearned income plus the market value of an individual’s leisure endowment), the normality
of health would imply that total personal income is a valid MIV. Note, however, that a restriction
of health as a normal good is stronger than Assumption 1.5.2, and is therefore sufficient, but
not necessary, for potential health outcomes to have a non-negative association with reported
total personal income. Indeed, a large empirical literature finds a positive health gradient with
respect to income, and supports the MIV assumption even if health may not be a normal good in
the proper sense (Gundersen and Kreider, 2009; Kreider et al., 2012). For example, Deaton (2002)
and Chetty et al. (2016) document an increasing relationship between life expectancy and income,
particularly for those with incomes towards the bottom of the distribution. Case et al. (2002)
additionally demonstrate that this gradient likely originates from childhood and accumulates
over the life cycle. These results offer strong evidence in favor on the MIV assumption in this
context.
The MIV bounds on the ATE are obtained in the following way. First, and without loss
of generality,14 discretize the values of (continuous) total personal income into 𝐿 bins denoted
ℬ1 , . . . , ℬ𝐿 . These are arranged such that 𝑧 ∈ ℬ1 and 𝑧 ′ ∈ ℬ2 implies that 𝑧 < 𝑧 ′. Using these
bins, iterate expecations on the mean potential outcomes to write

E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] =

𝐿
Õ

E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] · Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] ,

(1.11)

ℓ =1

with a similar expansion for E [𝑌𝑖 (0)]. The probability Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] is identified by the data,
while I am able to partially identify the conditional expectations E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] using any of
the bounds discussed above. In this chapter, I first focus on an MIV combined with the MTS
14 Manski

and Pepper (2000) derive the MIV bounds by iterating expectations over each point in the support of
the MIV. My exposition is equivalent by setting 𝐿 to the cardinality of the support set (if it is finite) or letting 𝐿 → ∞
(if the support is not finite). I use the terminology of bins because I believe it allows for clearer intuition in this case.
Additionally, feasible estimation of the MIV bounds as described in the next subsection requires discretization of
a continuous MIV.

26

assumption, and so I apply the MTS bounds within each bin. For ease of notation, I will write
the MTS lower bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] (or E [𝑌𝑖 (0)]) in bin ℓ as

LBℓmts,1



or

LBℓmts,0



, and likewise for

the upper bound.
The resulting MIV+MTS bounds are able to further narrow the identified set. To see this,
note that the MIV assumption implies that E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] weakly increases from bin 1 to
bin 𝐿. At the same time, it also implies that the lower bound on this conditional mean must be
non-decreasing over the bins, and that its upper bound must be non-increasing when moving
from bin 𝐿 to bin 1. Thus, the bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] can be written:

n

ℓ

o

n

¯

o

sup LB¯mts,1 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] ≤ inf UBℓmts,1 ,
ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

ℓ ≤ℓ
¯

(1.12)

and likewise for E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ].
Plugging these bounds into Equation (11) yields the MIV+MTS bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] (Manski
and Pepper, 2000):
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
sup LB¯mts,1
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] ≤
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

inf

ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

¯
UBℓmts,1



(1.13)

· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] .

Bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] are written in a similar fashion. The MIV+MTS bounds are then constructed
via the now-familiar order of subtraction between the two sets of bounds. Notice how the MIV
can add identifying power relative the the MTS assumption alone. The lower bound on the ATE
is constructed by taking a weighted average of the largest MTS lower bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] across
the 𝐿 bins and subtracting a weighted average of the smallest MTS upper bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (0)]
over the 𝐿 bins. The upper bound on the ATE subtracts a weighted average of the greatest lower
bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] from a weighted average of the least upper bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (1)]. In this way,
the non-negative relationship between the MIV and the mean potential outcomes implies that
the MIV+MTS lower bound is weakly greater than the MTS lower bound on the ATE and that
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the MIV+MTS upper bound is weakly less than the MTS upper bound.
Monotone Treatment Response
The final assumption is made directly on how an individual’s health responds to receiving a
housing voucher. The idea here is that potential health outcomes under voucher receipt are no
worse than potential health outcomes without a voucher. Recalling that 𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) = 1 denotes good
or better health, I assume (Manski and Pepper, 2000):
Assumption 1.5.3 (Monotone Treatment Response). Suppose that
𝑌𝑖 (1) ≥ 𝑌𝑖 (0)
for all individuals 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁.
Contrary to MTS and the MIV assumption, note that MTR is assumed to hold at the individual
level, rather than at the mean. That is, Assumption 1.5.3 requires that no individual in a
voucher household would have strictly better health in the counterfactual world where she is
receiving place-based rental assistance or renting without a subsidy, and that no individual
receiving place-based assistance or renting unsubsidized would have strictly worse health in
the counterfactual where she is in a voucher household. This is the strongest assumption I
make, and its plausibility is not obvious a priori.
The two mechanisms through which voucher receipt can impact health—indirectly by
relaxing the budget constraint and directly by influencing the housing choice—are at the heart
of the MTR assumption. The first follows from the discussion of non-housing expenditures in
Section 1.4. There, households who would have counterfactually been in LIHTC or unsubsidized
units are able to now allocate 70% of income towards the non-housing consumption 𝑏. If the
new bundle also includes more goods from the subset 𝑏˜ which are conducive to health, then the
voucher-induced income effect will lead the consumer to devote more resources to goods which
promote better health (Chen, Flores, and Flores-Lagunes, 2018).15 The second mechanism is
15 A

potential issue here is that voucher receipt likely reduces labor supply (Jacob et al., 2015). This is because
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precisely the Moving to Opportunity idea: the voucher may give recipients access to higher
quality housing or higher quality neighborhoods. This in turn can promote better health when
this quality represents improvements with respect to the WHO housing guidelines.
There are two primary concerns for this direct “housing choice effect” of voucher receipt.
First, it might be the case that landlords only accept vouchers at properties with poor physical
characteristics and/or properties located in low-amenity neighborhoods. Rosen (2020) describes
this type of steering in her case study of HCV in Baltimore. If such lower-quality housing leads
to worse health for some voucher holders (say, for example, an apartment building accepting
vouchers is in a neighborhood with a high crime rate or with low air quality), then this could
represent a violation of MTR.16
While the above could be true of the overall supply of housing relative to the supply available
to voucher holders, it does not necessarily imply a failure of the assumption. Recall that the
sample I use from the SIPP consists of individuals living in households with an income-topoverty ratio less than 1 and for which the counterfactual housing of voucher holders consists
of public housing, project-based Section 8, LIHTC units, or unsubsidized units offered to such
low-income populations. A scenario in which the housing options available upon receiving a
voucher are strictly worse than in the counterfactual without one seems unlikely in a population
at these income levels. Indeed, the very motivation for tenant-based assistance itself (as well as
the Moving to Opportunity experiment) was that vouchers offer an improved choice set relative
to public housing. Additionally, the requirement that a potential unit pass an inspection by the
PHA before a voucher can be used gives at least a nominal floor on the quality.
This question of the relative housing quality for voucher holders has also been well-studied
in the empirical literature. Many results offer suggestive evidence that the housing choices
available to voucher holders are no worse on average than for non-voucher holders. For example,
(1) the same income effect increases the demand for leisure, and (2) the 30% of income allocated to rent can be
understood as a tax on earnings, generating also a substitution effect into more leisure. However, for my purposes,
this is not a threat to MTR so long as the reduction in labor supply does not result in a post-transfer income below
that which would have been earned in the absence of the voucher (leaving the recipient only able to afford bundles
which harm health). I find such a scenario unlikely.
16 Note that, at this point, I am considering “steering” as a landlord observes a voucher holder and perceives it
as a signal for expected profitability from offering a lease. Given the usual meaning of steering based on race, I am
cognizant of the fact that what I discuss here may be compounded for Black voucher holders. I estimate separate
bounds by race below.
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Lens et al. (2011) use administrative HUD data to study census tracts across 91 large US cities
over the period 1999-2001 and find that voucher households were 6.4 and 6.9 percentage points
less likely to live in a high-crime neighborhood than, respectively, public housing tenants and
residents of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit units (each statistically significant at the 1% level).
If other neighborhood amenities are “bundled” with lower crime, then this could be indicative
that voucher holders also experience other neighborhood characteristics associated with better
health. As one example, Bondy et al. (2018) find a positive link between air pollution and crime
in London over 2004-2005. It thus appears reasonable that MTR is not violated through the
mechanism of voucher holders being restricted to low-quality neighborhoods. Additionally,
the finding by Schwartz et al. (2020) that voucher holders in New York City are less likely to
live in a building with hazardous code violations (where the counterfactual was housing in
unsubsidized private units) potentially suggests that MTR can also be justified on the margin
of physical housing characteristics.
Estimates from the spatial equilibrium model of Leung et al. (2012) mentioned in Section 1.2
provide similar evidence. With two household types (skilled/high-income and unskilled/lowincome) and two neighborhoods, their model predicts higher average lot sizes and higher
quality neighborhoods (measured by school quality)17 for voucher households relative to public
housing participants. To the extent that more living space is conducive to better health outcomes
(e.g., less crowding in the home [Solari and Mare, 2012]), their result that voucher holders end
up with higher average lot sizes versus public housing tenants would be consistent with the
MTR assumption.
A second potential concern for the housing choice effect is related to the idea that the choice
of housing for voucher recipients is a bundle of both physical structure quality (or housing
services) and neighborhood amenities. For example, a voucher recipient with children may
prefer to locate in a lower-quality structure that, at the same time, allows access to a high quality
school district.18 In this sense, some voucher holders may (perhaps indirectly) choose to trade
17 Recall

from Section 1.2 that empirical evidence on this particular margin of school quality from Horn, Ellen,
and Schwartz (2014) is somewhat mixed.
18 I thank Amy Ellen Schwartz for suggesting further consideration of this issue.
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off some health relative to their no-voucher counterfactual.
This simultaneous choice of structure quality and neighborhood characteristics is captured
by the housing choice model adapted into the conceptual framework of Section 1.4. Geyer (2017)
estimates the original model using administrative data from the Housing Authority of the City of
Pittsburgh for voucher recipients in 2006. Relevant to the current paper, the estimation recovers
three cross-elasticities for neighborhood amenities and the demand for housing services. For
school quality (measured by average standardized test scores for eighth graders) and average
public transit commute times, the elasticities are estimated at 0.11 and 0.03, respectively. These
indicate that both amenities are complementary goods with respect to housing services: with the
decrease in the relative price of housing services induced by the voucher, recipient households
consume more of both the amenities and housing services.19 This would plausibly imply that
MTR is not violated through voucher holders trading off health by choosing a lower-quality
structure in favor of neighborhood amenities.
Like with MTS, the bounds on the treatment effect of interest under the MTR assumption are
tightened relative to the worst-case bounds. First note that the restriction of 𝑌𝑖 (1) ≥ 𝑌𝑖 (0) implies
that E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 𝑣] ≥ E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 𝑣] for any 𝑣; that is, MTR also holds in expectation,
conditional on either voucher status. This is again useful with respect to the unobservable
conditional means E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] and E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1]. With MTR, I can conclude that:

E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] ≤ 1
and
0 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] .
Using once more the iterated expecations expansion of Equation (1.3), the mean potential
19 The third amenity considered is the proportion of neighborhood area designated as public parks.

The estimated
cross-elasticity is -0.001, suggesting that access to parks and housing services are slight substitutes. However, since
the elasticity is small in magnitude and parks may be conducive to better health, I do not view this as a contradiction
of my “housing choice effect” for MTR.
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outcomes can be set identified as (Manski, 1997; Manski and Pepper, 2000):

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 1] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 0]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] ≤

(1.14)

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 1] + Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 0] ,
and

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 0]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] ≤

(1.15)

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 0] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] · Pr [𝑉𝑖 = 1] .
The bounds on the ATE are computed via the same subtractions as in the previous subsection.
In the binary treatment setting, it can be plainly seen that the lower bound on the ATE is equal
to zero, as both the lower bound in (1.14) and the upper bound in (1.15) are equivalent to the
observed mean of the outcome. This is consistent with the MTR assumption, which implies

E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] ≥ E [𝑌𝑖 (0)], and thus that the average effect is non-negative. The MTR upper bound
remains the same as both the worst-case and MTS upper bounds.
In many empirical applications (e.g., Manski and Pepper, 2000; Gundersen and Kreider,
2009; De Haan, 2011; Germinario et al., 2021a,b), the bounds on the ATE are narrowed further
by imposing MTS and MTR simultaneously to obtain MTS+MTR bounds. The combination,
however, only adds identifying power when the two assumptions are in the same direction (i.e.,
when positive MTS and positive MTR or negative MTS and negative MTR are assumed). In
the present application, I assume (weakly) opposite directions for MTS and MTR, and so the
MTS+MTR bounds can be no narrower than the tighter of the MTS and MTR bounds separately.
To be more precise, consider first the upper bound when MTS and MTR are imposed together.
As noted above, the MTS and MTR upper bounds on the ATE are identical, and so this common
value is also the MTS+MTR upper bound. For the lower bound, it was previously seen that the
MTS lower bound is equal to the observed difference in mean health status between voucher
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recipients and non-recipients, while the MTR lower bound is equal to zero. The greatest lower
bound when combining these is therefore the maximum of the MTS and MTR lower bounds. If
the MTS lower bound is larger, then the MTS+MTR bounds are identical to the MTS bounds; if
the MTR bound (zero) is larger, then the MTS+MTR bounds are equivalent to the MTR bounds.
Since this is an empirical question, I still report results for MTS+MTR as a separate assumption
below.
Finally, all three assumptions can be imposed simultaneously to identify MIV+MTS+MTR
bounds on the ATE. The identification is identical to the discussion above surrounding inequalities
(1.12) and (1.13), with the only difference being that the MTS+MTR bounds are applied within
the MIV bins in this case.
The sharpest possible identified set under MIV+MTS+MTR is obtained with one final step.
For this, observe that the MTR assumption also applies inside each bin of the MIV (McCarthy
et al., 2015), or that E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] ≥ E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ], for each ℓ . This yields a useful
restriction that the MTS+MTR lower bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (1)] in bin ℓ cannot be less than MTS+MTR
upper bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] in that same bin.

1.5.2

Estimation and Inference Procedure

The worst-case, MTS, MTR, and MTS+MTR bounds all are estimated by replacing the expectations
and probabilities with their sample counterparts.20 I also compute 95% Imbens and Manski
(2004) confidence intervals for the ATE under each assumption.
To operationalize the MIV+MTS+MTR bounds as in the inequality of (1.13), the supremum
and infimum operators are replaced by maxima and minima, respectively. I also discretize total
personal income into 𝐿 = 5 bins, where the cutoffs to define the bins are based on the quintiles
of its empirical distribution. This choice of the number of bins is meant to balance two sources
of bias. Choosing too few bins does not utilize the identifying power of the MIV discussed at
the end of Section 1.5.1 above. Using a larger number of bins can therefore reduce bias. At the
same time, increasing the number of bins exponentially increases the number of objects that
20 All

estimation and inference described in this subsection is implemented in Stata using the package mpclr by
Germinario et al. (2021).
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must be estimated (see Appendix 1.A). Simulation evidence reported in Germinario, Flores, and
Flores-Lagunes (2021) suggests 5 bins as a reasonable choice: compared to estimates using 2
bins, the lower bound using 5 bins was 124% more likely to capture the true lower bound and
the upper bound was 29% more likely to capture the true upper bound.
Regardless of the choice for the number of bins, implementing the MIV+MTS+MTR estimators
for the bounds in (1.13) introduces two complications. First, these are an instance of intersection
bounds (due to the maximum and minimum operators), and it is well-documented that such
bounds suffer from bias in finite samples (Manski and Pepper, 2000; Chernozhukov et al., 2013;
Flores and Flores-Lagunes, 2013; Flores and Chen, 2018). This appears as an upward bias for the
lower bound and a downward bias in the upper bound. Left uncorrected, this results in bounds
which are narrower than the true identified set, which can suggest misleading conclusions
on treatment effects. Compounding the problem, Hirano and Porter (2012) demonstrate that
there are no locally asymptotically unbiased estimators when the parameters contain nondifferentiable functionals of the data (such as a maximum or minimum). The second issue is
that confidence intervals for the ATE with the desired coverage cannot be obtained with the
standard bootstrap.
I address both issues by applying the Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013) procedure
(hereafter, CLR) to obtain bias-corrected estimates of the MIV+MTS and MIV+MTS+MTR
bounds and valid confidence intervals for the ATE under those combined assumptions. This
allows for estimates of the upper and lower bounds on the ATE which satisfy a half-median
unbiasedness property. This means that the estimate of the lower bound is below the true lower
bound with a probability of at least 0.5, and the estimate of the upper bound exceeds the true
upper bound with a probability of 0.5 or above. In light of the Hirano and Porter (2012) result,
this is a desirable property for the estimates. The simulation evidence in Germinario, Flores,
and Flores-Lagunes (2021) also demonstrates that substantial bias can occur without the CLR
correction. In estimates using 5 bins for the MIV, the CLR-corrected lower bound was below
the true lower bound in 48% of the simulations; the CLR-corrected upper bound was above
the true upper bound in 97% of the simulations. Without the correction, these were 8.4% and
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72.4%, respectively. Further details on my implementation of the CLR procedure are contained
in Appendix 1.A.

1.6

Results

1.6.1

Main Results for Self-Reported Health

Estimation results for the effect of receiving a housing voucher on the self-reported health status
of individuals within the household are summarized in Table 1.3. The first column contains
the naïve OLS result from regressing health status on the indicator for voucher receipt; under
negative MTS, this coefficient is a downward-biased (i.e., more negative) estimate of the ATE.
This indicates the large gap in health status between those with and without a housing voucher,
even in my sample focused on those in households with an income-to-poverty ratio less than
1. That individuals in a household without a voucher are 20.9 percentage points more likely
to report good or better health is likely due to the negative selection into the voucher program
which I assume is present in results making use of MTS.
Table 1.3: Bounds on the ATE for Self-Reported Health: Total Personal Income as MIV, 5 Bins
(1)
OLS
ATE(1, 0)

−0.209★★★
(0.033)

(2)
Worst-Case

(3)
MTS

(4)
MIV+MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

[0.000 , 0.247]

[0.048 , 0.213]

(-0.767 , 0.260) (-0.266 , 0.261) (-0.195 , 0.239) (0.000 , 0.260) (0.000 , 0.261)

(0.023 , 0.238)

[-0.753 , 0.247] [-0.210 , 0.247] [-0.092 , 0.213] [0.000 , 0.247]

[·] denotes estimated bounds in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, or half-median unbiased MIV bounds in Columns 4 and 7. (·) denotes the standard error in
Column 1, or 95% CLR confidence intervals on the ATE in Columns 2-7. Bounds are estimated using 3529 observations. The variance-covariance
matrix in the CLR first step is based on 240 BRR replications, where the replicate weights provided by SIPP are used.

Column 2 reports the worst-case bounds on the ATE, where I make use only of the fact that
the outcome is binary. As is typical, these bounds are not particularly informative of the sign of
the treatment effect. While the lower bound of a 75.3 percentage point decline in the probability
of good or better health is not feasible relative to the baseline for voucher holders, the upper
bound only allows for up to a 24.7 percentage point increase in the same probability.
It is interesting that this worst-case upper bound—where, again, I have not yet imposed any
substantive assumptions—excludes the 26.4 percentage point ATT estimated by Katz et al. (2001)
for MTO in Boston, and this point estimate also narrowly lies outside the 95% confidence interval
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I construct for the ATE. This may suggest three things. First, since the MTO experiment had
only one-sided non-compliance (no members of the control group could receive the treatment,
but not all those assigned to the voucher group accepted one), the estimated ATT is a LATE for
those who complied with treatment assignment. The effect for these compliers may be larger
than the effect for the population at large. Second, Katz et al. (2001) analyze only data from
Boston, and it may be the case that vouchers have a greater effect on health in that city than
at the national level. Finally, it is possible that the exclusion restriction used to identify the
LATE—treatment assignment impacts health only through its effect on voucher uptake—was
violated in the MTO experiment.21 In this case, an estimate outside of the worst-case bounds
could also reflect upward bias in the estimate of the LATE.
Turning to the more substantive assumptions, the estimated bounds from imposing nonpositive MTS are reported in Column 3. These bounds account for negative selection into
voucher receipt, and are considerably tightened from below. Here, I am able to rule out any
negative health effect from receiving a voucher beyond 21.0 percentage points. In other words,
any detrimental impact is at worst equal to the observed difference in the probability of good
health across voucher statuses. The MTS upper bound continues to exclude any positive effect
of housing voucher receipt beyond 24.7 percentage points, or a 76% percent increase using the
baseline probability of good health observed for voucher holders.
In Column 4 are results combining the total personal income MIV with MTS. The MIV+MTS
lower bound is increased relative to MTS alone, limiting any negative effect to 9.2 percentage
points. The bounds are also tightened from above, with the upper bound excluding a positive
effect larger than 21.3 percentage points.
The estimates of the MTR and combined MTS+MTR bounds in Columns 5 and 6 are identical,
due to the impact of the MTR assumption. In both cases, MTR rules out any negative effect of
the vouchers on health, while the upper bounds continue to be those of the worst-case upper
bounds, excluding a positive effect on the likelihood of good or better health greater than 24.7
21 This is similar to a point Finkelstein et al. (2012) and Chen, Flores, and Flores-Lagunes (2018) make in the context

of the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: learning about the housing voucher program through treatment
assignment may increase awareness of other public assistance programs, which in turn can affect health, even if
the voucher is not ultimately used.
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percentage points.
My preferred results using the total personal income MIV along with both MTS and MTR
are presented in Column 7, where I have used 5 bins in the estimation of the bounds. These
MIV+MTS+MTR bounds provide evidence that the causal effect of housing vouchers on the selfreported health of those in recipient households is positive and statistically significant. Under
the relatively weak assumptions considered in this paper, I am able to conclude that receiving
a housing voucher increases the likelihood of reporting good or better health by at least 4.8
percentage points, and by no more than 21.3 percentage points. With the observed proportion
of those in voucher households reporting good or better health equal to 57.1, this lower bound
implies that these individuals are at least 9.2% more likely to report good health than they would
have been in the absence of the voucher. The upper bound suggests that voucher holders are at
most 59.5% more likely to report good health than they would have been without the voucher.
With the tightened upper bound under MIV+MTS+MTR, the 26.4 percentage point LATE
estimated using the Boston MTO data is further outside of my identified set for the population
ATE. This reinforces the idea above that the targeted population in the experiment differs
somewhat from the national-level population of renters with family income-to-poverty ratios
less than 1 that I study in this chapter. It is comforting for my analysis, however, that the range
of values I identify for the causal effect (ATE) of housing vouchers on self-reported health is of
a magnitude similar to a treatment effect (ATT/LATE) identified under random assignment.
Subgroup Analyses
Next, I consider the same assumptions for demographic subgroups as for the overall sample.
Though comparisons of partially-identified treatment effects are difficult across subgroups of
sex or racial/ethnic identity because bounds often overlap, there are a few potentially interesting
findings.
The two panels of Table 1.4 describe the main objects of interest for the subsamples by sex
as self-reported in the SIPP. For the female subgroup, 75% report good or better health, while
78.5% do so in the male subgroup. The proportion of females in voucher households (9.1%) is
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nearly double that of the proportion of males in voucher households (5.7%).
Table 1.4: Observed Probabilities of Good or Better Health and Distribution of Vouchers, by Sex
𝑡

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

𝑡

Female

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

Male

Voucher

0.545
(0.037)

0.091
(0.007)

197
-

Voucher

0.629
(0.059)

0.057
(0.008)

82
-

No Voucher

0.771
(0.010)

0.909
(0.007)

1897
-

No Voucher

0.794
(0.011)

0.943
(0.008)

1353
-

Total

0.750
(0.010)

1.000
-

2094
-

Total

0.785
(0.011)

1.000
-

1435
-

Estimates use the annual SIPP weights for individual-level analysis. Standard errors in parentheses are based on
240 BRR replications with the SIPP replicate weights.

In Table 1.5, I report the estimation results by sex. The top panel consists of estimates for the
subsample of female household residents, and the bottom panel for male residents. Column
1 again reports the difference in means across voucher status. For both the female and male
subgroups, the negative and statistically significant observed health gap remains, with females
in voucher households 22.5 percentage points less likely to report good or better health, and
males 16.5 percentage points less likely to report good health. This difference in the unadjusted
voucher health gap may indicate that the degree of negative selection into the program is
stronger among females. The worst-case bounds in Column 2 are quite similar for female and
male residents, and these also do not much differ from the same bounds for the full sample. As
usual, the worst-case bounds cannot identify the sign of the ATE. However, I am again able to
exclude large negative effects beyond a 74.2 (77.0) percentage point decrease for female (male)
household members, while also ruling out positive effects greater than 25.8 percentage points
(89.9%) for females and greater than 23.0 percentage points (57.6%) among males.
MTS tightens each set of bounds in Column 3, as the assumed negative selection places the
observed differences in means as the lower bound on the ATE. The addition of the total personal
income MIV in Column 4 further increases the lower bound so that I can rule out a negative
effect beyond 10.2 percentage points for females and beyond 10.9 percentage points for males.
The MTR and MTS+MTR bounds in Columns 5 and 6 alternatively tighten the bounds through
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Table 1.5: Bounds on the ATE for Self-Reported Health, by Sex: Total Personal Income as MIV, 5 Bins
(1)
OLS

(2)
Worst-Case

(3)
MTS

(4)
MIV+MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

ATE for Female −0.225★★★

[-0.742 , 0.258] [-0.225 , 0.258]

[-0.102 , 0.213] [0.000 , 0.258]

[0.000 , 0.258]

[0.062 , 0.213]

Subsample

(-0.758 , 0.275) (-0.291 , 0.275) (-0.209 , 0.246) (0.000 , 0.275)

(0.000 , 0.275)

(0.028 , 0.245)

[-0.770 , 0.230] [-0.165 , 0.230]

[-0.109 , 0.210] [0.000 , 0.230]

[0.000 , 0.230]

[0.013 , 0.210]

(-0.789 , 0.249) (-0.269 , 0.251) (-0.258 , 0.253) (0.000 , 0.249)

(0.000 , 0.251)

(0.000 , 0.252)

ATE for Male
Subsample

(0.039)
−0.165★★★
(0.059)

[·] denotes estimated bounds in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, or half-median unbiased MIV bounds in Columns 4 and 7. (·) denotes the standard error in
Column 1, or 95% CLR confidence intervals on the ATE in Columns 2-7. Bounds are estimated using 2094 observations for the female subsample and 1435
observations for the male subsample. The variance-covariance matrix in the CLR first step is based on 240 BRR replications, where the replicate weights
provided by SIPP are used.

the implication of a non-negative treatment effect. The upper bounds in Columns 3, 5, and 6
remain identical to the worst-case upper bounds. Adding the total personal income MIV to
MTS+MTR in Column 7 yields bounds which can identify the ATE as strictly positive for both
female and male household members, although the CLR confidence intervals indicate that the
effect can be statistically distinguished from zero at the 5% level only in the female subsample.
For females, I estimate a lower bound that indicates receiving a housing voucher increases the
probability of good or better health by at least 6.2 percentage points, which is somewhat larger
in magnitude compared to the lower bound for the overall population studied in this chapter.
Relative to the baseline likelihood of good health in the female subsample, this represents an
increase of at least 12.8%. The upper bound for females allows for up to a 21.3 percentage
point (59.5%) increase in the probability of reporting good health; this is equal to the upper
bound for the full population, meaning there is a slightly narrower set of possible values for
females than for the overall sample. For males, on the other hand, the estimated lower bound
reflects an increase in the probability of good health by at least 1.3 percentage points (2.1%), but
again a zero effect cannot be statistically ruled out. The greater lower bound for females does
not necessarily imply a greater positive effect, as there is still a substantial amount of overlap
between the two identified sets. However, it can rule out a range of smaller effects (i.e., between
1.3 and 6.2 percentage points) included in the MIV+MTS+MTR bounds for males.
Next, the three panels of Table 1.6 report the conditional probabilities of good self-reported
health and the treatment probabilities by racial/ethnic identity (Black, non-Hispanic; white,
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non-Hispanic; and Hispanic).22 A few things are noteworthy. First is that a substantially
higher proportion of Black individuals live in a voucher household compared to both white
and Hispanic individuals, which is consistent with the overall makeup of voucher recipients.23
Second is that the unadjusted gap in the probability of good health between voucher holders
and non-voucher holders is substantially smaller among Black recipients than among white or
Hispanic recipients. Combined with the results I describe below, I believe this may signal that
the positive effect of vouchers on health is larger for Black recipients. In other words, receiving a
voucher has a large enough effect within this subpopulation that the observed mean difference
in health status has substantially shrunk.
Table 1.6: Observed Probabilities of Good or Better Health and Distribution of Vouchers, by
Racial/Ethnic Identity

𝑡

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

𝑡

Black

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

White

Voucher

0.715
(0.044)

0.154
(0.017)

119
-

Voucher

0.434
(0.058)

0.040
(0.006)

71
-

No Voucher

0.742
(0.018)

0.846
(0.017)

638
-

No Voucher

0.767
(0.013)

0.960
(0.008)

1520
-

Total

0.738
(0.017)

1.000
-

757
-

Total

0.753
(0.013)

1.000
-

1591
-

𝑡

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

Hispanic
Voucher

0.384
(0.065)

0.079
(0.008)

64
-

No Voucher

0.809
(0.015)

0.921
(0.008)

770
-

Total

0.775
(0.016)

1.000
-

834
-

Estimates use the annual SIPP weights for individual-level analysis. Standard errors in parentheses are based on
240 BRR replications with the SIPP replicate weights.

Table 1.7 contains estimated bounds for the ATE of voucher receipt on self-reported health
22 Recall

from Section 3 that I have an insufficient sample size to estimate bounds for the Asian subsample.

23 In terms of the racial/ethnic breakdown of housing voucher recipients in my sample, 45.5% are Black, 23.4% are

white, and 22.8% are Hispanic. Compared to the figures reported by the National Low Income Housing Coalition,
my sample has a nearly identical proportion of Black voucher recipients (45%), a somewhat lower proportion of
white recipients (35%), and a somewhat higher proportion of Hispanic recipients (16%).
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separately for Black, white, and Hispanic household members. First, Column 1 again shows
that the observed mean difference in the likelihood of good or better health for those in voucher
households versus non-voucher households remains negative within each subgroup, although
here it is only statistically significant for white and Hispanic household members.
Table 1.7: Bounds on the ATE for Self-Reported Health, by Race: Total Personal Income as MIV, 5 Bins
(1)
OLS

(2)
Worst-Case

(3)
MTS

(4)
MIV+MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

[0.102 , 0.269]

ATE for Black

−0.027

[-0.672 , 0.328] [-0.027 , 0.328]

[0.000 , 0.328]

[0.000 , 0.328]

[0.117 , 0.269]

Residents

(0.045)

(-0.700 , 0.357) (-0.106 , 0.358) (-0.005 , 0.329) (0.000 , 0.358)

(0.000 , 0.348)

(0.019 , 0.329)

[-0.759 , 0.241] [-0.333 , 0.241]

[0.000 , 0.241]

[0.026 , 0.213]

(0.000 , 0.263)

(0.000 , 0.244)

ATE for White
Residents

−0.333★★★
(0.060)

[-0.234 , 0.213] [0.000 , 0.241]

(-0.780 , 0.262) (-0.436 , 0.263) (-0.439 , 0.246)

ATE for Hispanic −0.424★★★

[-0.793 , 0.207] [-0.425 , 0.207]

Residents

(-0.819 , 0.232) (-0.541 , 0.233) (-0.560 , 0.192)

(0.068)

(0.000 , 0.263)

[-0.418 , 0.137] [0.000 , 0.207]
(0.000 , 0.233)

[0.000 , 0.207]

[0.022 , 0.137]

(0.000 , 0.233)

(0.000 , 0.194)

[·] denotes estimated bounds in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, or half-median unbiased MIV bounds in Columns 4 and 7. (·) denotes the standard error in Column
1, or 95% CLR confidence intervals on the ATE in Columns 2-7. Bounds are estimated using 757 observations for the Black subsample, 1591 observations for
the white subsample, and 834 observations for the Hispanic subsample. The variance-covariance matrix in the CLR first step is based on 240 BRR replications,
where the replicate weights provided by SIPP are used.

The worst-case bounds in Column 2 are broadly similar in the white and Hispanic subsamples,
and these are in turn similar to the worst-case bounds for the overall sample. The bounds for
Black residents are shifted rightward (i.e., contain fewer negative possible ATEs) and rule out
a health detriment of more than 67.2 percentage points or a health benefit of more than 32.8
percentage points.
Estimates in Column 3 are narrowed substantially for Black household members under MTS.
By assuming weakly negative selection into the voucher program, I can rule out a negative effect
on the probability of good health beyond 2.7 percentage points. These bounds are narrowed for
the white and Hispanic subgroups as well, albeit to a lesser extent.
Notably, the MIV+MTS bounds in Column 4 are able to exclude zero for Black voucher
holders. That is, even without my strongest assumption of MTR, I estimate that the probability
of good health is increased by at least 10.2 percentage points (16.6%) for this subpopulation. I
cannot, however, conclude that the effect is statistically significant at the 5%, as the 95% CLR
confidence interval includes zero. However, the lower bound on the 90% confidence interval
(not reported in the table) is equal to 0.014, meaning that the ATE is statistically significant at
the 10% level.
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The full MIV+MTS+MTR set of assumptions reveals potentially interesting results in Column
7. First, the identified sets for each group are estimated to exclude zero, meaning that, under the
assumptions, vouchers have a positive effect on health status across all races in the sample
(though the effect is not statistically significant at the 5% level for the white or Hispanic
subgroups). The second item of note is that the lower bound for Black household members at
11.7 percentage points is more than double the magnitude of the lower bound in the overall
sample, and represents at least a 19.6% relative increase in the probability of good health for
this subpopulation. As with the results by sex, the larger lower bound does not definitively
mean that the ATE for Black voucher holders is larger than for white or Hispanic voucher
holders. However, the extent of overlap between the identified sets is lower for these results
by racial/ethnic identity. The bounds for Black and white household members share only the
values between an 11.7 and a 21.3 percentage point increase; for Black and Hispanic household
members, the bounds overlap only for increases of 11.7 to 13.7 percentage points.

1.6.2

Results for Hospitalization

I now turn to nights spent in the hospital during the previous year as a secondary, more objective
measure of overall health. To maintain the convention that 𝑌𝑖 (𝑣) = 1 represents good health, I
binarize the hospitalization variable such that 𝑌𝑖 = 1 if the individual reported zero nights spent
in the hospital, and 𝑌𝑖 = 0 if the individual was hospitalized for one or more nights. In this way,
the MTS, MIV, and MTR assumptions are invoked in the same way as discussed in Section 1.5.1
for self-reported health, and I continue to identify bounds on the ATE of voucher receipt on the
probability of good health.
Table 1.8 reports the estimates of the conditional expectations and probabilities which are
the key building blocks of the bounds. The sample from the SIPP is identical to the one used
above, and so the proportion of voucher holders remains 7.7%. Interesting here is that the
difference in the observed probability of no hospitalizations is much smaller than the difference
for self-reported good health: 80.4% of voucher holders report zero nights spent in the hospital
versus 86.1% of non-voucher holders.
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Table 1.8: Observed Probabilities of Zero Hospitalizations and Distribution of Vouchers
E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑡

𝑁𝑡

Voucher

0.804
(0.025)

0.077
(0.006)

279
-

No Voucher

0.861
(0.007)

0.923
(0.006)

3250
-

Total

0.857
(0.007)

1.000
-

3529
-

Estimates use the annual SIPP weights for individuallevel analysis. Standard errors in parentheses are based
on 240 BRR replications with the SIPP replicate weights.

The main estimation results for the full sample are in Table 1.9. Column 1 regresses the
no-hospitalizations indicator on the voucher status variable. This shows that the unadjusted 5.7
percentage point gap in the probability of zero hospitalizations is statistically significant at the
5% level. As before, I argue that this is likely a result of negatively-selected recipients.
Table 1.9: Bounds on the ATE for Zero Hospitalizations: Total Personal Income as MIV, 5 Bins
(1)
OLS
ATE(1, 0)

(2)
Worst-Case

(3)
MTS

(4)
MIV+MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

−0.057★★

[-0.810 , 0.190] [-0.057 , 0.190] [-0.074 , 0.184] [0.000 , 0.190]

[0.000 , 0.190]

[0.001 , 0.184]

(0.025)

(-0.822 , 0.202) (-0.100 , 0.203) (-0.122 , 0.202) (0.000 , 0.202)

(0.000 , 0.203)

(0.000 , 0.201)

[·] denotes estimated bounds in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, or half-median unbiased MIV bounds in Columns 4 and 7. (·) denotes the standard error in
Column 1, or 95% CLR confidence intervals on the ATE in Columns 2-7. Bounds are estimated using 2094 observations for the female subsample
and 1435 observations for the male subsample. The variance-covariance matrix in the CLR first step is based on 240 BRR replications, where the
replicate weights provided by SIPP are used.

The worst case bounds on the ATE are presented in Column 2. Using no information
other than the binary nature of the outcome, the upper bound indicates that I can exclude
any positive effect larger than 19.0 percentage points. MTS is imposed in Column 3, which
dramatically increases the lower bound: at worst, voucher receipt makes zero hospitalizations
5.7 percentage points (7.1%) less likely. Using total personal income for the MIV+MTS bounds
in Column 4 results in slightly wider bounds than MTS alone, suggesting that the MIV may
not have identifying power for the lower bound on the effect for hospitalizations in the full
sample. The lower bound rules out a negative effect larger than 7.4 percentage points (9.2%)
and a positive effect larger than 18.4 percentage points (29.7%).
Columns 5 and 6 respectively impose MTR and the combination of MTS+MTR, and the
estimated bounds are identical. The MTR assumption restricts the effect of vouchers to be non43

negative, and the upper bounds allow for up to a 19.0 percentage point increase in the probability
of no hospitalizations. Finally, my preferred MIV+MTS+MTR bounds which combine all three
assumptions are presented in Column 7. Here, the lower bound indicates that receiving a
housing voucher causes the likelihood of no hospitalizations to increase by at least 0.1 percentage
points (0.1%). However, the 95% (and unreported 90%) CLR confidence interval includes zero,
such that I cannot statistically distinguish the ATE from zero at conventional levels. Despite this,
the bounds remain informative in the sense that I can rule out large positive effects in excess of
a 29.7% relative increase in the probability.
Subgroup Analyses
I next apply the monotonicity assumptions within the same demographic subgroups based on
sex or racial/ethnic identity as above for the no-hospitalizations outcome. There are again some
potentially informative findings.
The panels of Table 1.10 report the point estimates of the key objects for the bounds on the
ATE. The size of the unadjusted gap in the probability of zero hospitalizations across voucher
statuses is nearly equal for both female and male household members at around 5 percentage
points. There is, however, a difference in the level of this probability by sex. For both those
with and without vouchers, females in the sample have lower likelihoods of no hospitalizations
versus males. Overall, males are 6.6 percentage points more likely to have avoided a night in
the hospital over the previous year.
Table 1.10: Observed Probabilities of Zero Hospitalizations and Distribution of Vouchers, by Sex
𝑡

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

𝑡

Female

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

Male

Voucher

0.783
(0.032)

0.091
(0.007)

197
-

Voucher

0.851
(0.041)

0.057
(0.008)

82
-

No Voucher

0.834
(0.009)

0.909
(0.007)

1897
-

No Voucher

0.898
(0.009)

0.943
(0.008)

1353
-

Total

0.829
(0.010)

1.000
-

2094
-

Total

0.895
(0.009)

1.000
-

1435
-

Estimates use the annual SIPP weights for individual-level analysis. Standard errors in parentheses are based on
240 BRR replications with the SIPP replicate weights.
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The estimates for the effect of voucher receipt are contained in Table 1.11. Column 1 reports
the observed differences in the probability of no hospitalizations. The difference is very slightly
larger for females at 5.1 percentage points versus 4.7 percentage points for males; however,
neither unadjusted gap is statistically significant at the 5% level. Next, Column 2 reports
estimates of the worst-case bounds on the ATE. For female household members, I can rule
out an effect larger than 22.2 percentage points (39.6%) based on the upper bound; for males,
positive effects beyond 14.5 percentage points (20.5%) can be excluded. Imposing MTS in
Column 3 renders the observed 5.1 and 4.7 percentage point differences in the probability of
zero hospitalizations as the lower bounds on the ATE for females and males, respectively.
Table 1.11: Bounds on the ATE for Zero Hospitalizations, by Sex: Total Personal Income as MIV, 5 Bins
(1)
OLS

(2)
Worst-Case

(3)
MTS

(4)
MIV+MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

ATE for Female −0.051

[-0.778 , 0.222] [-0.051 , 0.222] [-0.037 , 0.214]

[0.000 , 0.222]

[0.000 , 0.222]

[0.000 , 0.214]

Subsample

(0.032)

(-0.793 , 0.237) (-0.107 , 0.238) (-0.094 , 0.238) (0.000 , 0.237)

(0.000 , 0.238)

(0.000 , 0.237)

ATE for Male

−0.047

[-0.855 , 0.145] [-0.047 , 0.145] [-0.057 , 0.130]

[0.000 , 0.145]

[0.000 , 0.145]

[0.007 , 0.130]

Subsample

(0.041)

(-0.872 , 0.162) (-0.121 , 0.164) (-0.140 , 0.154) (0.000 , 0.162)

(0.000 , 0.164)

(0.000 , 0.153)

[·] denotes estimated bounds in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, or half-median unbiased MIV bounds in Columns 4 and 7. (·) denotes the standard error in Column 1,
or 95% CLR confidence intervals on the ATE in Columns 2-7. Bounds are estimated using 2094 observations for the female subsample and 1435 observations
for the male subsample. The variance-covariance matrix in the CLR first step is based on 240 BRR replications, where the replicate weights provided by SIPP are
used.

The addition of the total personal income MIV in Column 4 yields the MIV+MTS bounds.
For females, the lower bound is increased to -3.7 percentage points (-4.7%), ruling out any larger
negative effects on the probability of avoiding a night in the hospital. The upper bound is
slightly decreased relative to MTS alone, such that an effect larger than 21.4 percentage points
can be excluded. For males, the lower bound decreases slightly and indicates that decreases in
the likelihood of no hospitalizations of more than 5.7 percentage points (6.7%) can be ruled out.
This again likely indicates that the MIV does not add identifying power for bounding the effect
from below in the male subsample. The identified set is slightly tightened from above, such that
positive effects of more than 13.0 percentage points (18.0%) can be excluded.
The MTR and MTS+MTR estimates in Columns 5 and 6 are identical, each yielding bounds
which rule out negative effects and any positive effects greater than the worst-case and MTS
upper bounds. Finally, Column 7 simultaneously imposes MTS and MTR along with the total
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personal income MIV. The lower bound for female household members cannot exclude a null
effect, but still only allows for a positive effect of up to 21.4 percentage points. The bounds for
males are narrower from both sides, where it can be concluded that the voucher increases the
likelihood of no hospitalizations by no less than 0.7 percentage points (0.8%) and no more than
13.0 percentage points (18.0%). However, the 95% CLR confidence intervals include zero, so I
am unable to conclude that the ATE is positive as well as statistically significant for either sex.
Next, I consider the effect of housing voucher receipt on the probability of non-hospitalization
separately for Black, white, and Hispanic household members. The three panels of Table
1.12 report the sample proportions of those reporting zero nights in the hospital for each
subgroup. Most interesting here is that Black voucher holders have a slightly higher probability
of having avoided hospitalizations over the previous year compared to Black members of
households without a voucher. For white and Hispanic household members, the usual pattern
of non-voucher holders observed to have better health continues to be present. This may be
further suggestive evidence that a positive health effect is particularly pronounced among Black
recipients.
The estimated bounds on the ATE of voucher receipt on the probability of no hospitalizations
are reported in Table 1.13. Column 1 contains the results from regressing the no-hospitalizations
indicator on the voucher receipt variable. As noted above, Black voucher recipients are 3.5
percentage points more likely to have not spent any nights in the hospital, although this is not
statistically significant at conventional levels. White and Hispanic voucher holders, on the other
hand, are respectively 14.8 and 9.0 percentage points less likely to have avoided hospitalization;
both unadjusted gaps are statistically significant at the 5% level.
The worst-case bounds in Column 2 for white and Hispanic household members are generally
similar to the bounds for the overall sample. The upper bounds rule out positive effects greater
than 16.8 percentage points (31.2%) for the white subpopulation, or greater than 18.0 percentage
points (30.0%) for Hispanic household members. For Black household members, these bounds
are shifted somewhat to the right, such that the upper bound allows for an ATE of up to 26.9
percentage points (44.2%).
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Table 1.12: Observed Probabilities of Zero Hospitalizations and Distribution of Vouchers, by
Racial/Ethnic Identity

𝑡

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

𝑡

Black

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

White

Voucher

0.878
(0.031)

0.154
(0.017)

119
-

Voucher

0.706
(0.059)

0.040
(0.006)

71
-

No Voucher

0.843
(0.015)

0.846
(0.017)

638
-

No Voucher

0.854
(0.010)

0.960
(0.008)

1520
-

Total

0.848
(0.014)

1.000
-

757
-

Total

0.848
(0.010)

1.000
-

1591
-

𝑡

E [𝑌 | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

Hispanic
Voucher

0.781
(0.046)

0.079
(0.008)

64
-

No Voucher

0.872
(0.012)

0.921
(0.008)

770
-

Total

0.865
(0.012)

1.000
-

834
-

Estimates use the annual SIPP weights for individual-level analysis. Standard errors in parentheses are based on
240 BRR replications with the SIPP replicate weights.

Column 3 imposes the MTS assumption, raising the lower bound for each subgroup. Here,
MTS alone is sufficient to bound the ATE away from zero for Black household members, with
the lower bound indicating at least a 3.5 percentage point (4.2%) increase in the likelihood of
zero hospitalizations. The 95% confidence interval, however, includes a null effect, so I cannot
conclude the ATE is statistically significant at this level. For the other two subgroups, I am able
to rule out negative effects beyond a 14.9 percentage point (17.4%) decline in the probability of
non-hospitalization for white household members, and a 9.1 percentage point (10.4%) decrease
for Hispanic household members.
Interestingly, adding the total personal income MIV in Column 4 yields MIV+MTS bounds
that indicate a positive effect for both Black and white household members. For Black residents
of voucher households, the probability of zero hospitalizations is increased by at least 5.6
percentage points (6.8%), even without invoking the assumption on treatment response. For
white individuals, the lower bound is small in magnitude, but does rule out a zero effect.
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Table 1.13: Bounds on the ATE for Zero Hospitalizations, by Race: Total Personal Income as MIV, 5 Bins

ATE for Black
Residents
ATE for White

(1)
OLS

(2)
Worst-Case

(3)
MTS

(4)
MIV+MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

0.035

[-0.732 , 0.269]

[0.035 , 0.269]

[0.056 , 0.262]

(0.033)

[0.000 , 0.269]

[0.000 , 0.269]

[0.054 , 0.262]

(-0.762 , 0.298) (-0.022 , 0.300) (-0.024 , 0.310) (0.000 , 0.299)

(0.000 , 0.300)

(0.000 , 0.310)

[-0.832 , 0.168] [-0.149 , 0.168]

[0.000 , 0.168]

[0.000 , 0.168]

[0.099 , 0.157]

(-0.849 , 0.185) (-0.254 , 0.187) (-0.087 , 0.182) (0.000 , 0.185)

(0.000 , 0.187)

(0.082 , 0.181)

ATE for Hispanic −0.090★★

[-0.820 , 0.180] [-0.091 , 0.180] [-0.138 , 0.180] [0.000 , 0.180]

[0.000 , 0.180]

[0.000 , 0.180]

Residents

(-0.843 , 0.203) (-0.172 , 0.204) (-0.244 , 0.209) (0.000 , 0.203)

(0.000 , 0.204)

(0.000 , 0.208)

Residents

−0.148★★
(0.059)

(0.046)

[0.001 , 0.157]

[·] denotes estimated bounds in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, or half-median unbiased MIV bounds in Columns 4 and 7. (·) denotes the standard error in Column
1, or 95% CLR confidence intervals on the ATE in Columns 2-7. Bounds are estimated using 757 observations for the Black subsample, 1591 observations for
the white subsample, and 834 observations for the Hispanic subsample. The variance-covariance matrix in the CLR first step is based on 240 BRR replications,
where the replicate weights provided by SIPP are used.

However, the confidence intervals suggest that the ATE is not statistically significant under the
combination of only MIV and MTS. For Hispanic voucher holders, the MIV+MTS bounds are
strictly wider than the MTS bounds, suggesting a lack of identifying power from total personal
income for this group.
Columns 5 and 6 report the identified sets under MTR and MTS+MTR. These are equal to
one another, each ruling out a negative impact on the probability of zero hospitalizations. Lastly,
Column 7 uses total personal income as an MIV to obtain the MIV+MTS+MTR bounds. For Black
household members, these are nearly equivalent to the MIV+MTS bounds. The lower bound
for white household increases substantially, meaning that the probability of no hospitalizations
increases by at least 9.9 percentage points (16.3%) and up to 15.7 percentage points (29.3%), and
the 95% CLR confidence interval indicates that the ATE is statistically significant at the 5% level.
While the bounds for Hispanic household members cannot rule out a zero effect, I can conclude
that the effect is no larger than 17.9 percentage points (28.6%).
Overall, the bounds for the effect of voucher receipt on the probability of zero nights spent in
the hospital are less conclusive for its sign than the bounds estimated for the self-reported overall
health outcome. It is relevant to note that hospitalization is somewhat of an extreme outcome,
and so it is reasonable to expect that housing voucher receipt would have a smaller positive
impact. The small magnitude of the MIV+MTS+MTR lower bounds would be consistent with
this, as such smaller effects are not ruled out.
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1.6.3

The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated

The focus of this chapter has been on partially identifying the population average treatment
effect of vouchers on health outcomes, but other treatment effect parameters may be of additional
interest. Conceptually, the ATE answers the thought experiment of how, on average, the health
of any resident 𝑖 in an eligible household would be impacted if she were to be assigned a housing
voucher. While this typically would be the information sought by a policymaker, the nature of
HCV again complicates the matter. As discussed in the context of the MTS assumption, voucher
supply is severely limited and eligible non-voucher holders greatly outnumber households
which actually possess one. The ATE thought experiment would thus require a substantial
increase in the supply of vouchers if it were to be carried out. Given the failures of Build
Back Better and its moderate expansion to HCV, policymakers could then conceivably be less
interested in the ATE.24
An alternative question to answer may therefore be: what is the health effect of receiving a
voucher for those who actually receive a voucher? This is, of course, the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT), which can be written
ATT(1, 0) = E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1]

(1.16)

The first term is identified in the data by E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1], while the second remains a counterfactual.
The same assumptions used in Section 1.5 can be used to bound this counterfactual object. Thus,
they can also provide partial identification of the ATT.25
Bounded support for the outcome implies that
0 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] ≤ 1
24 Note

(1.17)

also that an expansion large enough to provide every eligible household with a voucher would be likely
to generate general equilibrium effects in violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) that is
implicitly held for the identification.
25 To the best of my knowledge, using the Manski and Pepper (2000) framework to bound an ATT is unique to
the present study.
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such that worst-case bounds on the ATT are identified as

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] − 1
≤ ATT(1, 0) ≤

(1.18)

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1]
As was the case for the ATE, the worst-case bounds have a width equal to 1 and so cannot strictly
identify the sign of the ATT, but may potentially be informative on its magnitude. Imposing the
remaining assumptions can again tighten the identified set.
Under MTS, it can be concluded that
0 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 0]

(1.19)

with the rightmost term identified with E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] in the data. MTS bounds on the ATT are
then obtained as

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 0]
≤ ATT(1, 0) ≤

(1.20)

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1]
Relative to the worst-case bounds, the lower bound in (1.20) is increased to the extent that the
mean outcome among non-voucher holders is less than 1, while the upper bound remains the
same.26
From the MTR assumption, I am able to write
0 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (0) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (1) | 𝑉𝑖 = 1]
26 One

(1.21)

may also notice that the MTS lower bound on the ATT is equal to the MTS lower bound on the ATE from
(1.9) and (1.10). This is specific to the all-binary treatment and outcome setting and need not be true in the general
case.
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where the observed mean among voucher holders identifies the rightmost term. Using this, the
bounds on the ATT under MTR become
0
(1.22)

≤ ATT(1, 0) ≤

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1]
This effectively enforces that the ATT is non-negative, while the upper bound is identical to
both the worst-case and MTS upper bounds. Therefore, the combination MTS+MTR bounds
also share the same upper bound, while the lower bound is equal to the larger of the difference

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 1] − E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑉𝑖 = 0] and zero.
Finally, the MIV+MTS and MIV+MTS+MTR identified sets are obtained as in (1.12) and
(1.13), with the ATT bounds of this subsection replacing the ATE bounds under MTS and
MTS+MTR in those inequalities. Estimation and inference is carried out via the same procedure
as described in Section 1.5.2 above.
Table 1.14: Bounds on the ATT for Self-Reported Health: Total Personal Income as MIV, 5 Bins

ATT(1, 0)

(1)
OLS

(2)
Worst-Case

(3)
MTS

(4)
MIV+MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

−0.209★★★

[-0.429 , 0.571]

[-0.210 , 0.571]

[-0.092 , 0.529]

[0.000 , 0.571]

[0.000 , 0.571]

[0.101 , 0.529]

(0.033)

(-0.483 , 0.625)

(-0.265 , 0.625)

(-0.190 , 0.597)

(0.000 , 0.626)

(0.000 , 0.626)

(0.000 , 0.598)

·

⟨-0.471 , 0.613⟩

⟨-0.253 , 0.614⟩

⟨-0.169 , 0.583⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.614⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.625⟩

⟨0.018 , 0.585⟩

[·] denotes estimated bounds in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, or half-median unbiased MIV bounds in Columns 4 and 7. (·) denotes the standard error in
Column 1, or 95% CLR confidence intervals on the ATT in Columns 2-7. ⟨·⟩ denotes 90% confidence intervals in Columns 2-7. Bounds are estimated
using 3529 observations. The variance-covariance matrix in the CLR first step is based on 240 BRR replications, where the replicate weights provided
by SIPP are used.

Table 1.14 presents the results for the ATT of housing voucher receipt on self-reported health
in the full sample. Column 1 regresses the indicator for good or better self-reported health on
the voucher dummy, which would identify the ATT (and the ATE) under exogenous treatment
selection. This suggests a large 20.9 percentage decline in the probability of reporting good or
better health. As before, my identification argument holds that this is a biased estimate of the
ATT due to negative selection into voucher status on potential health outcomes.
Turning to the estimated bounds, Column 2 reports the worst-case bounds on the ATT. These
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indicate that the probability of good or better self-reported health is decreased by no more than
42.9 percentage points for voucher recipients, and increased by no more than 57.1 percentage
points. As usual, no information about the sign of the effect can be learned from the worst-case
bounds, and the fact that the ones here are nearly centered at zero means only extremely large
effects in either direction can be ruled out.
MTS is imposed in Column 3, which increases the lower bound to a 21.0 percentage point
decrease in the probability of good SRH. This signifies that any negative effect would be at
worst equal to the observed difference in means across voucher status, while the upper bound
is equivalent to the worst-case upper bound. Adding the total personal income MIV in Column
4 further increases the lower bound, which estimates that a negative effect can be no greater
than a 9.2 percentage point decrease in the probability of good health.
The MTR and MTS+MTR bounds in Columns 5 and 6 are identical, with both sets ruling
out a negative ATT, as well as any effect larger than a 57.1 percentage point increase. Finally,
Column 7 uses the total personal income MIV to estimate the MIV+MTS+MTR bounds. From
the lower bound, the probability of reporting good or better health among recipient households
is increased by at least 10.1 percentage points, which represents a 21.5% relative increase. From
the upper bound, I am able to reject anything beyond a 52.9 percentage point increase (1260%).
While I cannot statistically reject a null effect based on the 95% confidence interval, the 90%
confidence interval (the bottom row) does indicate that the ATT is statistically different from
zero at that level.
Next, I report results for self-reported health broken down by sex and by racial/ethnic
identity in Table 1.15. Panels A and B show the estimates for the female and male subsamples,
respectively. Column 1 contains the differences in means, which would indicate a reasonably
large and statistically significant negative impact on self-reported health for both female and
male voucher recipients if there were no issues of endogenous selection.
The worst-case bounds on the ATT in Column 2 for the female subsample are quite similar
to the bounds for the full sample, where they are almost centered at zero and can only
exclude greater than a 45.5 percentage point decrease or a 54.6 percentage point increase in
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the probability of good self-reported health. For males in voucher households, the worst-case
bounds are shifted somewhat to the right, where any negative effect is limited to a 37.1 percentage
point decrease in the likelihood of good health, and allowing for up to a 62.9 percentage point
increase.
Table 1.15: Bounds on the ATT for Self-Reported Health, by Sex and by Racial/Ethnic Identity: Total
Personal Income as MIV, 5 Bins

(1)
OLS

(2)
Worst-Case

(3)
MTS

(4)
MIV+MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

−0.225★★★

[-0.455 , 0.546]

[-0.225 , 0.546]

[-0.102 , 0.478]

[0.000 , 0.546]

[0.000 , 0.546]

[0.126 , 0.478]

(0.039)

(-0.516 , 0.607)

(-0.289 , 0.607)

(-0.204 , 0.558)

(0.000 , 0.608)

(0.000 , 0.608)

(0.007 , 0.562)

·

⟨-0.503 , 0.593⟩

⟨-0.275 , 0.594⟩

⟨-0.183 , 0.541⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.595⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.595⟩

⟨0.030 , 0.546⟩

−0.165★★★

[-0.371 , 0.629]

[-0.165 , 0.629]

[-0.109 , 0.620]

[0.000 , 0.629]

[0.000 , 0.629]

[0.044 , 0.620]

Panel A: Female
ATT(1, 0)

Panel B: Male
ATT(1, 0)

(0.059)

(-0.468 , 0.727)

(-0.264 , 0.728)

(-0.252 , 0.769)

(0.000 , 0.729)

(0.000 , 0.729)

(0.000 , 0.770)

·

⟨-0.447 , 0.706⟩

⟨-0.244 , 0.707⟩

⟨-0.224 , 0.739⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.709⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.709⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.741⟩

Panel C: Black
ATT(1, 0)

-0.027

[-0.285 , 0.715]

[-0.027 , 0.715]

[0.102 , 0.641]

[0.000 , 0.715]

[0.000 , 0.715]

[0.125 , 0.641]

(0.045)

(-0.357 , 0.787)

(-0.103 , 0.787)

(0.002 , 0.765)

(0.000 , 0.787)

(0.000 , 0.787)

(0.000 , 0.767)

·

⟨-0.341 , 0.771⟩

⟨-0.086 , 0.772⟩

⟨0.022 , 0.740⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.772⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.772⟩

⟨0.007 , 0.742⟩

−0.333★★★

[-0.567 , 0.434]

[-0.333 , 0.434]

[-0.234 , 0.408]

[0.000 , 0.434]

[0.000 , 0.434]

[0.043 , 0.408]

Panel D: White
ATT(1, 0)

(0.060)

(-0.663 , 0.530)

(-0.434 , 0.532)

(-0.436 , 0.527)

(0.000 , 0.536)

(0.000 , 0.536)

(0.000 , 0.529)

·

⟨-0.642 , 0.510⟩

⟨-0.413 , 0.512⟩

⟨-0.410 , 0.505⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.516⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.516⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.507⟩

−0.424★★★

[-0.616 , 0.385]

[-0.425 , 0.385]

[-0.418 , 0.423]

[0.000 , 0.385]

[0.000 , 0.385]

[0.000 , 0.423]

(0.068)

(-0.724 , 0.493)

(-0.538 , 0.494)

(-0.556 , 0.532)

(0.000 , 0.500)

(0.000 , 0.500)

(0.000 , 0.534)

·

⟨-0.701 , 0.470⟩

⟨-0.515 , 0.472⟩

⟨-0.530 , 0.509⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.479⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.479⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.512⟩

Panel E: Hispanic
ATT(1, 0)

[·] denotes estimated bounds in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, or half-median unbiased MIV bounds in Columns 4 and 7. (·) denotes the standard error in Column 1, or
95% CLR confidence intervals on the ATT in Columns 2-7. ⟨·⟩ denotes 90% confidence intervals in Columns 2-7. Bounds are estimated using 3529 observations.
The variance-covariance matrix in the CLR first step is based on 240 BRR replications, where the replicate weights provided by SIPP are used.

For the MTS bounds in Column 3, the lower bounds are increased such that the probability of
reporting good or better health is estimated to decrease by no more than 22.5 percentage points
for female voucher recipients, and by no more than 16.5 percentage points for male recipients.
The upper bounds remain the same as under only the bounded outcome support assumption.
The MTS and MTS+MTR bounds in Columns 5 and 6 are identical for both the female and
male subsamples, which restrict the ATT to be non-negative and no greater than a 54.6 and 62.9
percentage point increase in the probability of good health, respectively.
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Column 4 combines the MTS assumption with the total personal income MIV. This increases
the lower bound for female voucher holders to a 10.2 percentage point decline in the probability
of good or better SRH, and simultaneously decreases the upper bound to exclude increases larger
than 47.8 percentage points. For male recipients, negative effects beyond a 10.9 percentage point
decrease can be ruled out, as can positive effects larger than 62.0 percentage points. Finally,
I report the MIV+MTS+MTR bounds in Column 7. For females in voucher households, these
estimate that the probability of reporting good or better health is increased by at least 12.6
percentage points (30.1%) and at most 47.8 percentage points (813%), and the ATT can be
distinguished from 0 at the 5% level. For the male subsample, the ATT is estimated to be at
least a 4.4 percentage point (7.5%) increase in the probability of good or better SRH, and no
greater than a 62.0 percentage point increase (6989%). Zero is included in both the 95% and 90%
confidence intervals, meaning that the effect cannot be distinguished from 0 at conventional
levels.
Panels C, D, and E report the estimates by racial and ethnic identity. Column 1 contains
the naïve OLS regressions, which again would indicate negative effects under an exogenous
selection assumption. The worst-case bounds for Black voucher holders in Panel C, Column 2
exclude negative impacts on the probability of good or better health larger than a 28.5 percentage
point decrease. The bounds for white recipients in Panel D, on the other hand, are closer to
centered at zero, while those for Hispanic voucher recipients in Panel E are shifted leftward,
ruling out any large increase in the probability of good health above 38.5 percentage points.
Some other results are noteworthy. The MIV+MTS bounds for Black voucher recipients
in Column 4 suggest that—even without the stronger MTR assumption—the probability of
reporting good or better health is increased by at least 10.2 percentage points (16.6%), and that
this ATT statistically differs from 0 at the 5% level. For the MIV+MTS+MTR bounds in Column
7, the lower bound for Black voucher holders increases to estimate that the probability of good
or better health increases by at least 12.5 percentage points (21.2%), with the 90% confidence
interval able to rule out a null effect. For white recipients, the lower bound indicates that the
likelihood of good or better SRH is increased by no less than 4.3 percentage points (11.0%),
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although the confidence intervals do not allow me to rule out a zero ATT at conventional levels.
Finally, there appears to again be a lack of identifying power from the total personal income
MIV for the Hispanic subsample, to the extent that the upper bound on the ATT is estimated
to be larger than the observed proportion of Hispanic voucher holders reporting good or better
health in the SIPP.
Complete results on the ATT for the no-hospitalizations outcome can be found in Appendix
1.B. Considering the full sample estimates in Appendix Table 1.B.1, imposing the MTS assumption
limits any negative effect to a 5.7 percentage point drop in the probability of avoiding a hospital
stay in the previous year. Adding MTR further increases the lower bound to rule out any
negative impact. The upper bounds, on the other hand, are all either equal to the sample
proportion of those experiencing zero hospitalizations, or exceed this proportion. They are
therefore not informative about the magnitude of the ATT, as the sample proportion is the
largest possible effect even without any assumptions. Further, the total personal income MIV
does not appear to add identifying power, as the MIV+MTS and MIV+MTS+MTR are wider
than their counterparts without the MIV.
Though the upper bounds also are not especially informative for the demographic subgroups
in Appendix Table 1.B.2, some of the lower bounds using the total personal income MIV do
have additional identifying power for certain groups. In Panels A, C, and D containing the
estimates for female, Black, and white voucher holders, respectively, the lower bounds under
MIV+MTS+MTR indicate a positive ATT. For female residents of voucher households, the
probability of avoiding hospitalization is increased by at least 2.2 percentage points, or a 2.9%
relative increase. Among Black recipients, the effect is at least a 4.6 percentage point (5.5%)
increase, and the lower bound for white recipients indicates at least a 13.6 percentage point
(23.9%) rise in the probability of avoiding a stay in the hospital. The latter result is statistically
different from zero at the 5% level, while conventional confidence intervals cannot reject a null
ATT for the female and Black subpopulations.
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1.7

Conclusion

Credible estimates of a causal relationship between housing assistance and recipients’ health
are difficult to obtain, particularly with publicly-available survey data. I appeal to mild and
relatively plausible assumptions in order to overcome the selection issues present in voucher
receipt and the lack of exogenous variation induced by policy changes and identify bounds on
the ATE. The use of monotone treatment selection (MTS), a monotone instrumental variable
(MIV), and monotone treatment response (MTR) to achieve partial identification in this context
provides novel evidence on an understudied aspect of the Housing Choice Voucher program.
As a secondary contribution, I also demonstrate further the usefulness of the Manski and
Pepper (2000) method in analyzing components of the US social safety net, which has elsewhere
been applied fruitfully in studying the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
(Gundersen and Kreider, 2009; Kreider et al., 2012).
My first assumption of MTS captures the idea that voucher holders are negatively selected
into treatment with respect to their health. Put another way, average potential health outcomes
are weakly poorer among observed voucher recipients in any state of the world. I argue that
this primarily follows from long waiting lists inducing Roy selection into HCV by those with
characteristics correlated with “true need” for housing assistance.
The second assumption that total personal income is a valid MIV requires that potential
health outcomes are on average non-decreasing in its values. Sufficient, but not necessary, for
this is the normality of health as a good in the population of interest, a result which follows
from the human capital model of the demand for health. The validity of income as an MIV is
also consistent with a large literature documenting a positive relationship between income and
health.
Finally, my MTR assumption states that each individual’s health under voucher receipt
would be no worse than her health in the place-based assistance or no-assistance state. The
argument here proceeds by separately considering the possible income effect on health via a
relaxed budget constraint and a housing choice effect through the ability of voucher holders
to adjust their dual choice of housing services and neighborhood amenities. When relevant,
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the income effect is positive as long as health is a normal good. The housing choice effect is
more complicated, but is arguably non-negative given the likely behavior of both landlords and
voucher holders.
Under all three assumptions, the estimated MIV+MTS+MTR bounds suggest that the receipt
of a housing voucher improves the likelihood of self-reporting good or better health by between
4.8 and 21.3 percentage points, where the effect is statistically significant at the 95% level. Using
the baseline proportion of voucher holders in good health, this represents at least a 9.2% increase
and up to a 59.5% increase. In terms of the probability of zero hospitalizations over the past year,
I also estimate relative increases of at least a 0.1% and at most 29.7%, but I cannot statistically
reject a null effect. Looking at subpopulations, the estimates for Black household members show
a rightward-shifted identified set for the effect on self-reported health, with a lower bound of
11.7 percentage points (a 19.6% relative effect) and an upper bound of 26.9 percentage points (a
60.3% relative effect). While this means I can rule out a range of smaller effects identified for the
overall population, the nature of partial identification does not allow me to draw any definitive
conclusions from comparing across groups (i.e., I cannot use the larger lower bound to say that
Black voucher recipients benefit more than the population generally). On the other hand, I can
conclude that the health of lower-income Black renters is meaningfully improved through the
housing voucher program.
Overall, since these are bounds on a population ATE for adults in low-income renter
households eligible for a voucher and who would counterfactually receive place-based rental
assistance or no assistance at all, the results should be of policy interest for discussions of
the voucher program. If the results are also relevant for the broader question of housing
stability’s health impact (i.e., not just specific to the Housing Choice Voucher Program), they
may also shed light on the Summer 2021 Supreme Court decision to disallow the Centers for
Disease Control from extending the pandemic moratorium on evictions amidst the surging Delta
variant of COVID-19, and then the eventual Omicron wave. From my bounds, this introduction
of instability had the ability to cause at least a modest negative health consequence, with the
potential for substantial declines in the probability of good health if the true ATE lies closer to
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the upper bound in my estimates. Further, the large lower bound I estimate for low-income
Black renters means that the consequences for this subpopulation have the potential to be even
greater and exacerbate the unequal burdens the pandemic has already placed across racial and
ethnic groups.
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Appendix
1.A

Technical Appendix for CLR (2013)

To illustrate the method, consider, for example, the MIV+MTS+MTR lower bound on the mean
potential outcome E [𝑌𝑖 (1)]:
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
max LB¯mtsr,1
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

where the supremum is replaced with a maximum.
In the terminology of Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013), I create a set of bounding
functions out of the above expression. These allow me to use the properties of the maximum
(or minimum) operator to rewrite the single summation as a set of multiple summations over
which a single maximum (or minimum) is taken. The intuition is that the bounding functions
capture all possibilities from taking the maxima at each piece of the original form of the lower
bounds. Choosing, for example, 𝐿 = 3 bins for the MIV would yield the following 4 = 23−1



bounding functions:



max LB1mtsr,1 , (𝑝1 + 𝑝2 )LB1mtsr,1 + 𝑝3 LB3mtsr,1 , 𝑝1 LB1mtsr,1 + 𝑝2 LB2mtsr,1 + 𝑝3 LB2mtsr,1 ,
𝑝 1 LB1mtsr,1

+

𝑝 2 LB2mtsr,1

+

𝑝3 LB3mtsr,1



,

where 𝑝ℓ ≡ Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ].
A similar set of bounding functions for the MIV+MTS+MTR upper bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] can
be obtained, where properties of the minimum operator are used instead. Then the full set of
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bounding functions for the lower bound on the ATE is obtained by exhausting the number of
possible subtractions of one term from the set of upper bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (0)] from one term of
the set of lower bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (1)]. This yields a total of 25−1

2

= 256 bounding functions

for each bound on the average treatment effect in my application where I use 5 bins of the
MIV. For convenience, I borrow the Chernozhukov et al. (2013) notation and use 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣) and
𝜃 𝑢 (𝑣), 𝑣 = 1, . . . , 256, to denote these bounding functions for the lower and upper ATE bounds,
respectively.
The key aspect of the CLR method is that the procedures for obtaining the half-median
unbiased estimates of the bounds and for the valid confidence intervals are performed on
each bounding function 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣) and 𝜃 𝑢 (𝑣) prior to the evaluation of the associated maximum or
minimum. The technical condition required to do so is that there exist estimators of the 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣)
and 𝜃 𝑢 (𝑣) which are consistent and asymptotically normal. Given that the bounding functions
in this paper are composed of sample means and sample proportions, this condition is satisfied.
Therefore, I proceed with a precision adjustment, which gives bias-corrected estimated bounds
and valid confidence intervals for the ATE.
The CLR precision-adjustment step first entails taking the product of a critical value denoted
𝜅(𝑝) and the pointwise standard error of the bounding function estimator written 𝑠(𝑣). For upper
bound bounding functions this product is added to the estimator 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (𝑣), and it is subtracted from
𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (𝑣) for lower bound bounding functions. The choice of 𝑝 in the critical value governs whether
the adjustment yields the median-unbiased bounding function (which sets 𝑝 = 0.5) or yields
the desired bound for the confidence interval (see below). In this way, the CLR method has the
advantage that the bias correction and inference is done within the same procedure.
The precision-corrected estimators for the respective lower and upper ATE bounds are given
by



𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (𝑝) = max 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (𝑣) − 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑝) · 𝑠 𝑙 (𝑣)
𝑣
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and



ˆ𝑢

ˆ𝑢

𝑢

𝑢

𝜃 (𝑝) = min 𝜃 (𝑣) + 𝜅 (𝑝) · 𝑠 (𝑣)



𝑣

where 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (𝑣) and 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (𝑣) are the unadjusted estimators of the bounding functions and 𝑠 𝑙 (𝑣) and
𝑠 𝑢 (𝑣) are their associated standard errors, which are defined below.
The critical values 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑝) and 𝜅 𝑢 (𝑝) are computed according to the following. Let 𝜸ˆ 𝑙 be
a 256-dimensional column vector of all the unadjusted bounding function estimators for the
lower bound, with 𝜸ˆ 𝑢 defined likewise for the upper bound. The first step obtains, using 240
𝑙

b of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of
BRR replications,27 a consistent estimate 𝛀
√
𝒍

ˆ 1/2,𝑙 , I can thus define 𝑠 𝑙 (𝑣) ≡ ∥ b𝒈√(𝒗)∥ .
𝑁 𝜸ˆ 𝑙 − 𝜸 𝑙 .28 With b
𝒈 𝒍 (𝒗)′ the 𝑣 th row of 𝛀
𝑁

Next, I simulate 𝑅 = 100, 000 draws from a 𝒩(0, 𝑰) distribution, where 𝑰 is the 256 ×
256 identity matrix.

The draws are labelled 𝒁 𝑟 , 𝑟 = 1, . . . , 𝑅, and are used to compute

𝑍 𝑟∗ (𝑣) ≡ b
𝒈 𝒍 (𝒗)′ 𝒁 𝑟 /∥ b
𝒈 𝒍 (𝒗)∥ for each 𝑟 and 𝑣. In each replication, the maximum over the set
of 𝑍 𝑟∗ (1), . . . , 𝑍 𝑟∗ (4𝐿−1 ) is selected. From the resulting 𝑅 values, I compute 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑐), defined as the
𝑐 th quantile of the values, where 𝑐 ≡ 1 − (0.1/log 𝑁). This value 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑐) is used to construct the
following set:



 𝑙

𝑙
𝑙
𝑙
𝑙
𝑙
𝑙
𝑙
ˆ
ˆ
b
𝑉 = 𝑣 ∈ 𝒱 : 𝜃 (𝑣) ≥ max 𝜃 (𝑣˜ ) − 𝜅 (𝑐) · 𝑠 (𝑣˜ ) − 2𝜅 (𝑐) · 𝑠 (𝑣)
𝑣˜ ∈𝒱 𝑙

where 𝒱 𝑙 is the indexing set for the lower bound bounding functions 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣). Returning to the
values 𝑍 𝑟∗ (𝑣), I now take the maximum from each replication 𝑟, this time restricting the search

b 𝑙 . The CLR critical value 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑝) is then the 𝑝 th quantile of the resulting 𝑅 values,
only to 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉
such that 𝜅 𝑙 (0.5) gives the half-median unbiased estimate of the lower bound 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.5) on the ATE.
Obtaining the lower bound on a (1−𝛼)·100% confidence interval requires one final adjustment
to account for the width of the bias-corrected bounds. Borrowing notation from Chernozhukov
27 This

is again a limitation of the SIPP data. Replicate weights are provided for obtaining correct variance
estimates, but only for up to 240 replications. While the CLR procedure performs better with more replications,
the simulation results in Germinario, Flores, and Flores-Lagunes (2021) show reasonable performance using 199
replications. Thus, the limited number of replications here should be adequate.
28 I illustrate here only the estimate of the lower bound. The process for the upper bound is analogous.
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et al. (2013), define

b
Γ ≡ 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (0.5) − 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.5)
n o
b
Γ+ ≡ max 0, b
Γ
𝜌 = max 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (0.75) − 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (0.25) , 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.25) − 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.75)



𝜏 ≡ 1/(𝜌 log 𝑁)





𝑝ˆ ≡ 1 − Φ 𝜏b
Γ+ · 𝛼
where Φ(·) is the standard normal CDF. The lower bound of a 95% confidence interval is based
ˆ which uses the critical value 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑝),
ˆ with 𝛼 = 0.05 in the expression for 𝑝.
ˆ
on 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (𝑝),
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1.B

Additional Tables

Table 1.B.1: Bounds on the ATT for Zero Hospitalizations: Total Personal Income as MIV, 5 Bins

ATT(1, 0)

(1)
OLS

(2)
Worst-Case

(3)
MTS

(4)
MIV+MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

−0.057★★

[-0.196 , 0.804]

[-0.057 , 0.804]

[-0.074 , 0.825]

[0.000 , 0.804]

[0.000 , 0.804]

[0.000 , 0.825]

(0.025)

(-0.237 , 0.845)

(-0.098 , 0.845)

(-0.119 , 0.868)

(0.000 , 0.845)

(0.000 , 0.845)

(0.000 , 0.868)

·

⟨-0.228 , 0.836⟩

⟨-0.089 , 0.836⟩

⟨-0.109 , 0.858⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.836⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.836⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.858⟩

[·] denotes estimated bounds in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, or half-median unbiased MIV bounds in Columns 4 and 7. (·) denotes the standard error in
Column 1, or 95% CLR confidence intervals on the ATT in Columns 2-7. ⟨·⟩ denotes 90% confidence intervals in Columns 2-7. Bounds are estimated
using 3529 observations. The variance-covariance matrix in the CLR first step is based on 240 BRR replications, where the replicate weights provided
by SIPP are used.

Table 1.B.2: Bounds on the ATT for Zero Hospitalizations, by Sex and by Racial/Ethnic Identity: Total
Personal Income as MIV, 5 Bins

(1)
OLS

(2)
Worst-Case

(3)
MTS

(4)
MIV+MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

Panel A: Female
ATT(1, 0)

-0.051

[-0.217 , 0.783]

[-0.051 , 0.783]

[-0.037 , 0.778]

[0.000 , 0.783]

[0.000 , 0.783]

[0.022 , 0.778]

(0.032)

(-0.269 , 0.835)

(-0.104 , 0.835)

(-0.090 , 0.837)

(0.000 , 0.835)

(0.000 , 0.835)

(0.000 , 0.837)

·

⟨-0.258 , 0.824⟩

⟨-0.092 , 0.824⟩

⟨-0.078 , 0.824⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.824⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.824⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.824⟩

-0.047

[-0.149 , 0.851]

[-0.047 , 0.851]

[-0.057 , 0.882]

[0.000 , 0.851]

[0.000 , 0.851]

[0.000 , 0.882]

Panel B: Male
ATT(1, 0)

(0.041)

(-0.217 , 0.918)

(-0.114 , 0.918)

(-0.132 , 0.955)

(0.000 , 0.918)

(0.000 , 0.918)

(0.000 , 0.955)

·

⟨-0.202 , 0.903⟩

⟨-0.100 , 0.904⟩

⟨-0.116 , 0.941⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.904⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.904⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.942⟩

Panel C: Black
ATT(1, 0)

0.035

[-0.122 , 0.878]

[0.035 , 0.878]

[0.056 , 0.886]

[0.000 , 0.878]

[0.000 , 0.878]

[0.046 , 0.886]

(0.033)

(-0.173 , 0.929)

(-0.019 , 0.929)

(-0.018 , 0.958)

(0.000 , 0.929)

(0.000 , 0.929)

(0.000 , 0.958)

·

⟨-0.162 , 0.918⟩

⟨-0.007 , 0.918⟩

⟨-0.001 , 0.947⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.918⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.918⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.947⟩

−0.148★★

[-0.295 , 0.706]

[-0.149 , 0.706]

[0.001 , 0.729]

[0.000 , 0.706]

[0.000 , 0.706]

[0.136 , 0.729]

Panel D: White
ATT(1, 0)

(0.059)

(-0.392 , 0.803)

(-0.247 , 0.804)

(-0.079 , 0.836)

(0.000 , 0.805)

(0.000 , 0.805)

(0.074 , 0.837)

·

⟨-0.371 , 0.782⟩

⟨-0.226 , 0.783⟩

⟨-0.063 , 0.813⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.785⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.785⟩

⟨0.085 , 0.815⟩

Panel E: Hispanic
ATT(1, 0)

−0.090★★

[-0.219 , 0.782]

[-0.091 , 0.782]

[-0.138 , 0.825]

[0.000 , 0.782]

[0.000 , 0.782]

[0.000 , 0.825]

(0.046)

(-0.294 , 0.856)

(-0.166 , 0.856)

(-0.236 , 0.913)

(0.000 , 0.857)

(0.000 , 0.857)

(0.000 , 0.913)

·

⟨-0.277 , 0.840⟩

⟨-0.150 , 0.840⟩

⟨-0.215 , 0.894⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.840⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.840⟩

⟨0.000 , 0.894⟩

[·] denotes estimated bounds in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6, or half-median unbiased MIV bounds in Columns 4 and 7. (·) denotes the standard error in Column 1, or
95% CLR confidence intervals on the ATT in Columns 2-7. ⟨·⟩ denotes 90% confidence intervals in Columns 2-7. Bounds are estimated using 3529 observations.
The variance-covariance matrix in the CLR first step is based on 240 BRR replications, where the replicate weights provided by SIPP are used.
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Chapter 2
What Can We Learn About the Effect of
Mental Health on Labor Market Outcomes
Under Weak Assumptions? Evidence from
the NLSY79∗
Giuseppe Germinario,† Vikesh Amin,‡ Carlos Flores,§ Alfonso Flores-Lagunes¶

2.1

Introduction

It is well-documented that poor mental health is correlated with worse labor market outcomes. A
review of early studies by Marcotte and Wilcox-Gök (2001b) concluded that 5-6 million workers
in the US between the ages of 16 and 54 lose, fail to seek, or cannot find employment due to
mental illnesses, and that mental illness decreases annual income by $3,500-$6,000, conditional
∗ We
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on working. Poor mental health could limit employment and lower earnings because (1) it affects
factors such as mood, memory or motivation, (2) it increases absenteeism and presenteeism,
(3) of employer taste-based discrimination or (4) of employers’ unwillingness to accommodate
health problems. There is empirical evidence showing that poor mental health is associated
with higher rates of absenteeism and presenteeism (Bubonya et al., 2017) and lower productivity
(Oswald et al., 2015).1 , 2 Establishing causality though is complicated because of omitted variable
bias and reverse causality. Omitted variable bias arises due to “third” factors (e.g., genetic
endowments, cognitive ability, childhood circumstances, personality) that are correlated with
both mental health and labor market outcomes, while reverse causality occurs when lack of
employment or reduced earnings worsen mental health.
To identify causal effects, several studies (summarized in Section 2.2) have used instrumental
variables (IV) strategies to isolate variation in mental health that is argued to be orthogonal to
unobserved factors. Instruments used have pertained to childhood and parental mental health,
religiosity, death of a close friend, and availability of social services and social support. Other
studies have used panel data and individual fixed-effect regression specifications to control
for time invariant individual characteristics correlated with mental health and labor market
outcomes. The consensus from prior studies is that poor mental health reduces employment
but effects for earnings are mixed.
While IV and panel data approaches are an improvement upon naïve OLS estimates, the
assumptions needed for causality may be violated. Valid instruments rely on the exclusion
restriction—that the instruments only affect labor market outcomes indirectly through their
effect on mental health. One can think of reasons why the exclusion restriction may not be
satisfied for each of the instruments used in the literature. Childhood/adolescent mental health
may violate the exclusion restriction because poor adolescent mental health is associated with
1 Using

the first 14 waves of Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia and conditional fixed-effect
logit models, Bubonya et al. (2017) find that absence rates are five percent higher among workers who report
being in poor mental health. They also find that the odds that workers in poor mental health report diminished
productivity due to emotional problems is six times higher than those of similar workers in good mental health.
2 Oswald et al. (2015) conduct a series of laboratory experiments at an elite university in the UK where students
are randomly assigned “happiness” (showing comedy movie clips, providing chocolate, fruit and drinks) before
completing a piece rate task. They find treated individuals have 12% higher productivity.
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lower educational attainment (Fletcher, 2008) and worse labor market outcomes (Fletcher, 2013a;
Lundborg et al., 2014; Mousteri et al., 2019). Parental mental illness has been found to increase the
probability of high school dropout of children (Farahati et al., 2003), which could in turn affect
labor market outcomes. Religiosity is likely correlated with earnings (Gruber, 2005) and could
affect labor market outcomes through other indirect channels (e.g., attending religious services
could be helpful for career networking).3 Individual fixed-effect estimates are identified from
individuals who experience changes in mental health and labor market outcomes. If withinperson variation in mental health and labor market outcomes are randomly distributed across
all individuals, then individual fixed-effect estimates will identify the average treatment effect
(ATE) on the population, which is arguably more policy relevant. Alternatively, the estimates
could reflect an effect for a specific subpopulation if the within-person variation is present in
certain subgroups of the population. Moreover, if there is insufficient within-person variation
in mental health and labor market outcomes, then estimates may lack statistical power to detect
effects of mental health. Individual fixed-effects also do not control for time varying factors
correlated with mental health and labor market outcomes, such as stress and health shocks.
In addition, attenuation bias due to random measurement error in mental health is typically
exacerbated in fixed-effects models.
We estimate the effect of mental health (based on a count of depressive symptoms from
the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale) in the 1992 round (when individuals
are 30 years old) of the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) on employment
and earnings in 1993. Our key contribution is that we provide novel evidence by employing a
nonparametric partial identification approach (Manski and Pepper, 2000) to bound the causal
effect, which has at least three advantages. First, it provides bounds on the population ATE as
opposed to a subpopulation. Second, it allows for arbitrary correlations between mental health
and unobserved factors that can affect employment and earnings. Third, it relies on relatively
weak assumptions, which are, arguably, more credible. These advantages, though, come at a
cost of obtaining a range of (equally-likely) possible values for the causal population ATE rather
3 Furthermore,

in the presence of heterogeneous effects, IV identifies a local average treatment effect (LATE)
for those individuals whose treatment (mental health) is affected by the instrument used. In this sense, estimates
derived from random shocks such as death of a close friend are potentially less informative for policy.

66

than a point estimate of it. The assumptions we use are three: (1) monotone treatment selection
(MTS) which posits that individuals “selected” into worse mental health have lower latent
employment probabilities and earnings; (2) monotone treatment response (MTR) which imposes
the restriction that worse mental health does not improve labor market outcomes; (3) we employ
adolescent test scores as a monotone instrumental variable (MIV)—a variable that is assumed
to have a weakly increasing mean relationship with potential outcomes—to help tighten the
bounds under the MTS and MTR assumptions. In our context, the MIV assumption states
that individuals with higher test scores have no lower average latent employment probabilities
and earnings than those with lower test scores. The MIV assumption is weaker than the
exclusion restriction in IV models, since the MIV is allowed to have a direct impact on potential
outcomes and may be non-random itself. We discuss and assess these assumptions below. The
nonparametric partial identification method that we employ has been used in other contexts
but to our knowledge has not been applied to bound effects of mental health on labor market
outcomes.4 Lastly, since mental health is inherently a continuous condition but is typically
measured in the literature with an indicator variable for being depressed or having a psychiatric
condition, we provide insights into the effects at different levels of adverse mental health
experienced (no-to-mild, moderate, and severe depressive symptoms).
Our estimated bounds indicate that being categorized as depressed decreases employment
by 10% and earnings by 27% at most, but we cannot statistically exclude a zero effect. When
considering different levels of depression, we find that going from having no-to-mild to severe
depressive symptoms reduces employment by 2-16% and earnings by 8-37%, with both estimated
bounds statistically ruling out zero effects.

Therefore, our results provide evidence of a

statistically significant average causal effect of going from having no-to-mild depression symptoms
to having severe depression symptoms on labor market outcomes. They also allow ruling out
relevant magnitudes of the effects of depression on labor market outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review of the
4 Examples

of previous applications include bounding the causal effect of parents’ schooling on children’s
schooling (De Haan, 2011), unemployment on mental health (Cygan-Rehm et al., 2017), English proficiency on
labor market outcomes (Gonzalez, 2005), criminal convictions on labor market outcomes (Richey, 2015), education
on social support (Huang et al., 2012), and social activities on cognition (Christelis and Dobrescu, 2019).
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literature and Section 2.3 gives a description of the data. Our econometric approach is explained
in Section 2.4 and the results are presented in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.

2.2

Literature Review

Most of the IV evidence on the effect of mental health on labor market outcomes for the US comes
from analysis of the National Comorbidity Survey (NCS), a nationally representative survey of
15-54 year-olds designed to study the prevalence, causes and consequences of comorbidity
between substance abuse disorders and nonsubstance abuse psychiatric disorders. Using the
1990-1992 NCS and instrumenting adult mental health with childhood and parental mental
illnesses, Ettner et al. (1997) found that a diagnosis of any psychiatric disorder in the last
year reduced the probability of being employed by 11 percentage points. They also found
negative effects of a past year psychiatric disorder on earnings, though IV estimates were only
statistically significant for women. Marcotte and Wilcox-Gök (2001a) estimated the effect of
depression, dysthymia, anxiety disorder, and anti-social personality disorder on earnings in the
1990-1992 NCS using measures of parental mental health as the instruments. They only found
a statistically significant negative effect for anxiety disorder on earnings for women, with IV
estimates showing that an anxiety disorder in the past year reduced earnings by 49%. Based
on IV quantile regressions, they did however find large negative effects of all four disorders at
the lower tail of the earnings distribution. Chatterji et al. (2011) estimated the effect of a past
year psychiatric disorder on employment and earnings in the 2001-2003 National Comorbidity
Survey-Replication, using childhood mental health and religiosity as instruments. Their IV
estimates showed that a past year psychiatric disorder reduced the likelihood of employment
by 17 percentage points for men and 9 percentage points for women.5 , 6 Unlike Ettner et al.
(1997) and Marcotte and Wilcox-Gök (2001a), Chatterji et al. (2011) did not find any evidence of
5 These

IV estimates are from appendix tables 2A and 2B in their NBER 2008 working paper (Chatterji et al.,
2008). The IV results for employment are not shown in their published paper (Chatterji et al., 2011).
6 Findings were similar based on bivariate probit models using the methods in Altonji et al. (2005), where
identification comes from making assumptions about the correlation between unobserved and observed factors
determining the outcome and endogenous variable, and the functional form. The bivariate probit estimates showed
that a past year psychiatric disorder decreases employment by 14 percentage points for men and 13 percentage
points for women.
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negative effects for earnings. They conjecture that the difference in findings could be due to the
US economy being stronger in 2001-2003 compared to 1990-1992.
Other IV studies for the US not using the NCS are Alexandre and French (2001), Chatterji
et al. (2007), and Ojeda et al. (2010). Alexandre and French (2001) use survey data collected from
a low-income neighborhood in Miami-Dade County, 1996-1997. Using religiosity and social
supports as instruments they found that depression reduces employment by 19 percentage
points. Chatterji et al. (2007) estimate labor market effects of a past year psychiatric disorder in
the 2002-2003 National Latino and Asian American Study using childhood mental health and
religiosity as instruments. They found large effects for Latinos—a past year psychiatric disorder
decreased employment by 8 percentage points for men and 26 percentage points for women—
and smaller negative effects of 1-3% on employment for Asians. Ojeda et al. (2010) estimate
the effect of the K6 Scale of Mental Illness on labor supply for natives and immigrants in the
2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Health using social support as the IV. They found that
immigrants’ labor supply is less responsive to mental health problems than the labor supply of
natives.
Results from US panel data studies also indicate detrimental effects of poor mental health on
employment, though the magnitudes are substantially smaller than IV estimates, and there is
mixed evidence for earnings. Peng et al. (2016) used the 2004-2009 Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey and correlated random effects specifications to control for omitted variable bias. They
found that depression reduces the probability of employment by 2.6 percentage points but did
not affect earnings. Cseh (2008) estimated regressions with individual fixed effects using the
1992, 1994, and 2004 rounds of the NLSY79, and found that depression did not affect wages for
women, but reduced wages of men by 3.4-4.3%.
Detrimental effects of poor mental health on employment have also been reported for other
countries. For example, Frĳters et al. (2014) estimate the effect of mental health on employment
using 10 waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey. They
construct a mental health index based on nine questions from the short-form general health
survey. They use death of a close friend as an instrument and estimate IV regressions with
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individual fixed effects. They find that a one standard deviation decrease in the mental health
index decreases employment by 30 percentage points. Bryan et al. (2020) use nine waves of
the UK Household Longitudinal Study and estimate individual fixed-effects regressions which
indicate that depression reduces employment by 1.6 percentage points. In a recent study, Biasi
et al. (2021) leverage the approval of lithium as a treatment for bipolar disorder in Denmark in
1976 as a natural experiment to identify the causal effect of access to treatment on career earnings.
They compare those with access at age 20—the usual age for onset of bipolar disorder—to those
born prior to 1956, using administrative data. They find that access to treatment reduces the
observed earnings difference of 38% between those with bipolar disorder and those without by
28%, and reduces the probability of zero earnings by 33%.
In sum, previous studies have consistently found negative effects of poor mental health
on employment in the US and internationally, and mixed findings for earnings. IV estimates
typically show larger detrimental effects of poor mental health on employment than individual
fixed-effect estimates.

2.3

Data

We use the NLSY79 which is a nationally representative panel study that follows 12,686
individuals from 1979, when they were aged 14–22, through the present. We measure mental
health using the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). The CES-D was
developed to provide a self-reported measure of symptoms of clinical depressive episodes to
allow for the epidemiological study of psychiatric problems in the general population (Radloff,
1977). The CES-D assesses depressive symptoms as a continuum and measures the frequency
of depressive symptoms over one week with 20 items. For example, respondents are asked
how often in the last week they were bothered by things not normally bothersome; could not
shake the blues; and felt like they were not as good as others. With four response categories
(0 = none to 3 = almost every day), the maximum score of the scale is 60. A score of 16 or
more on the CES-D indicates that one has a higher risk of clinical depression. Individuals can
also be classified as having no-to-mild depressive symptoms (CES-D score of 0-15), moderate
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depressive symptoms (CES-D score of 16-23) and severe depressive symptoms (CES-D score of
24-60) (Center for Child and Human Development, Georgetown University 2021).7 The original
20-item CES-D was first administered at the 1992 round, when individuals were 30 years old on
average. A total of 9,016 individuals were interviewed in 1992, of which 8,978 have valid data
on the CES-D score.
We estimate the effect of mental health measured in 1992 on employment and annual earnings
in the following year, 1993, to reduce concerns of reverse causality. Employment is measured
by a dummy variable equal to one if the individual reports working positive hours, and zero if
the individual reports working zero hours. Individuals who report being employed but work
zero hours, and individuals in the armed forces are coded as missing. A useful aspect of the
NLSY79 is that it contains Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) scores from the 1981 round
when respondents were between 16-21 years old. As we describe in the next section, we use the
AFQT score as a monotone instrumental variable. In total we have a sample of 7,665 individuals
with non-missing information on depressive symptoms, employment, earnings and the AFQT
score. Throughout our analysis we use the 1993 panel weights provided in the NLSY79.8
Summary statistics for our estimation sample are shown in Table 2.1. In the full sample
(column 1) the average age in 1992 is 31 years and 51% are female. White individuals make up
80% of the sample, and there is a higher proportion of Black individuals (14%) than Hispanic
individuals (6%).9 The average CES-D score in 1992 is 9.04 and 21% are classified as depressed
(CES-D ≥ 16). Most individuals (82%) have no-to-mild depressive symptoms (0 ≤ CES-D≤
15), while 10% have moderate (16 ≤ CES-D ≤ 23) and 8% have severe (CES-D ≥ 24) depressive
symptoms. Women have worse mental health than men—22% of women are depressed whereas
15% of men are depressed. Black and Hispanic individuals are also more likely to be depressed
7 We

also considered other classifications, such as no to very mild, mild, severe, and very severe depression
symptoms. The results are in general similar to those obtained with the 3-group classification we use herein.
8 The information on primary sampling units (PSUs) for the NLSY79 is part of the restricted geocode data, which
presents a complication for the bootstrapping inside our estimation and inference procedure described below. We
use the respondent’s Census region as the PSU, which is the finest level of geographical information available in
the public use dataset. We also follow Altonji et al. (2012) and stratify based on race and sex for the bootstrap
samples.
9 Respondents reported their race/ethnicity at baseline, which was mapped into three groups: Black, Hispanic,
and non-Black/non-Hispanic. We refer to the last group as white, although it is a heterogeneous group.
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than whites. The 1993 employment rate in the full sample is 88%, but there are differences by
sex and race. The employment rate of men (94%) is substantially higher than women (82%).
Similarly, white individuals have a higher employment rate (89%) than Black (80%) and Hispanic
(84%) individuals. A similar pattern is also observed for earnings. Average earnings (in 1993
dollars) are higher for men than women, and for white individuals compared to Black and
Hispanic individuals.

2.4

Methodology and Identifying Assumptions

Let every individual 𝑖 have a response function 𝑌(·) : 𝑇 → 𝑌 which maps treatments 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 into
potential outcomes 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡) ∈ 𝑌. In our context, the treatment 𝑡 is depressive symptoms measured
by the CES-D score in the form of either a binary indicator for depression or a discretized version
consisting of three levels: no-to-mild symptoms, moderate symptoms, and severe symptoms.
The outcome 𝑌 is employment or earnings. Let 𝑆 𝑖 denote the realized treatment received by
individual 𝑖, so that 𝑌𝑖 ≡

Í

𝑡∈𝑇

1{𝑆 𝑖 = 𝑡} · 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡) is the associated observed outcome.

To illustrate how the bounds are obtained, in this section we will focus on the case of three
treatment levels 𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , and 𝑡3 , which respectively correspond to no-to-mild, moderate, and severe
depressive symptoms.10 We are interested in the population ATE of, for example, worsening
mental health from 𝑡1 to 𝑡2 on labor market outcomes defined as:
Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) ≡ E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] − E [𝑌(𝑡1 )]

(2.1)

Estimation of the ATE is complicated because the potential outcome 𝑌(𝑡2 ) is unobserved for
individuals with treatment level of 𝑡1 , and the potential outcome 𝑌(𝑡1 ) is unobserved for
individuals with treatment level of 𝑡2 . This identification problem can be seen by using the
law of iterated expectations to write the expected potential outcome E [𝑌(𝑡1 )] as:

E [𝑌(𝑡1 )] = E [𝑌(𝑡1 ) | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] + E [𝑌(𝑡1 ) | 𝑆 ≠ 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 ≠ 𝑡1 ]
10 A

similar discussion would follow for a binary treatment defined by an indicator for depression.
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(2.2)

The data identify the sample analogues of all the right-hand side quantities except of the
counterfactual E [𝑌(𝑡1 ) | 𝑆 ≠ 𝑡1 ]. We thus need to impose identifying assumptions about this
missing counterfactual. Manski (1989) suggested a bounded support assumption, whereby one
imposes uses minimum (𝑌min ) and maximum (𝑌max ) values for the outcome variable in place
of E [𝑌(𝑡1 ) | 𝑆 ≠ 𝑡1 ]. Often, an outcome has natural boundaries, in which case the assumption
is innocuous. For the present chapter, an indicator for employment trivially has 𝑌min = 0 and
𝑌max = 1, and earnings also naturally are no less than zero. A choice of 𝑌max for earnings, on the
other hand, is less obvious. In such cases, the bounded support assumption can instead serve to
define the population of interest. In this vein, we will consider the sample maximum for earnings
in the NLSY as the upper bound on the support, such that we restrict attention to the space
of earnings reported in the data. Bounded support gives the Manski (1989) “no-assumption”
bounds:

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] + 𝑌min · Pr [𝑆 ≠ 𝑡1 ]
≤ E [𝑌(𝑡1 )] ≤

(2.3)

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] + 𝑌max · Pr [𝑆 ≠ 𝑡1 ]
The no-assumption lower (respectively, upper) bound on the ATE Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) is calculated by
subtracting the upper (lower) bound of E [𝑌(𝑡1 )] from the lower (upper) bound of E [𝑌(𝑡2 )]. That
is, bounds on Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) are written:

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + 𝑌min · Pr [𝑆 ≠ 𝑡2 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] − 𝑌max · Pr [𝑆 ≠ 𝑡1 ]
≤ Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) ≤

(2.4)

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + 𝑌max · Pr [𝑆 ≠ 𝑡2 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] − 𝑌min · Pr [𝑆 ≠ 𝑡1 ]
Bounds for other treatment effects such as Δ(𝑡3 , 𝑡2 ) or Δ(𝑡3 , 𝑡1 ) are computed analogously. In
practice, the no-assumption bounds are typically wide and they contain zero by construction.
They can, however, potentially rule out large positive or large negative values of the ATE. To
tighten the bounds, we employ three monotonicity assumptions introduced in Manski (1997)
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and Manski and Pepper (2000): (1) monotone treatment selection; (2) monotone treatment
response; and (3) monotone instrumental variable.

2.4.1

Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS)

The MTS assumption captures the notion that individuals who “selected” into higher CES-D
scores have lower latent employment probabilities and earnings. Formally, the non-positive
MTS assumption states that, for each 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 and two treatment levels 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 ,
𝜇2 > 𝜇1 =⇒ E [𝑌(𝑡) | 𝑆 = 𝜇2 ] ≤ E [𝑌(𝑡) | 𝑆 = 𝜇2 ]

(2.5)

In our context, the MTS assumption requires that, on average, individuals with worse mental
health have weakly lower potential outcomes than individuals with better mental health. The
MTS assumption is untestable since potential outcomes are unobserved. However, there is
evidence that poor mental health is associated with traits such as lower measured intelligence
and higher neuroticism which are in turn associated with lower employment and earnings
(Lin et al., 2018; Fletcher, 2013b). Moreover, we can indirectly shed light on the plausibility
of the MTS assumption in our sample by computing average characteristics of individuals
in different categories of depressive symptoms.

Intuitively, we would expect to see that

individuals with worse depressive symptoms show traits correlated with worse labor market
outcomes.11 Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for some observed characteristics by noto-mild, moderate, and severe depressive symptoms. Average parental education is lower for
individuals with moderate and severe depressive symptoms compared to individuals with noto-mild depressive symptoms. Individuals with moderate and severe depressive symptoms
also have statistically significantly lower AFQT scores in adolescence compared to individuals
with no-to-mild depressive symptoms. Furthermore, in adolescence they are also statistically
significantly less likely to expect to graduate from college.12 Education attained in adulthood
11 In

principle, this exercise should use characteristics that are not themselves affected by the individual’s mental
health. Some of the characteristics in Table 2.2 satisfy this condition (e.g., mother’s and father’s education), while
others may not (e.g., years of education). We still present averages for the latter variables for reference.
12 At the 1981 round in the NLSY respondents were asked “as things now stand, what is the highest grade or
year you think you will actually complete?”. We classify individuals as expecting to graduate college if they report
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(by 1993) may be influenced by mental health, but it is suggestive that individuals with moderate
and severe depressive symptoms have statistically significantly fewer years of education and
are less likely to be college graduates. Given the observed differences in those characteristics,
the MTS assumption seems plausible because individuals with worse mental health likely come
from lower SES families, have lower ability and education, all of which are associated with worse
labor market outcomes. Alternatively, the MTS assumption would be violated if individuals with
severe (moderate) depressive symptoms have better potential outcomes than individuals with
moderate (no-to-mild) depressive symptoms. This situation seems unlikely given that average
parental education, AFQT scores, educational expectations, and educational attainment are all
(weakly) lower for individuals with moderate and severe depressive symptoms compared to
individuals with no-to-mild depressive symptoms.13
To illustrate the derivation of the bounds on the ATE Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) under the MTS assumption,
consider bounding the term E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] in Equation (2.1). Using the law of iterated expectations,
we can write E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] as:

E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] = E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 < 𝑡2 ]·Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ]+E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ]·Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ]+E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]·Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
Then, the MTS bounds on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] are given by (Manski and Pepper, 2000):

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + 𝑌min · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
≤ E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] ≤

(2.6)

𝑌max · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
Notice how MTS tightens the bounds on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] relative to the no-assumption case.
First, for the conditional mean potential outcomes E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 < 𝑡2 ], we previously could only
4th year of college, or 5th year of college, or 6th+ year of college.
13 Corresponding summary statistics by gender and by race are given in Appendix Tables 2.A.1 and 2.A.2. A
similar pattern is observed to that in Table 2.2. The one notable point is that for Hispanic individuals average
parental education, AFQT scores, college expectations, and educational attainment are higher for individuals
with severe depressive symptoms compared to individuals with moderate depressive symptoms. However, those
differences are not statistically different from zero, and thus they are consistent with the weak inequality in the
MTS assumption.
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conclude that this is bounded below by 𝑌min due to the assumption of bounded support on
the outcome. However, under MTS, Equation (2.5) further implies that this cannot be less
than E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ], which is identified by the observed mean for those receiving 𝑡2 . Thus,
the lower bound on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] under MTS will exceed the no-assumption lower bound to the
extent that E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] is larger than 𝑌min . Similarly, for the conditional mean potential
outcome E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 > 𝑡2 ], bounded support alone could only yield an upper bound using
𝑌max . Again using Equation (2.5), MTS implies that the unidentified quantity can be no larger
than E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ], or the observed mean for 𝑆 = 𝑡2 , E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ]. Therefore, the upper
bound on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] under MTS will be below that from the no-assumption case.
As before, the lower (respectively, upper) bound on the ATE Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) is calculated by
subtracting the upper (lower) bound of E [𝑌(𝑡1 )] from the lower (upper) bound of E [𝑌(𝑡2 )]:

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + 𝑌min · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
− 𝑌max · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡1 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡1 ]
≤ Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) ≤

(2.7)

𝑌max · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
− E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡1 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] − 𝑌min · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡1 ]
and other comparisons of interest are obtained likewise.

2.4.2

Monotone Treatment Response (MTR)

The non-positive MTR assumption we employ imposes the restriction that worse mental health
(higher CES-D score) does not improve labor market outcomes. Formally, for each individual
and any treatment levels 𝑡 𝑘 and 𝑡 𝑗 :
𝑡 𝑗 > 𝑡 𝑘 =⇒ 𝑌(𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤ 𝑌(𝑡 𝑘 )

(2.8)

We believe that MTR is a reasonable assumption in our context because of the well-documented
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correlations between poor mental health and worse labor market outcomes (e.g., Chatterji et al.,
2007, 2011; Ettner et al., 1997; Marcotte and Wilcox-Gök, 2001b) and evidence that worse mental
health is associated with higher rates of absenteeism, “presenteeism” (Bubonya et al., 2017), and
lower productivity (Oswald et al., 2015). Theoretical models also imply that poor health leads
to worse labor market outcomes. For example, the Grossman (1972) health investment model
shows that poor health reduces time available for work because of increased time spent being
ill, increased preferences for leisure, or increased time needed to maintain health. Health is
also an input into the production function for human capital, and those with worse health have
lower human capital investments. Given the positive correlation of human capital investments
and labor market outcomes, as well as the economic theory behind the positive effect of human
capital accumulation on labor market outcomes (e.g., Card, 1999), MTR is consistent with those
theories.
A key implication from MTR is that, for example, E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 = 𝑡ℓ ] ≤ E [𝑌(𝑡1 ) | 𝑆 = 𝑡ℓ ] for
any ℓ , given that 𝑡2 > 𝑡1 . This provides tighter bounds on, say, E [𝑌(𝑡2 )], relative to the noassumption case in the following way. For any treatment levels 𝑡 < 𝑡2 , MTR implies that the
conditional mean E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 = 𝑡] is no greater than E [𝑌(𝑡) | 𝑆 = 𝑡], or the observed mean of 𝑌
at 𝑡, E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡]. This decreases the upper bound on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )], relative to that obtained from
the bounded support assumption alone. Further, for treatment levels 𝑡 ′ > 𝑡2 , MTR implies that
the conditional mean E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 = 𝑡 ′] cannot lie below E [𝑌(𝑡 ′) | 𝑆 = 𝑡 ′], which is identified by
the observed mean of 𝑌 at 𝑡 ′, E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡 ′]. This raises the lower bound on the unconditional
mean E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] when compared to the no-assumption lower bound.
The MTR bounds on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] are given by (Manski, 1997):
𝑌min · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 > 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
≤ E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] ≤

(2.9)

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + 𝑌max · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
The MTR lower (respectively, upper) bound on the ATE Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) is calculated by subtracting
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the upper (lower) bound of E [𝑌(𝑡1 )] from the lower (upper) bound of E [𝑌(𝑡2 )]. Thus, we have
𝑌min · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 > 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
− E [𝑌 | 𝑆 < 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡1 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] − 𝑌max · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡1 ]
≤ Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) ≤

(2.10)

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + 𝑌max · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
− 𝑌min · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡1 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 > 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡1 ]
Under the non-positive MTR assumption, the upper bound on Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) is never above zero,
because MTR rules out the possibility that worse mental health improves labor market outcomes.
The MTR and MTS assumptions can be combined to provide tighter bounds on the mean
potential outcomes. Taking again the example of E [𝑌(𝑡2 )], recall that, among treatment levels
𝑡 < 𝑡2 , MTS worked to increase the lower bound, while MTR decreases the upper bound. When
imposed simultaneously, the bounds are narrowed from both sides, as we are able to conclude
that E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 = 𝑡] lies between the observed mean at 𝑡2 (from below) and the observed mean
at 𝑡 (from above). In a similar way, the conditional mean E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑆 = 𝑡 ′], for any 𝑡 ′ > 𝑡2 , lies
weakly above the observed mean at 𝑡 ′ (due to MTR) and weakly below the observed mean at 𝑡2
(due to MTS).
The MTR-MTS bounds on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] are given by (Manski and Pepper, 2000):

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 > 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
≤ E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] ≤

(2.11)

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
As before, the MTR-MTS lower (upper) bound on the ATE Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) is calculated by subtracting
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the upper (lower) bound of E [𝑌(𝑡1 )] from the lower (upper) bound of E [𝑌(𝑡2 )], as follows:

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 > 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
− E [𝑌 | 𝑆 < 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡1 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡1 ]
(2.12)

≤ Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) ≤

E [𝑌 | 𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] + E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡2 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡2 ]
− E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 < 𝑡1 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 = 𝑡1 ] − E [𝑌 | 𝑆 > 𝑡1 ] · Pr [𝑆 > 𝑡1 ]
Note that the MTS and MTR assumptions imposed together yield a testable implication that
observed mean labor market outcomes are weakly decreasing in the CES-D score. That is, for
any two treatments 𝑡 𝑘 and 𝑡 𝑗 , 𝑡 𝑗 > 𝑡 𝑘 implies that E 𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡 𝑗 ≤ E [𝑌 | 𝑆 = 𝑡 𝑘 ]. Table 2.3 shows





that average labor market outcomes are decreasing as a function of depressive symptoms.
While this is not necessarily evidence that MTR-MTS holds in the sample, it is consistent
with the implication from combining the MTS and MTR assumptions. The employment rate
(respectively, average earnings) for individuals with no-to-mild depressive symptoms is 90%
($22,830); in contrast, it is 82% ($16,752) for individuals with moderate depressive symptoms
and 75% ($12,509) for individuals with severe depressive symptoms.14

2.4.3

Monotone Instrumental Variable (MIV)

The MTR-MTS bounds can be further narrowed by using a monotone instrumental variable
(MIV), which is a variable that has a monotone (weakly increasing or weakly decreasing) mean
relationship with the potential outcomes 𝑌(𝑡). The MIV assumption is weaker than the exclusion
restriction in IV models, which requires the instrument to be mean independent of the outcome.
The MIV assumption also does not require that the variable has a causal effect on the outcome.
14 Appendix

Table 2.A.3 shows that mean employment and earnings are also decreasing in the CES-D score for
men, women, white and Black individuals. Hispanic individuals with severe depressive symptoms have higher
employment and earnings on average than individuals with moderate depressive symptoms, but the differences
are not statistically significantly different from zero, and thus consistent with the weak inequality in the testable
implication.
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Specifically, a weakly increasing MIV 𝑍 satisfies:
𝑚1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑚2 =⇒ E [𝑌(𝑡) | 𝑍 = 𝑚1 ] ≤ E [𝑌(𝑡) | 𝑍 = 𝑚] ≤ E [𝑌(𝑡) | 𝑍 = 𝑚2 ]

(2.13)

for all treatment levels 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇.
In this chapter, we use adolescent AFQT scores as an MIV. Using this measure of cognitive
skills or ability is easy to justify based economic models of human capital (e.g., Ben-Porath, 1967).
These models imply that higher innate ability is related to higher labor market outcomes both
directly and indirectly through education. Those models, as well as our MIV assumption, are
consistent with the well-documented positive relationship between the AFQT (and in general
adolescent cognitive ability) and better labor market outcomes, as well as on genetic correlations
between intelligence and household income.15
With a variable 𝑍 satisfying the MIV assumption, we can divide the sample into bins defined
by the values of 𝑍 and compute the MTR-MTS bounds within each bin. In our case of a nonnegative MIV, Equation (2.13) implies that the lower bound on E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑍 = 𝑚] is no lower than
the lower bound on E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑍 = 𝑚1 ], and its upper bound is no higher than the upper bound
on E [𝑌(𝑡2 ) | 𝑍 = 𝑚2 ]. For the bin where 𝑍 has a value of 𝑚, we can thus obtain a new lower
bound by taking the largest lower bound over all bins where 𝑍 ≤ 𝑚. Likewise, we can obtain
a new upper bound by taking the smallest upper bound over all bins where 𝑍 ≥ 𝑚. The MIVMTR-MTS bounds are then obtained by taking the weighted average over all the conditional
bounds (which follows from the law of iterated expectations):

Õ



Pr [𝑍 = 𝑚] · max LBE[𝑌(𝑡2 )|𝑍=𝑚1 ]



𝑚1 ≤𝑚

𝑚∈𝑀

(2.14)

≤ E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] ≤

Õ
𝑚∈𝑀



Pr [𝑍 = 𝑚] · min UBE[𝑌(𝑡2 )|𝑍=𝑚2 ]



𝑚2 ≥𝑚

where LB denotes the MTR-MTS lower bound from Equation (2.11) on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] at values 𝑍 = 𝑚1
15 Using

the UK Biobank, Hill et al. (2019) find a genetic correlation of 0.69 between intelligence and income.

80

of the MIV. Likewise, UB represents the MTR-MTS upper bound on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] conditional on
values 𝑍 = 𝑚2 of the MIV. The MIV-MTR-MTS lower (upper) bound on the ATE Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 )
is calculated once again by subtracting the upper (lower) bound of E [𝑌(𝑡1 )] from the lower
(upper) bound of E [𝑌(𝑡2 )]:

Õ





Pr [𝑍 = 𝑚] · max LBE[𝑌(𝑡2 )|𝑍=𝑚1 ] −
𝑚1 ≤𝑚

𝑚∈𝑀

Õ



Pr [𝑍 = 𝑚] · min UBE[𝑌(𝑡1 )|𝑍=𝑚2 ]

𝑚∈𝑀



𝑚2 ≥𝑚

(2.15)

≤ E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] ≤

Õ
𝑚∈𝑀





Pr [𝑍 = 𝑚] · min UBE[𝑌(𝑡2 )|𝑍=𝑚2 ] −
𝑚2 ≥𝑚

Õ
𝑚∈𝑀



Pr [𝑍 = 𝑚] · max LBE[𝑌(𝑡1 )|𝑍=𝑚1 ]



𝑚1 ≤𝑚

We make an additional observation regarding the MIV-MTR-MTS bounds which cannot be
easily seen from (2.15), but which can allow for further tightening of the bounds in practice.
Consider the ATE in (2.1): when MTR in (2.8) is imposed alongside an MIV it implies that, within
each bin of the MIV, the lower bound on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] must be at least as large as the upper bound
on E [𝑌(𝑡1 )] (with 𝑡2 > 𝑡1 ). This implication of MTR (that bin-specific ATEs are non-negative)
represents a potential source for tightening the bounds relative to not assuming MTR. This was
originally emphasized by McCarthy et al. (2015).

2.4.4

Estimation and Inference

The no-assumption, MTS, MTR, and MTR-MTS bounds are all estimated straightforwardly by
plugging in sample analogs for the expectations and probabilities in the corresponding bounds’
expressions. Inference is undertaken by constructing Imbens and Manski (2004) confidence
intervals. Estimation and inference under the MIV-MTR-MTS bounds require that we deal with
two issues which have been noted since Manski and Pepper (2000). The first is that the plug-in
estimators of Equation (2.14)—an example of so-called intersection bounds—suffer from bias
in finite samples that makes them narrower relative to the corresponding true identified set.
The bias then carries over to estimated bounds on the average treatment effects of interest in
(2.15). The second, related issue is that the corresponding confidence intervals do not have the
expected coverage at the desired level. Both of these issues arise because of the non-concavity
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and non-convexity, respectively, of the min and max operators in Equation (2.14).
We address both issues in the bounds involving the MIV assumption by employing the
estimation and valid-inference procedure in Chernozhukov et al. (2013) for intersection bounds
(hereafter, CLR).16 The CLR procedure allows us to obtain lower and upper bound estimators
that satisfy a half-median unbiasedness property; that is, the estimated lower/upper bound
will fall below/above the true lower/upper bound with a probability of at least one-half
asymptotically. This property is important because Hirano and Porter (2012) showed that
there exist no locally asymptotically unbiased estimators of parameters that contain min and
max operators, implying that methods aimed at reducing bias (such as the bootstrap) cannot
completely eliminate it and reducing bias too much eventually leads the variance of such
methods to increase significantly. The details on our implementation of the CLR procedure can
be found in Appendix 2.B.

2.5
2.5.1

Results
Main Results

Table 2.4 provides results for the effect of being depressed on employment and earnings. The
OLS estimates in column 1 indicate that depressed individuals are 10 percentage points less
likely to be employed, and their earnings are $7,931 less than non-depressed individuals. OLS
estimates are unlikely to be causal because of unobserved factors that are correlated with
mental health and labor market outcomes. Columns 2-6 provide bounds and 95% confidence
intervals on the ATE of being depressed using the nonparametric partial identification procedure
described in Section 4. The no assumption bounds in column 2 are wide, which is typical of
this kind of bounds. They indicate that the true causal effect of depression on employment
ranges from -77 to 23 percentage points, and from -$34,516 to $66,441 for earnings. Still, they
rule out, without assumptions beyond bounded support of the outcome, detrimental effects
16 See

also Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2013) for additional discussion on the CLR procedure and an application
estimating bounds on local average treatment effects without the exclusion restriction under a different set of
monotonicity assumptions.
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from depression that are larger than 77 percentage points and $34,516 for employment and
earnings, respectively. Adding the MTS assumption—that depressed individuals have lower
average potential labor market outcomes than individuals who are not depressed—substantially
increases the lower bounds. The MTS bounds in column 3 indicate that the effect of depression
is to at most reduce employment by 11 percentage points and earnings by $7,935. The MTS
bounds are still wide and null effects as well as relatively large positive effects cannot be ruled
out. Column 4 shows bounds under the MTR assumption, which states that worse mental
health does not improve labor market outcomes. This means that the upper bound under the
MTR assumption is zero, while the lower bound is the same as in the no assumption bounds.
The combination of the MTR and MTS assumptions in column 5 provides considerably tighter
bounds compared to the previous bounds. The bounds for employment and earnings are [0.11, 0.00] and [-$7,935, $0.00], respectively. Adding the MIV assumption to the MTR-MTS
bounds further narrows the bounds. The MIV-MTS-MTR bounds in column 6 indicate that
being depressed decreases employment by at most 9 percentage points and earnings by at most
$6,082. These estimates correspond to effects of at most 10% for employment and 27% for
earnings relative to average employment and earnings for individuals who are not depressed.17
These effects are smaller than the effect indicated by the OLS point estimates, though the OLS
point estimates are included in the corresponding 95% confidence interval for employment,
but not for earnings. The estimated bounds do not exclude zero and are consistent with
both relatively large effects reported in IV studies and small effects reported in studies using
individual fixed-effects of depression. However, it is important to recall that in the presence of
heterogeneous treatment effects, IV and individual fixed-effect methods estimate a parameter
that is different from the ATE, which is the one we are bounding.
Table 2.5 presents bounds on the ATE of going from having (1) no-to-mild to moderate
depressive symptoms, (2) moderate to severe depressive symptoms and (3) no-to-mild to severe
depressive symptoms. OLS estimates show large labor market disparities between individuals
with no-to-mild and moderate depressive symptoms. Individuals with moderate depressive
symptoms are 8 percentage points less likely to be employed compared to individuals with no17 Average

employment and earnings for non-depressed individuals are 0.90 and $22,830 respectively.
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to-mild depressive symptoms, and their earnings are $6,077 lower. Employment and earnings
differences between individuals with moderate and severe depressive symptoms are slightly
smaller; the employment gap is 7 percentage points and the earnings differential is $4,243.
The largest labor market disparities are observed between individuals with severe and no-tomild depressive symptoms, with an employment gap of 15 percentage points and an earnings
differential of $10,321. As before, the OLS estimates are likely not causal due to omitted variable
bias. The pattern of results from sequentially adding the MTS, MTR, and MIV assumptions is
the same as in Table 2.4. The narrowest bounds are provided by employing the MTS, MTR,
and MIV assumptions in column 6. These bounds do not rule out a null effect for going
from having no-to-mild to moderate depressive symptoms. The lower bounds though suggest
slightly smaller effects than the corresponding OLS estimates, although the latter are inside
the bounds’ 95% confidence intervals. The effect of going from having no-to-mild to moderate
depressive symptoms is to decrease employment by at most 7 percentage points and earnings
by at most $5,045. These effects correspond to decreases of at most 8% for employment and
22% for earnings, relative to average employment and earnings for individuals with no-to-mild
depressive symptoms. The MIV-MTS-MTR bounds on the effect for going from having moderate
to severe depressive symptoms also do not exclude zero and the OLS estimates are within the
estimated bounds. The lower bound indicates that going from moderate to severe depressive
symptoms at most reduces employment by 12 percentage points (15%) and earnings by $7,390
(44%).
Notably, the results in Table 2.5 show that a null effect is statistically excluded (at the 95%
confidence level) in the estimated bounds for severe vs no-to-mild depressive symptoms under
the MTS, MTR, and MIV assumptions. These estimated bounds imply that the reduction in
employment (respectively, earnings) is at least 2 percentage points ($1,785) and at most 14
percentage points ($8,400). In percentage terms, these results imply that the population causal
average effect of going from no-to-mild to severe depression symptoms is a decrease of 2-16%
for employment, and 8-37% for earnings. These estimated bounds on the effects of interest are
meaningful as they are obtained under relatively weak assumptions. To get a sense about the
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magnitude of these estimated effects, Table 2.6 provides bounds on the effect of education on
employment and earnings for our estimation sample.18 These estimated bounds closely mirror
the original application in Manski and Pepper (2000). The MIV-MTS-MTR bounds on high
school dropout versus high school graduate/some college do not exclude zero, but indicate that
going from being a high school dropout to high school graduate/some college at most increases
employment by 11 percentage points (15%) and earnings by $9,148 (87%). The maximum
reduction in employment (earnings) in percentage terms from going from no-to-mild to severe
depressive symptoms is similar to (half the size of) the increase in employment (earnings) from
going from being a high school dropout to high school graduate/some college. While this is
a comparison of the upper bounds on the effects, it suggests that the effects of no-to-mild to
severe depression symptoms on labor market outcomes are non-negligible. Another point of
comparison for the magnitude of our estimated effects is to consider traditional estimates of the
returns to schooling. In a survey by Card (1999) of IV estimates of the return on earnings to
one year of schooling, he finds that they range from about 6-15%. Our inference on the effect of
no-to-mild to severe depressive symptoms on earnings of between 8-37% is at least comparable to
the earnings effect of an additional year of schooling, informally reinforcing that the magnitude
of our estimated effects is not negligible (as before, we point out that the IV estimates surveyed in
Card (1999) apply to a subpopulation defined by each of the instruments used in those studies).

2.5.2

Results by Sex, and by Race

In this section, we further analyze our effects of interest across different demographic groups.
The results are summarized in Figures 1 and 2, which show the MIV-MTR-MTS bounds and 95%
confidence intervals, along with the OLS estimates (full results are given in Appendix Tables
2.A.4-2.A.8). While it is difficult to make formal comparisons across groups because the bounds
overlap, there are some interesting findings. First, examining the width of the bounds, the range
of possible values of the causal effect is clearly narrower for women than for men. Second, the
bounds on the ATE of going from no-to-mild to severe depressive symptoms for employment are
18 For

this exercise, we drop 6 observations from our estimation sample that have missing values on education,
resulting in a sample size of 7,659.
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statistically negative for men, but not for women. Going from no-to-mild to severe depressive
symptoms decreases the probability of being employed by 3-17 percentage points (3-18%) and
earnings by $2,500-$11,172 (9-39%) for men. Third, the bounds on severe versus no-to-mild
depressive symptoms for employment and earnings exclude zero for white, Black and Hispanic
individuals, but their corresponding 95% confidence intervals include zero. The exception is
the 95% confidence interval on earnings for Hispanic individuals, which indicates a reduction
in earnings of $2,133 to $8,932 (11-45%).

2.6

Summary

Credibly identifying the causal effect of poor mental health on labor market outcomes is
challenging because of omitted variable bias and reverse causality. To address these issues,
previous literature has used childhood and parental mental health, religiosity, death of a close
friend, availability of social services and social support as instruments, but these instruments
may not satisfy the exclusion restriction. Other studies have used individual fixed effects, which
control for unobserved time invariant characteristics, but they are unable to control for time
varying confounders, such as stress. In addition, in the presence of heterogeneous effects, IV
and individual fixed-effect methods estimate effects for specific subpopulations that may or
may not correspond to the population of interest. We contribute to the literature by using a
nonparametric partial identification method to provide bounds on the population average effect
of depression on employment and earnings. Although we do not point identify the causal
effect, our approach uses relatively weak assumptions and provides bounds on the population
average treatment effect. These assumptions are based on weak monotonicity relationships on
the selection process (MTS), the treatment response (MTR), and the link between a variable
(referred to as a monotone instrument) and the outcome (MIV).
When looking at a binary indicator for depression, our results under the MTS, MTR and
MIV assumptions indicate that the effect of depression is at most 10% on employment and
27% on earnings, thus ruling out potentially plausible magnitudes for these effects. When
considering the dose-response nature of depression symptoms and labor market outcomes, we
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find statistically significant and economically non-negligible effects of going from no-to-mild
to severe depression symptoms on employment and earnings. In particular, we find that these
effects result in decreases of 2-16% for employment, and 8-37% for earnings. Interestingly, these
bounds are somewhat comparable in magnitude (in absolute value) to corresponding bounds
obtained for going from being a high school dropout to high school graduate/some college on
labor market outcomes. Moreover, our estimated bounds rule out, for the population average
effect, the magnitude of some of the effects obtained in prior studies, particularly very large
detrimental effects on employment, and a zero effect on earnings (at least for going from no-tomild to severe depressive symptoms). Therefore, our findings, obtained using relatively weak
assumptions, point to potentially significant detrimental causal effects of depression symptoms
on labor market outcomes.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Full

Male

Female

White

Black

Hispanic

Female

0.51
(0.50)

·
·

·
·

0.50
(0.50)

0.52
(0.50)

0.50
(0.50)

White

0.80
(0.40)

0.80
(0.40)

0.80
(0.40)

·
·

·
·

·
·

Black

0.14
(0.35)

0.14
(0.34)

0.14
(0.35)

·
·

·
·

·
·

Hispanic

0.06
(0.24)

0.06
(0.24)

0.06
(0.24)

·
·

·
·

·
·

AFQT (1981)

47.79
(28.85)

48.29
(30.03)

47.31
(27.65)

53.52
(27.44)

22.41
(20.62)

30.49
(24.67)

Age (1992)

31.06
(2.31)

31.03
(2.33)

31.07
(2.31)

31.07
(2.31)

31.01
(2.33)

30.93
(2.35)

CES-D score (1992)

9.04
(9.00)

8.07
(8.15)

9.99
(9.67)

8.49
(8.76)

11.42
(9.48)

10.82
(9.89)

Depressed

0.21
(0.41)

0.15
(0.35)

0.22
(0.42)

0.16
(0.37)

0.28
(0.45)

0.24
(0.43)

No-to-mild symptoms

0.82
(0.39)

0.85
(0.35)

0.78
(0.42)

0.84
(0.37)

0.72
(0.45)

0.76
(0.43)

Moderate symptoms

0.10
(0.31)

0.08
(0.28)

0.12
(0.33)

0.09
(0.29)

0.16
(0.37)

0.12
(0.32)

Severe symptoms

0.08
(0.27)

0.06
(0.24)

0.10
(0.30)

0.07
(0.26)

0.11
(0.32)

0.12
(0.33)

Employed (1993)

0.88
(0.33)

0.94
(0.24)

0.82
(0.39)

0.89
(0.31)

0.80
(0.40)

0.84
(0.36)

Earnings (1993)

21,365
(19,862)

22,769
(20,594)

14,767
(14,823)

17,944
(16,405)

3,907

2,291

1,467

Observations

7,665

27,455
15,405
(21,575) (15,916)
3,678

3,987

Summary statistics are weighted using the 1993 panel sampling weights. Standard deviations in
parentheses.

88

Table 2.2: Observed Family Background, Ability, and Education
by Depressive Symptom Severity, Full Sample
No-to-Mild

Moderate

Severe

Female

0.48
(0.05)

0.60
(0.06)

0.61
(0.05)

0.12★★★
(0.03)

0.01
(0.04)

0.13★★★
(0.03)

White

0.82
(0.04)

0.71
(0.06)

0.71
(0.05)

−0.11★★★
(0.03)

0.00
(0.03)

−0.11★★★
(0.03)

Black

0.12
(0.03)

0.22
(0.07)

0.19
(0.05)

0.09★★
(0.03)

-0.03
(0.03)

0.07★★★
(0.03)

Hispanic

0.06
(0.01)

0.07
(0.02)

0.10
(0.02)

0.01★
(0.01)

0.03★★
(0.01)

0.04★★★
(0.01)

Mother′s Education

11.73
(0.08)

11.12
(0.14)

10.80
(0.23)

−0.60★★★
(0.10)

-0.32
(0.24)

−0.93★★★
(0.19)

Father′s Education

11.97
(0.13)

11.31
(0.24)

11.16
(0.30)

−0.66★★★
(0.21)

-0.15
(0.30)

−0.81★★★
(0.21)

AFQT Score

50.35
(1.32)

38.77
(2.29)

33.59
(1.46)

−11.56★★★
(1.34)

−5.18★★★
(1.50)

−16.77★★★
(0.75)

Expect to Graduate College

0.41
(0.01)

0.31
(0.02)

0.24
(0.03)

−0.10★★★
(0.02)

−0.07★★★
(0.02)

−0.17★★★
(0.02)

Years of Education

13.41
(0.06)

12.78
(0.11)

12.19
(0.12)

−0.63★★★
(0.08)

−0.59★★★
(0.11)

−1.23★★★
(0.10)

College Graduate

0.25
(0.01)

0.18
(0.02)

0.11
(0.02)

−0.08★★★
(0.02)

−0.07★★★
(0.02)

−0.15★★★
(0.02)

Variable (Survey Year)

Moderate – Severe –
No-to-Mild Moderate

Severe –
No-to-Mild

Demographics (1979)

Family Background (1979)

Ability Measures (1981)

Education (1993)

Summary statistics are weighted by the 1993 panel sampling weights. The sample size for demographics and AFQT score is
7,665. The sample sizes for the other variables are lower due to missing values: (1) mother’s education 𝑁 = 7, 190; (2) father’s
education 𝑁 = 6, 554; (3) expect to graduate college 𝑁 = 7, 610; (4) Education 𝑁 = 7, 654. Standard errors in parentheses.
★ ★ ★ statistically significant at 1%, ★★ statistically significant at 5%, ★ statistically significant at 10%
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Table 2.3: Labor Market Outcomes by Depressive Symptom Severity, Full Sample
Depressive Symptoms, 𝑡

E [Employed | 𝑇 = 𝑡] E [Earnings | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

No-to-Mild

0.90

22,830

0.82

6,023

Moderate

0.82

16,752

0.10

926

Severe

0.75

12,509

0.08

716

Summary statistics are weighted by the 1993 panel sampling weights.
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Table 2.4: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of being Depressed on Labor Market
Outcomes

(1)
OLS

(2)
No Assumption

(3)
MTS

(4)
MTR

(5)
MTS+MTR

(6)
MIV+MTS+MTR

−0.108★★★

[-0.771 , 0.229]

[-0.108 , 0.229]

[-0.771 , 0.000]

[-0.108 , 0.000]

[-0.091 , 0.000]

(0.019)

(-0.788 , 0.246)

(-0.140 , 0.246)

(-0.788 , 0.000)

(-0.143 , 0.000)

(-0.121 , 0.000)

−7931★★★

[-34,516 , 66,441]

[-7935 , 66,441] [-34,516 , 0.000]

[-7935 , 0.000]

[-6082 , 0.000]

(-35,868 , 67,793) (-9188 , 67,793) (-35,868 , 0.000)

(-9261 , 0.000)

(-7520 , 0.000)

Panel A: Employment
Depressed

Panel B: Earnings
Depressed

(749)

Robust standard errors in (.) in column 1. In columns 2-6 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding 95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999
bootstrap replications. Earnings are bounded between $0 and $100,948. AFQT score is used as the MIV with 5 bins. 1993 panel weights are applied
to OLS regressions and estimated bounds.
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Table 2.5: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of Depressive Symptom Intensity on Labor
Market Outcomes

(1)
OLS

(2)
No Assumption

(3)
MTS

(4)
MTR

(5)
MTS+MTR

(6)
MIV+MTS+MTR

Moderate vs

−0.077★★★

[-0.832 , 0.249]

[-0.143 , 0.235]

[-0.771 , 0.000]

[-0.083 , 0.000]

[-0.067 , 0.000]

No-to-Mild

(0.020)

(-0.843 , 0.269)

(-0.173 , 0.253)

(-0.788 , 0.000)

(-0.119 , 0.000)

(-0.094 , 0.000)

Severe vs

−0.072★★★

[-0.921 , 0.894]

[-0.218 , 0.225]

[-0.838 , 0.000]

[-0.135 , 0.000]

[-0.122 , 0.000]

Moderate

(0.018)

(-0.929 , 0.902)

(-0.254 , 0.250)

(-0.854 , 0.000)

(-0.172 , 0.000)

(-0.159 , 0.000)

Severe vs

−0.149★★★

[-0.857 , 0.248]

[-0.149 , 0.248]

[-0.857 , 0.000]

[-0.149 , 0.000]

[-0.139 , -0.017]

(0.024)

(-0.873 , 0.265)

(-0.189 , 0.266)

(-0.873 , 0.000)

(-0.192 , 0.000)

(-0.182 , -0.002)

Moderate vs

−6077★★★

[-35,526 , 73,580]

[-7435, 66,784]

[-34,516, 0.000]

[-6425, 0.000]

[-5045, 0.000]

No-to-Mild

(1087)

(-36,942, 75,159)

(-9160, 68,218)

(-35,868, 0.000)

(-8292, 0.000)

(-7009, 0.000)

Severe vs

−4243★★★

[-91,180, 92,069]

[-72,886, 78,413] [-27,497, 0.000]

[-9200, 0.000]

[-7390, 0.000]

Moderate

(871)

(-92,131, 92,913)

(-74,426, 79,722)

(-28,621, 0.000)

(-10,043, 0.000)

(-8097, 0.000)

Severe vs

−10, 321★★★

[-36,259, 75,202]

[-10,324, 75,202] [-36,259, 0.000]

[-10,324, 0.000]

[-8400, -1785]

(588)

(-37,667, 76,279)

(-11,290, 76,279) (-37,668, 0.000)

(-11,309, 0.000)

(-9328, -97)

Panel A: Employment

No-to-Mild
Panel B: Earnings

No-to-Mild

Robust standard errors in (.) in column 1. In columns 2-6 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding 95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999
bootstrap replications. Earnings are bounded between $0 and $100,948. AFQT score is used as the MIV with 5 bins. 1993 panel weights are applied
to OLS regressions and estimated bounds.
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Table 2.6: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of Educational Attainment on Labor
Market Outcomes

(1)
OLS

(2)
No Assumption

(3)
MTS

(4)
MTR

(5)
MTS+MTR

(6)
MIV+MTS+MTR

0.137★★★

[-0.398, 0.837]

[-0.192, 0.166]

[0.000, 0.825]

[0.000, 0.154]

[0.000, 0.106]

(0.025)

(-0.413, 0.851)

(-0.207, 0.210)

(0.000, 0.840)

(0.000, 0.200)

(0.000, 0.162)

0.071★★★

[-0.697, 0.415]

[-0.683, 0.170]

[0.000, 0.332]

[0.000, 0.087]

[0.000, 0.069]

(0.004)

(-0.709, 0.430)

(-0.694, 0.185)

(0.000, 0.344)

(0.000, 0.096)

(0.000, 0.080)

0.208★★★

[-0.749, 0.905]

[-0.749, 0.208]

[0.000, 0.905]

[0.000, 0.208]

[0.004, 0.148]

(0.028)

(-0.763, 0.921)

(-0.763, 0.254)

(0.000, 0.921)

(0.000, 0.258)

(0.001, 0.196)

8355★★★

[-78,523, 46,114]

[-74,105, 27,625]

[0.000, 30,319]

[0.000, 11,829]

[0.000, 9148]

(1217)

(-79,547, 47,951)

(-75,259, 30,156) (0.000, 31,709)

(0.000, 13,955)

(0.000, 10,971)

14, 785★★★

[-39,398, 72,847]

[-30,214, 16,896]

[0.000, 71,675]

[0.000, 15,723]

[0.000, 8578]

(972)

(-40,891, 74,082)

(-31,423, 18,495) (0.000, 72,851)

(0.000, 17,277)

(0.000, 9392)

23, 139★★★

[-82,948, 83,984]

[-82,948, 23,146]

[0.000, 83,984]

[0.000, 23,146]

[307, 16,428]

(1530)

(-84,370, 84,938)

(-84,370, 25,543) (0.000, 84,938)

(0.000, 25,606)

(199, 17,919)

Panel A: Employment
HS Grad/Some College vs
HS Dropout
College Grad vs
HS Grad/Some College
College Grad vs
HS Dropout
Panel B: Earnings
HS Grad/Some College vs
HS Dropout
College Grad vs
HS Grad/Some College
College Grad vs
HS Dropout

Robust standard errors in (.) in column 1. In columns 2-6 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding 95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999
bootstrap replications. Earnings are bounded between $0 and $100,948. AFQT score is used as the MIV with 5 bins. Sample size is 7,659. Average
employment and earnings in (1) high school dropouts are 0.74 and $10,480; (2) high school grad/some college are 0.88 and $18,835 and (3) college
grads are 0.95 and $33,619. 1993 panel weights are applied to OLS regressions and estimated bounds.
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Figure 2.1: MIV+MTS+MTR Bounds for Employment
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Figure 2.2: MIV+MTS+MTR Bounds for Earnings
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Appendix
2.A

Additional Tables
Table 2.A.1: Observed Family Background, Ability, and Education
by Depressive Symptom Severity and Sex
No-to-Mild

Moderate

Mother′s Education

11.74
(0.12)

11.35
(0.25)

10.73
(0.43)

−0.44★★
(0.18)

-0.62
(0.35)

−1.06★★★
(0.35)

Father′s Education

12.06
(0.22)

11.49
(0.45)

11.01
(0.72)

-0.57
(0.32)

-0.47
(0.65)

−1.04★
(0.53)

AFQT Score

50.46
(1.91)

39.34
(3.89)

30.95
(2.79)

−11.12★★★
(2.17)

−8.38★★
(2.72)

−19.50★★★
(1.60)

Expect to Graduate College

0.42
(0.02)

0.28
(0.02)

0.25
(0.06)

−0.14★★★
(0.02)

-0.03
(0.04)

−0.17★★★
(0.05)

Years of Education

13.23
(0.08)

12.71
(0.12)

12.01
(0.17)

−0.62★★★
(0.09)

−0.69★★★
(0.16)

−1.32★★★
(0.14)

College Graduate

0.25
(0.01)

0.17
(0.02)

0.09
(0.02)

−0.08★★★
(0.02)

−0.07★★
(0.03)

−0.15★★★
(0.02)

Mother′s Education

11.66
(0.10)

10.96
(0.16)

10.84
(0.27)

−0.70★★★
(0.12)

-0.12
(0.31)

−0.82★★★
(0.22)

Father′s Education

11.87
(0.15)

11.19
(0.27)

11.24
(0.21)

−0.69★
(0.29)

0.06
(0.27)

−0.63★★★
(0.18)

AFQT Score

50.24
(1.82)

38.38
(2.78)

35.24
(1.57)

−11.86★★★
(1.81)

−3.14★
(1.59)

−15.01★★★
(0.73)

Expect to Graduate College

0.40
(0.02)

0.33
(0.04)

0.23
(0.04)

−0.07★★
(0.03)

−0.10★★
(0.02)

−0.16★★★
(0.02)

Years of Education

13.50
(0.07)

12.83
(0.16)

12.30
(0.18)

−0.67★★★
(0.10)

−0.53★★
(0.16)

−1.20★★★
(0.13)

College Graduate

0.26
(0.01)

0.19
(0.03)

0.12
(0.03)

−0.07★★★
(0.02)

−0.07★
(0.04)

−0.14★★★
(0.03)

Variable

Severe Moderate – Severe –
No-to-Mild Moderate

Severe –
No-to-Mild

Panel A: Male

Panel B: Female

Summary statistics are weighted by the 1993 panel sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses. ★ ★ ★ statistically
significant at 1%, ★★ statistically significant at 5%, ★ statistically significant at 10%
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Table 2.A.2: Observed Family Background, Ability, and Education
by Depressive Symptom Severity and Race
No-to-Mild

Moderate

Mother′s Education

12.04
(0.09)

11.61
(0.13)

11.31
(0.34)

−0.43★★
(0.11)

-0.30
(0.33)

−0.74★★
(0.27)

Father′s Education

12.35
(0.16)

11.98
(0.21)

11.65
(0.39)

-0.38
(0.22)

-0.33
(0.34)

−0.71★★
(0.26)

AFQT Score

55.39
(1.08)

47.09
(1.44)

40.15
(1.60)

−8.30★★★
(1.22)

−6.94★★★
(1.26)

−15.24★★★
(0.77)

Expect to Graduate College

0.41
(0.02)

0.33
(0.03)

0.23
(0.04)

−0.08★★★
(0.03)

−0.10★★★
(0.03)

−0.18★★★
(0.03)

Years of Education

13.55
(0.07)

13.04
(0.14)

12.33
(0.18)

−0.49★★★
(0.10)

−0.71★★★
(0.15)

−1.21★★★
(0.15)

College Graduate

0.28
(0.01)

0.22
(0.03)

0.13
(0.03)

−0.06★
(0.02)

−0.09★
(0.04)

−0.15★★★
(0.02)

Mother′s Education

11.12
(0.15)

10.62
(0.20)

10.20
(0.33)

−0.50★★★
(0.14)

-0.42
(0.34)

−0.92★★★
(0.29)

Father′s Education

10.55
(0.22)

9.63
(0.37)

9.97
(0.39)

−0.92★★★
(0.21)

0.34
(0.33)

−0.58★
(0.23)

AFQT Score

24.74
(1.50)

17.26
(1.48)

14.89
(1.35)

−7.48★★★
(1.61)

-2.36
(1.71)

−9.85★★★
(0.52)

Expect to Graduate College

0.42
(0.02)

0.30
(0.04)

0.28
(0.03)

−0.12★★★
(0.03)

-0.02
(0.03)

−0.14★★★
(0.02)

Years of Education

12.95
(0.08)

12.32
(0.11)

11.76
(0.13)

−0.64★★★
(0.09)

−0.56★★
(0.13)

−1.19★★★
(0.15)

College Graduate

0.16
(0.01)

0.09
(0.01)

0.03
(0.02)

−0.07★★★
(0.01)

−0.05★★
(0.02)

−0.12★★★
(0.01)

Mother′s Education

8.34
(0.18)

7.45
(0.44)

8.17
(0.23)

−0.89★
(0.41)

0.72
(0.40)

-0.17
(0.34)

Father′s Education

8.59
(0.32)

7.86
(0.38)

8.98
(0.55)

-0.73
(0.60)

1.12
(0.61)

0.38
(0.71)

AFQT Score

33.36
(1.61)

20.55
(2.15)

22.20
(1.75)

−12.81★★★
(1.49)

1.64
(3.26)

−11.17★★★
(2.33)

Expect to Graduate College

0.37
(0.02)

0.21
(0.03)

0.26
(0.03)

−0.16★★
(0.02)

0.05
(0.04)

−0.11★★★
(0.03)

Years of Education

12.51
(0.13)

11.50
(0.32)

11.91
(0.11)

−1.02★★
(0.37)

0.41
(0.36)

−0.60★★★
(0.08)

College Graduate

0.13
(0.01)

0.05
(0.03)

0.07
(0.02)

−0.08★
(0.03)

0.02
(0.02)

−0.06★★
(0.02)

Variable

Severe Moderate – Severe –
No-to-Mild Moderate

Severe –
No-to-Mild

Panel A: White

Panel B: Black

Panel C: Hispanic

Summary statistics are weighted by the 1993 panel sampling weights. Standard errors in parentheses. ★ ★ ★ statistically
significant at 1%, ★★ statistically significant at 5%, ★ statistically significant at 10%
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Table 2.A.3: Labor Market Outcomes by Depressive Symptom Severity, Full Sample
Depressive Symptoms, 𝑡

E [Employed | 𝑇 = 𝑡] E [Earnings | 𝑇 = 𝑡] Pr [𝑇 = 𝑡]

𝑁𝑡

Panel A: Male
No-to-Mild

0.96

28,891

0.85

3,012

Moderate

0.88

21,807

0.08

394

Severe

0.78

15,607

0.06

272

No-to-Mild

0.83

16,339

0.78

3,011

Moderate

0.78

13,344

0.12

532

Severe

0.73

10,565

0.10

444

No-to-Mild

0.91

23,957

0.84

3,263

Moderate

0.86

18,996

0.09

365

Severe

0.78

13,833

0.07

279

No-to-Mild

0.85

16,738

0.72

1,649

Moderate

0.71

10,935

0.16

378

Severe

0.62

7,641

0.11

264

No-to-Mild

0.87

19,772

0.76

1,111

Moderate

0.74

11,903

0.12

183

Severe

0.76

12,396

0.12

173

Panel B: Female

Panel C: White

Panel D: Black

Panel E: Hispanic

Summary statistics are weighted by the 1993 panel sampling weights.
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Table 2.A.4: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of Depressive Symptom Intensity on
Labor Market Outcomes, Male Subsample

(1)
OLS

(2)
No Assumption

(3)
MTS

(4)
MTR

(5)
MTS+MTR

(6)
MIV+MTS+MTR

Depressed vs
Not Depressed

−0.121★★★
(0.019)

[-0.841, 0.159]
(-0.857, 0.175)

[-0.121, 0.159]
(-0.154, 0.175)

[-0.841, 0.000]
(-0.857, 0.000)

[-0.121, 0.000]
(-0.156, 0.000)

[-0.107, 0.000]
(-0.135, 0.000)

Moderate vs
No-to-Mild

−0.079★★★
(0.023)

[-0.890, 0.173]
(-0.903, 0.190)

[-0.135, 0.165]
(-0.178, 0.180)

[-0.841, 0.000]
(-0.857, 0.000)

[-0.085, 0.000]
(-0.125, 0.000)

[-0.080, 0.000]
(-0.111, 0.000)

Severe vs
Moderate

−0.097★★
(0.037)

[-0.941, 0.912]
(-0.952, 0.920)

[-0.200, 0.162]
(-0.247, 0.206)

[-0.905, 0.000]
(-0.920, 0.000)

[-0.165, 0.000]
(-0.214, 0.000)

[-0.152, 0.000]
(-0.192, 0.000)

Severe vs
No-to-Mild

−0.177★★★
(0.028)

[-0.915, 0.169]
(-0.927, 0.189)

[-0.177, 0.169]
(-0.224, 0.190)

[-0.915, 0.000]
(-0.927, 0.000)

[-0.177, 0.000]
(-0.226, 0.000)

[-0.167, -0.026]
(-0.212, -0.007)

Depressed vs
Not Depressed

−9726★★★
(856)

[-36,708, 64,253]
(-38,861, 66,406)

[-9730, 64,253] [-36,708, 0.000]
(-11,169, 66,406) (-38,864, 0.000)

[-9730, 0.000]
(-11,237, 0.000)

[-7184, 0.000]
(-8392, 0.000)

Moderate vs
No-to-Mild

−7083★★★
(1151)

[-37,691, 69,621]
(-40,085, 71,282)

[-8462, 64,643] [-36,708, 0.000]
(-10,523, 66,825) (-38,862, 0.000)

[-7479, 0.000]
(-9496, 0.000)

[-5532, 0.000]
(-6734, 0.000)

Severe vs
Moderate

−6201★★★
(1102)

[-93,262, 93,733]
(-94,440, 94,639)

[-73,663, 75,148] [-31,850, 0.000] [-12,241, 0.000]
(-76,259, 77,057) (-34,186, 0.000) (-13,122, 0.000)

[-10,229, 0.000]
(-12,069, 0.000)

−13, 284★★★
(545)

[-38,556, 70,960]
(-40,791, 73,274)

[-13,287, 70,960] [-38,556, 0.000] [-13,287, 0.000]
(-14,208, 73,274) (-40,795, 0.000) (-14,212, 0.000)

[-11,172, -2500]
(-13,206, -1532)

Panel A: Employment

Panel B: Earnings

Severe vs
No-to-Mild

Robust standard errors in (.) in column 1. In columns 2-6 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding 95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999
bootstrap replications. Earnings are bounded between $0 and $100,948. AFQT score is used as the MIV with 5 bins. 1993 panel weights are applied
to OLS regressions and estimated bounds.
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Table 2.A.5: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of Depressive Symptom Intensity on
Labor Market Outcomes, Female Subsample

(1)
OLS

(2)
No Assumption

(3)
MTS

(4)
MTR

(5)
MTS+MTR

(6)
MIV+MTS+MTR

−0.075★★
(0.028)

[-0.703, 0.297]
(-0.717, 0.312)

[-0.075, 0.297]
(-0.122, 0.312)

[-0.703, 0.000]
(-0.717, 0.000)

[-0.075, 0.000]
(-0.127, 0.000)

[-0.060, 0.000]
(-0.104, 0.000)

-0.051
(0.029)

[-0.774, 0.324]
(-0.785, 0.341)

[-0.128, 0.303]
(-0.167, 0.320)

[-0.703, 0.000]
(-0.717, 0.000)

[-0.057, 0.000]
(-0.111, 0.000)

[-0.042, 0.000]
(-0.078, 0.000)

Severe vs
Moderate

−0.053★★
(0.023)

[-0.902, 0.877]
(-0.908, 0.891)

[-0.223, 0.268]
(-0.275, 0.301)

[-0.772, 0.000]
(-0.783, 0.000)

[-0.093, 0.000]
(-0.147, 0.000)

[-0.093, 0.000]
(-0.151, 0.000)

Severe vs
No-to-Mild

−0.105★★
(0.034)

[-0.799, 0.324]
(-0.815, 0.338)

[-0.105, 0.324]
(-0.163, 0.339)

[-0.799, 0.000]
(-0.815, 0.000)

[-0.105, 0.000]
(-0.169, 0.000)

[-0.106, -0.005]
(-0.172, 0.000)

−4228★★★
(981)

[-32,374, 68,586]
(-34,234, 70,446)

[-4234, 68,586]
(-5917, 70,446)

[-32,374, 0.000]
(-34,237, 0.000)

[-4234, 0.000]
(-6119, 0.000)

[-3271, 0.000]
(-5239, 0.000)

Moderate vs
No-to-Mild

−2996★
(1348)

[-33,410, 77,455]
(-35,238, 79,696)

[-4311, 68,858]
(-6442, 70,827)

[-32,374, 0.000]
(-34,234, 0.000)

[-3274, 0.000]
(-5750, 0.000)

[-2668, 0.000]
(-5223, 0.000)

Severe vs
Moderate

−2778★★
(999)

[-89,143, 90,441]
(-90,796, 91,379)

[-71,018, 80,050] [-23,239, 0.000]
(-72,510, 81,840) (-24,286, 0.000)

[-5114, 0.000]
(-6242, 0.000)

[-4173, 0.000]
(-5142, 0.000)

Severe vs
No-to-Mild

−5774★★★
(823)

[-34,015, 79,355]
(-35,917, 80,353)

[-5777, 0.000]
(-7238, 0.000)

[-4789, 0.000]
(-6132, 0.000)

Panel A: Employment
Depressed vs
Not Depressed
Moderate vs
No-to-Mild

Panel B: Earnings
Depressed vs
Not Depressed

[-5777, 79,355]
(-7126, 80,353)

[-34,015, 0.000]
(-35,919, 0.000)

Robust standard errors in (.) in column 1. In columns 2-6 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding 95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999
bootstrap replications. Earnings are bounded between $0 and $100,948. AFQT score is used as the MIV with 5 bins. 1993 panel weights are applied
to OLS regressions and estimated bounds.
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Table 2.A.6: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of Depressive Symptom Intensity on
Labor Market Outcomes, White Subsample

(1)
OLS

(2)
No Assumption

(3)
MTS

(4)
MTR

(5)
MTS+MTR

(6)
MIV+MTS+MTR

−0.080★★
(0.023)

[-0.787, 0.214]
(-0.807, 0.234)

[-0.080, 0.214]
(-0.119, 0.235)

[-0.787, 0.000]
(-0.807, 0.000)

[-0.080, 0.000]
(-0.122, 0.000)

[-0.078, 0.000]
(-0.110, 0.000)

-0.045
(0.024)

[-0.843, 0.229]
(-0.856, 0.253)

[-0.107, 0.219]
(-0.140, 0.242)

[-0.787, 0.000]
(-0.807, 0.000)

[-0.051, 0.000]
(-0.096, 0.000)

[-0.052, 0.000]
(-0.084, 0.000)

Severe vs
Moderate

−0.080★★
(0.022)

[-0.931, 0.904]
(-0.939, 0.911)

[-0.194, 0.184]
(-0.243, 0.212)

[-0.854, 0.000]
(-0.873, 0.000)

[-0.117, 0.000]
(-0.166, 0.000)

[-0.090, 0.000]
(-0.122, 0.000)

Severe vs
No-to-Mild

−0.125★★★
(0.029)

[-0.867, 0.226]
(-0.887, 0.246)

[-0.125, 0.226]
(-0.175, 0.247)

[-0.867, 0.000]
(-0.887, 0.000)

[-0.125, 0.000]
(-0.179, 0.000)

[-0.102, -0.005]
(-0.138, 0.000)

Depressed vs
Not Depressed

−7214★★★
(912)

[-33,887, 67,071]
(-35,467, 68,651)

[-7219, 67,071]
(-8780, 68,651)

[-33,887, 0.000]
(-35,467, 0.000)

[-7219, 0.000]
(-8901, 0.000)

[-6048, 0.000]
(-7764, 0.000)

Moderate vs
No-to-Mild

−4961★★
(1379)

[-34,881, 73,335]
(-36,538, 75,350)

[-6333, 67,442]
(-8540, 69,129)

[-33,886, 0.000]
(-35,466, 0.000)

[-5339, 0.000]
(-7786, 0.000)

[-4733, 0.000]
(-7122, 0.000)

Severe vs
Moderate

−5162★★★
(1140)

[-92,348, 92,924]
(-93,105, 93,933)

[-73,620, 77,059] [-28,041, 0.000]
(-75,458, 78,744) (-29,411, 0.000)

[-9309, 0.000]
(-10,291, 0.000)

[-7902, 0.000]
(-8769, 0.000)

−10, 124★★★
(664)

[-35,650, 74,677]
(-37,297, 75,958)

[-10,127, 74,677] [-35,650, 0.000] [-10,127, 0.000]
(-11,254, 75,958) (-37,297, 0.000) (-11,283, 0.000)

[-8839, -1123]
(-9963, 0.000)

Panel A: Employment
Depressed vs
Not Depressed
Moderate vs
No-to-Mild

Panel B: Earnings

Severe vs
No-to-Mild

Robust standard errors in (.) in column 1. In columns 2-6 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding 95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999
bootstrap replications. Earnings are bounded between $0 and $100,948. AFQT score is used as the MIV with 5 bins. 1993 panel weights are applied
to OLS regressions and estimated bounds.
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Table 2.A.7: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of Depressive Symptom Intensity on
Labor Market Outcomes, Black Subsample

(1)
OLS

(2)
No Assumption

(3)
MTS

(4)
MTR

(5)
MTS+MTR

(6)
MIV+MTS+MTR

Depressed vs
Not Depressed

−0.174★★★
(0.028)

[-0.704, 0.297]
(-0.726, 0.319)

[-0.175, 0.297]
(-0.235, 0.319)

[-0.704, 0.000]
(-0.726, 0.000)

[-0.175, 0.000]
(-0.240, 0.000)

[-0.153, 0.000]
(-0.205, 0.000)

Moderate vs
No-to-Mild

−0.137★★★
(0.024)

[-0.773, 0.339]
(-0.795, 0.360)

[-0.217, 0.307]
(-0.275, 0.329)

[-0.704, 0.000]
(-0.726, 0.000)

[-0.148, 0.000]
(-0.207, 0.000)

[-0.116, 0.000]
(-0.160, 0.000)

−0.091★
(0.043)

[-0.883, 0.841]
(-0.897, 0.856)

[-0.302, 0.328]
(-0.391, 0.378)

[-0.772, 0.000]
(-0.799, 0.000)

[-0.191, 0.000]
(-0.274, 0.000)

[-0.180, 0.000]
(-0.251, 0.000)

−0.229★★★
(0.044)

[-0.820, 0.344]
(-0.847, 0.366)

[-0.229, 0.344]
(-0.312, 0.367)

[-0.820, 0.000]
(-0.847, 0.000)

[-0.229, 0.000]
(-0.317, 0.000)

[-0.221, -0.035]
(-0.303, 0.000)

Depressed vs
Not Depressed

−7141★★★
(1123)

[-37,338, 63,618]
(-38,584, 64,863)

[-7148, 63,618]
(-9348, 64,863)

[-37,338, 0.000]
(-38,584, 0.000)

[-7148, 0.000]
(-9568, 0.000)

[-5424, 0.000]
(-7632, 0.000)

Moderate vs
No-to-Mild

−5802★★★
(1268)

[-38,195, 74,082]
(-39,538, 75,368)

[-7036, 63,987]
(-9529, 65,273)

[-37,338, 0.000]
(-38,583, 0.000)

[-6179, 0.000]
(-8923, 0.000)

[-4600, 0.000]
(-7175, 0.000)

Severe vs
Moderate

−3294★★★
(736)

[-85,345, 88,694]
(-87,463, 89,922)

[-68,465, 80,779] [-24,380, 0.000]
(-70,536, 82,422) (-26,311, 0.000)

[-7498, 0.000]
(-8594, 0.000)

[-6153, 0.000]
(-7114, 0.000)

Severe vs
No-to-Mild

−9096★★★
(800)

[-39,131, 78,372]
(-40,491, 80,607)

[-9101, 78,372] [-39,131, 0.000] [-9101, 0.000]
(-10,606, 80,608) (-40,491, 0.000) (-10,683, 0.000)

Panel A: Employment

Severe vs
Moderate
Severe vs
No-to-Mild
Panel B: Earnings

[-7602, -733]
(-9069, 0.000)

Robust standard errors in (.) in column 1. In columns 2-6 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding 95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999
bootstrap replications. Earnings are bounded between $0 and $100,948. AFQT score is used as the MIV with 5 bins. 1993 panel weights are applied
to OLS regressions and estimated bounds.
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Table 2.A.8: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of Depressive Symptom Intensity on
Labor Market Outcomes, Hispanic Subsample

(1)
OLS

(2)
No Assumption

(3)
MTS

(4)
MTR

(5)
MTS+MTR

(6)
MIV+MTS+MTR

Depressed vs
Not Depressed

−0.118★★
(0.033)

[-0.722, 0.279]
(-0.761, 0.318)

[-0.118, 0.279]
(-0.181, 0.320)

[-0.722, 0.000]
(-0.761, 0.000)

[-0.118, 0.000]
(-0.186, 0.000)

[-0.098, 0.000]
(-0.160, 0.000)

Moderate vs
No-to-Mild

−0.125★
(0.054)

[-0.816, 0.309]
(-0.850, 0.357)

[-0.218, 0.277]
(-0.300, 0.326)

[-0.722, 0.000]
(-0.761, 0.000)

[-0.124, 0.000]
(-0.221, 0.000)

[-0.098, 0.000]
(-0.193, 0.000)

Severe vs
Moderate

0.014
(0.058)

[-0.876, 0.884]
(-0.890, 0.900)

[-0.179, 0.317]
(-0.260, 0.398)

[-0.779, 0.000]
(-0.818, 0.000)

[-0.082, 0.000]
(-0.147, 0.000)

[-0.050, 0.000]
(-0.087, 0.000)

−0.111★★
(0.032)

[-0.808, 0.308]
(-0.844, 0.348)

[-0.112, 0.308]
(-0.172, 0.350)

[-0.808, 0.000]
(-0.844, 0.000)

[-0.112, 0.000]
(-0.178, 0.000)

[-0.080, -0.064]
(-0.124, 0.000)

Depressed vs
Not Depressed

−7614★★★
(773)

[-36,347, 64,607]
(-37,335, 65,595)

[-7619, 64,607]
(-9076, 65,595)

[-36,347, 0.000]
(-37,335, 0.000)

[-7619, 0.000]
(-9159, 0.000)

[-6549, 0.000]
(-7914, 0.000)

Moderate vs
No-to-Mild

−7869★★★
(1050)

[-37,886, 75,605]
(-38,846, 76,750)

[-9353, 64,545] [-36,347, 0.000]
(-11,177, 65,390) (-37,335, 0.000)

[-7813, -59]
(-9735, 0.000)

[-7065, 0.000]
(-9012, 0.000)

493
(1602)

[-89,090, 88,575]
(-90,146, 90,173)

[-67,177, 79,532] [-27,407, 0.000]
(-69,184, 81,894) (-28,903, 0.000)

[-5494, 0.000]
(-8025, 0.000)

[-5901, 0.000]
(-7559, 0.000)

−7376★★★
(1165)

[-37,727, 74,929]
(-38,793, 76,378)

[-7383, 0.000]
(-9876, 0.000)

[-7085, -4396]
(-8932, -2133)

Panel A: Employment

Severe vs
No-to-Mild
Panel B: Earnings

Severe vs
Moderate
Severe vs
No-to-Mild

[-7383, 74,929]
(-9657, 76,378)

[-37727, 0.000]
(-38,793, 0.000)

Robust standard errors in (.) in column 1. In columns 2-6 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding 95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999
bootstrap replications. Earnings are bounded between $0 and $100,948. AFQT score is used as the MIV with 5 bins. 1993 panel weights are applied
to OLS regressions and estimated bounds.
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2.B

Technical Appendix on the CLR Method

This technical appendix provides additional details about the Chernozhukov et al. (2013)
methodology that yields bias-corrected estimated bounds and valid confidence intervals for
intersection bounds. To provide some intuition on the CLR method, we first make explicit the
notion of creating the bins of the MIV. We use below 5 MIV bins ℬ𝑚 , 𝑚 = 1, . . . , 5, each spanning
20 percentiles of the empirical distribution of AFQT scores in the NLSY79 sample. The lower
bound on E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] from Equation (2.14) can then be rewritten as:
5
Õ

Pr [𝑍 ∈ ℬ𝑚 ] · max LB1𝑚1
𝑚1 ≤𝑚

𝑚=1

(2.16)

where the LB1𝑚1 are the MTR-MTS lower bounds in bins 𝑚1 up through 𝑚.
Instead of expressions like (2.16) which comprise 5 different maxima, the CLR method
requires that these be rewritten as a set of expressions under a single maximum (or minimum,
for upper bounds), with each element inside the max operator called a bounding function.
Intuitively, each bounding function represents one of the possible outcomes from evaluating
(2.16) in the data. Finally, the full set of bounding functions is defined for the ATE, so we
also perform all necessary subtractions. For example, the final bounding functions for the
lower bound on Δ(𝑡2 , 𝑡1 ) are created from all possible subtractions of the E [𝑌(𝑡1 )] upper bound
bounding functions from the E [𝑌(𝑡2 )] lower bound bounding functions. In total, each bound
on the ATE implies (25−1 )2 = 256 bounding functions, denoted 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣) and 𝜃 𝑢 (𝑣), 𝑣 = 1, . . . , 256,
for the respective lower and upper bounds.
The key aspect of the CLR procedure is that the steps for estimation of the bounds and for
constructing confidence intervals are completed on the individual bounding functions prior to
taking the associated maximum (or minimum). This is referred to as the precision adjustment and
proceeds as follows.19 Generally, the adjustment involves taking the product of a critical value
𝜅(𝑝) and the pointwise standard error 𝑠(𝑣) of the bounding function. For lower bounds, this
product is subtracted from the estimator 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (𝑣); for upper bounds it is added to 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (𝑣). Then—
19 This

process requires that the estimators of 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣) and 𝜃 𝑢 (𝑣) are consistent and asymptotically normal. Since in
our case these estimators are made up of sample means and sample proportions, this condition is met.
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depending on the choice of critical value 𝑝—the adjustment yields either the half-median
unbiased estimator of the lower and upper bounds (𝑝 = 0.5), or the desired lower and upper
limits of the confidence interval (see below). In this way, the CLR method offers the convenience
that bias correction and inference are carried out within the same procedure. Also, we note
that the resulting large number of bounding functions makes it crucial to implement the CLR
procedure for estimation of the bounds and the construction of valid confidence intervals, as in
our experience, the amount of bias tends to increase with the number of bounding functions.
More specifically, the precision-corrected estimators of the bounding functions for each
average treatment effect bound are given by:



ˆ𝑙

ˆ𝑙

𝑙

𝑙

ˆ𝑢

𝑢

𝑢

𝜃 (𝑝) = max 𝜃 (𝑣) − 𝜅 (𝑝) · 𝑠 (𝑣)



𝑣

(2.17)

and



ˆ𝑢

𝜃 (𝑝) = min 𝜃 (𝑣) + 𝜅 (𝑝) · 𝑠 (𝑣)
𝑣



(2.18)

where 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (𝑣) and 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (𝑣) are the unadjusted estimators of the bounding functions and 𝑠 𝑙 (𝑣) and
𝑠 𝑢 (𝑣) are their associated standard errors. The critical values 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑝) and 𝜅 𝑢 (𝑝) are computed via
simulation as follows.
Let 𝜸ˆ 𝑙 be a 256-dimensional column vector of all the unadjusted bounding function estimators
for the lower bounds, with 𝜸ˆ 𝑢 defined likewise for the upper bounds. An initial step obtains from
𝑙

b of the asymptotic variance-covariance
𝐵 = 999 bootstrap replications a consistent estimate 𝛀
√

𝒈 𝒍 (𝒗)′
matrix of 𝑁 𝜸ˆ 𝑙 − 𝜸 𝑙 (an analogous process is followed for the upper bounds). With b
ˆ 1/2,𝑙 , we can thus define 𝑠 𝑙 (𝑣) ≡
the 𝑣 th row of 𝛀

∥b
𝒈 𝒍 (𝒗)∥
√
.
𝑁

Next, following CLR, we simulate

𝑅 = 100, 000 draws from a 𝒩(0, 𝑰) distribution, where 𝑰 is the 256 × 256 identity matrix. The
draws are labelled 𝒁 𝑟 , 𝑟 = 1, . . . , 𝑅, and are used to compute 𝑍 𝑟∗ (𝑣) ≡ b
𝒈 𝒍 (𝒗)′ 𝒁 𝑟 /∥ b
𝒈 𝒍 (𝒗)∥ for each
𝑟 and 𝑣. In each replication, we select the maximum over the set of 𝑍 𝑟∗ (1), . . . , 𝑍 𝑟∗ (256). From the
resulting 𝑅 values, we compute 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑐), which is defined as the 𝑐 th quantile of the values, where
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𝑐 ≡ 1 − (0.1/log 𝑁). This value is used to construct the following set:

b𝑙



𝑙

ˆ𝑙

ˆ𝑙

𝑙

𝑙

𝑙

𝑙

𝑉 = 𝑣 ∈ 𝒱 : 𝜃 (𝑣) ≥ max 𝜃 (𝑣˜ ) − 𝜅 (𝑐) · 𝑠 (𝑣˜ ) − 2𝜅 (𝑐) · 𝑠 (𝑣)







𝑣˜ ∈𝒱 𝑙

where 𝒱 𝑙 is the indexing set for the lower bound bounding functions 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣). From the values
𝑍 𝑟∗ (𝑣), we next take the maximum from each replication 𝑟, this time restricting the search only to

b 𝑙 . The CLR critical value 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑝) is taken as the 𝑝 th quantile of the 𝑅 values, such that 𝜅 𝑙 (0.5)
𝑣∈𝑉
gives the half-median unbiased estimate of the lower bound 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.5) on the average treatment
effect.
To obtain the lower bound on a (1 − 𝛼) · 100% confidence interval, we must make one
final adjustment which accounts for the width of the identified set. Borrowing notation from
Chernozhukov et al. (2013), define

b
Γ ≡ 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (0.5) − 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.5)
n o
b
Γ+ ≡ max 0, b
Γ
𝜌 = max 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (0.75) − 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (0.25) , 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.25) − 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.75)



𝜏 ≡ 1/(𝜌 log 𝑁)




+
b
𝑝ˆ ≡ 1 − Φ 𝜏Γ · 𝛼
where Φ(·) is the standard normal CDF. We report 95% confidence intervals for the estimates
ˆ which uses the critical value 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑝),
ˆ with 𝛼 = 0.05 in the expression
based on, for example, 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 ( 𝑝),
ˆ
for 𝑝.
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Chapter 3
The Use of Polygenic Scores as Monotone
Instrumental Variables in Health Research∗
Giuseppe Germinario,† Vikesh Amin,‡ Carlos Flores,§ Alfonso Flores-Lagunes¶

3.1

Introduction

Instrumental variables (IV) is a common econometric method used to estimate causal effects,
though finding valid instruments is difficult. Genetic variants are promising IVs because
of Mendel’s first and second laws. The first law (the principle of segregation) states that
during the formation of sex cells there is random segregation of alleles from parent to child.
The second law (independent assortment) states that the allocation of genetic variation at
conception is approximately random conditional on parental genotype. The random assignment
∗ This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris, de- signed by
J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other federal agencies and foundations. Special acknowledgment
is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Information on how to obtain
the Add Health data files is available on the Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct
support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis. The authors acknowledge research funding from
NIH grant number 1R01HD094011-01.
† Department of Economics, Syracuse University
‡ Department of Economics, Central Michigan University
§ Orfalea College of Business, California Polytechnic State University
¶ Department of Economics and Center for Policy Research, Syracuse University; IZA, and GLO
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of genes at conception can be seen as being analogous to a randomized control trial (RCT),
where the randomization process produces groups of individuals who differ with respect
to the intervention (the genetic variants) and between which unobserved factors are equally
distributed. Any differences observed in the outcome of interest between randomly allocated
groups should therefore be due to the exposure with which the genetic variants are associated
with. With this appeal, researchers across epidemiology, economics, and other social sciences
are using polygenic scores (PGSs)—which aggregate effects of hundreds of thousands of genetic
variants into a summary measure of genetic predisposition—as instruments to identify causal
effects. In economics journals, PGSs have been used to identify causal effects of BMI on mental
health (Willage, 2018; Amin et al., 2020), hospital costs (Dixon et al., 2020), academic achievement
(von Hinke et al., 2016) and labor market outcomes (Böckerman et al., 2019; Edwards et al., 2021);
effects of height on academic achievement (von Hinke et al., 2013) and labor market earnings
(Böckerman et al., 2017); effects of birthweight on labor market outcomes (Pehkonen et al., 2021);
and effects of maternal depression on children’s educational attainment (Clark et al., 2021).
Genetic variants are valid instruments if (1) genes are randomly assigned among people
(independence); (2) genes influence the exposure (relevance) and (3) the genes that influence
the exposure do not influence the outcome via any other channels other than through the
exposure (exclusion restriction).1 Despite the analogy to an RCT, there are concerns about the
validity of the independence assumption and the exclusion restriction. The exclusion restriction
is likely to be violated due to pleiotropy (von Hinke et al., 2016; van Kippersluis and Rietveld,
2018a; DiPrete et al., 2018). Genes have multiple functions (pleiotropy), and genes related
to the exposure may be related to other traits that also affect the outcome. A gene could
also be related to another gene through linkage disequilibrium (the non-random association
of alleles at different loci in a given population) that directly affects the outcome. In terms of
the independence assumption, though genes are randomly inherited conditional on parental
genotype at the individual level, they are not randomly assigned within a population. The
independence assumption may fail because of population stratification, dynastic effects, and
1 See

von Hinke et al. (2016) for an excellent exposition of the biological conditions and statistical assumptions
when using genes as IVs.
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cross-trait assortative mating (Brumpton et al., 2020). Population stratification occurs when
genes systematically differ by population subgroups, which can result in a spurious correlation
between genes and outcomes if the subpopulations systematically have different outcomes.
Dynastic effects occur when parental genetics affect children’s outcomes through parental traits.
For example, highly educated parents are likely to provide more nurturing environments which
affect children’s educational attainment. IV estimates will be biased if there is a path between
the child’s genes and outcome via the effect of parental traits on the child’s outcome. Biases due
to population stratification, dynastic effects, and cross-trait assortative mating can be addressed
through family fixed effects. Statistical methods have been proposed to allow researchers to
assess violations of the exclusion restriction. For example, van Kippersluis and Rietveld (2018a)
show that the Conley et al. (2012) ’plausibly exogenous’ method—which allows for the IV to
have a direct effect on the outcome—can be used to test the sensitivity of IV estimates.2 Despite
statistical innovations and increasing availability of datasets with genetic and family data, the
use of PGSs as IVs in economics is relatively low especially compared to other disciplines such
as epidemiology.
We draw attention to another possible application of PGSs: as a monotone instrumental
variable (MIV) within the nonparametric partial identification framework of Manski and Pepper
(2000). Their setting provides bounds on the population average treatment effect (ATE) making
fairly weak monotonicity assumptions regarding treatment selection and treatment response.
Those bounds can be further tightened by employing an MIV: a variable that has a monotone
(weakly increasing or weakly decreasing) relationship with the outcome. The MIV assumption is
weaker than the exclusion restriction since the MIV is allowed to have a direct impact on potential
outcomes and may itself be non-random. Therefore, PGSs related to the outcome (rather than
the treatment) are candidate MIVs to partially identify the causal effect of interest, as long
as one can justify the (weak) direction in which pleiotropy violates the exclusion restriction.
There are at least two attractive features in the Manski and Pepper (2000) setting. First, it
produces bounds on the population ATE which is arguably more policy relevant than local
2 Examples

of other statistical approaches to test the sensitivity to vilations of the exclusion restriction include
Bowden et al. (2016), Davies et al. (2018), DiPrete et al. (2018), Hartwig et al. (2017), Hemani et al. (2018).
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average treatment effects based on genetic variation. Second, it does not impose homogeneous
treatment effects, which means can one look at the dose-response relationship between different
treatment levels and the outcome. Partial identification comes at the cost of point identification,
but we view nonparametric bounds as providing important complementary evidence about
the plausible magnitude of the causal effect under relatively weak assumptions. This is in line
with the views of Mullahy et al. (2021), who argue that partial identification should be more
prevalent in public health and clinical research: rather than focusing on point estimates, base
public health recommendations and policies on ranges of plausible effects.
To illustrate what can be learned from nonparametric bounds with PGSs as MIVs, we use the
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health to answer two important questions:
are there causal effects of both education and BMI on mental health? The literature on causal
effects of education on mental health is sparse with mixed results. Studies using compulsory
schooling laws for exogenous variation in education have found both protective and null effects
of education. We find that increasing schooling from primary to secondary decreases depressive
symptoms by at most 32%. The bounds indicate that the causal effect could also be zero or
small. The range of possible causal effects is consistent with evidence from studies using
compulsory education. However, we obtain narrower bounds for increasing schooling from
secondary to tertiary. In particular, transitioning from being a high school to college graduate
reduces depressive symptoms by 2-19%. For obesity and mental health, we find that depressive
symptoms of obese individuals are 0-14% higher than non-obese individuals. When looking at
the dose-response relationship we find that depressive symptoms of severely obese individuals
are 3-16% higher than normal weight individuals.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a thorough exposition
of the Manski and Pepper (2000) approach and identifying assumptions. We described the Add
Health data in Section 3.3. Bounds on the effects of education and obesity are provided in
Sections 3.4 and 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
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3.2

Econometric Framework

We begin by defining the notation which will be used throughout the chapter. The outcome
of interest for individual 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 is denoted 𝑌𝑖 , where 𝑁 is the number of observations.
This outcome variable may be continuous or binary in nature.3 The treatment under analysis
is denoted 𝑇𝑖 and takes values within the treatment space 𝒯 . The treatment can be binary—so
that 𝒯 = {0, 1}—or take on a finite number of discrete values, in which case 𝒯 = {𝑡1 , 𝑡2 , . . . , 𝑡 𝐾 },
where 𝐾 is the number of different possible levels of treatment. We also note that, in practice, the
treatment may instead be closer to a “continuous” variable that the researcher then discretizes
into 𝐾 levels in a manner suited to her application. As an example, in our second application
below we discretize body mass index into classifications of normal, overweight, obese, and
severely obese.
Using the potential outcomes framework (Rubin, 2005), we define 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) to be individual 𝑖’s
potential outcome under treatment level 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 . This implies that the outcomes observed in the
data can be written as
𝑌𝑖 =

𝐾
Õ

1{𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 } · 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )

𝑘=1

where 1{·} is an indicator function. As in Manski and Pepper (2000), any additional covariates
are used to define the sample of interest.
The primary object we wish to identify and estimate is the average treatment effect of
receiving a treatment level 𝑡 𝑘 versus an alternative level 𝑡 𝑗 , which we will write as ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ).
Specifically, this is defined to be
ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) = E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) − 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 )



which admits the formulation of

𝐾(𝐾−1)
2



(3.1)

possible treatment effects from the 𝐾 different levels of

3 In the case of a binary outcome, the expectations taken in what follows can be exchanged for statements related

to the probability that 𝑌𝑖 is equal to one.
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treatment. Notice that, in the binary treatment case, this simplifies to the familiar
ATE(1, 0) = E [𝑌𝑖 (1) − 𝑌𝑖 (0)]

(3.2)

Regardless of the number of treatment levels, the fundamental problem of causal inference
remains: we observe 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) when 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 , while 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) is unobservable for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘. Thus,
researchers must appeal to assumptions about counterfactual outcomes in order to draw
conclusions about these causal effects.
One way to deal with the situation of endogenous selection is to introduce a third variable,
𝑍 𝑖 , which could serve as a valid instrument. In this case, the observed treatment is a function
of the instrument, so that we have potential treatments written 𝑇𝑖 (𝑧), where 𝑧 is a level of the
instrument. Potential outcomes under treatment 𝑡 𝑘 then have two arguments and are written
𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑧).
For the instrument 𝑍 𝑖 to be valid, it must satisfy the key assumptions in the local average
treatment effects framework of Imbens and Angrist (1994).

The first of these is that the

instrument is randomly assigned in the population being studied. Polygenic scores have been
seen as particularly attractive for the reason that Mendelian randomization would satisfy this
assumption. For completeness, we note that the LATE assumptions also include: (1) that there is
a non-zero average effect of the instrument on the treatment variable, and (2) that the treatment
variable is monotonic in the instrument at the individual level.4
The last key assumption is that 𝑍 𝑖 satisfies an exclusion restriction. Colloquially, this requires
that the proposed instrument affects the outcome only via its effect on the treatment. Formally,
Assumption 3.2.1 (Exclusion Restriction). For each treatment level 𝑡 𝑘 ∈ 𝒯 , it is the case that
𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑧) = 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑧 ′)
for all instrument values 𝑧 and 𝑧 ′ and for all individuals 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁.
4 The first of these ensures that there is a “first stage" in the language of two-stage least squares, while the second

rules out “defiers” in the LATE framework.
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Under all four of these assumptions, the local average treatment effect (LATE) of 𝑡 𝑘 versus
𝑡 𝑗 can be point-estimated using two-stage least squares or the IV estimator, which captures the
effect for the subpopulation of compliers. This is in contrast to the ATE in Equations (3.1) or
(3.2), which is the average causal effect of the treatment for the entire population. In what
follows, we partially identify this population ATE, a parameter that may be of wider relevance
for policy.
In the case of PGSs as instruments, the main concern is pleiotropy (von Hinke et al., 2016),
which renders the exclusion restriction dubious. This would seem to dampen the promise of
the available genetic data in identifying a range of treatment effects in observational studies.
However, to the extent that the researcher is willing to forsake point identification, PGSs can
be combined with weaker assumptions in a manner which may still be informative about those
average treatment effects. We now turn to the nonparametric bounds of Manski and Pepper
(2000).

3.2.1

Manski and Pepper (2000) Assumptions

The first assumption is that the outcome variable 𝑌𝑖 (and thus also the potential outcomes) is
bounded.
Assumption 3.2.2 (Bounded Support). Suppose 𝑌𝑖 ∈ [𝐾 0 , 𝐾1 ] for all 𝑖, where 𝐾 0 is a lower bound on
the outcome and 𝐾 1 is an upper bound.
In cases where the outcome is a binary indicator, this holds trivially with 𝐾 0 = 0 and 𝐾1 = 1.
For a continuous 𝑌𝑖 , the choices of these bounds will depend upon the given context. For
example, if the outcome of interest is a score from the 10-item Center for Epidemiological
Studies Depression (CES-D) Scale, then the minimum score of 0 can be taken as 𝐾0 and the
maximum score of 30 taken as 𝐾 1 . In general, this is an assumption which can be enforced in
the sample and is unlikely to be controversial.
Imposing only a bounded support on the outcome with no restrictions on selection into
treatment levels, the worst-case bounds on the mean potential outcome E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )], for any 𝑡 𝑘 ∈ 𝒯 ,
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can be derived, following Manski (1989). For this, we iterate expectations to write

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] = E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑡 𝑘 ]
The conditional mean E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑡 𝑘 ] is not identified by the data. However, the bounded
support of 𝑌𝑖 does permit the logical conclusion that this object must lie between 𝐾 0 and 𝐾1 , the
respective minimum and maximum values which the outcome can assume. Therefore, we are
able to bound the mean potential outcome under 𝑡 𝑘 as

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾0 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑡 𝑘 ]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] ≤

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾1 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑡 𝑘 ]
As these bounds also hold for treatment level 𝑡 𝑗 , worst-case bounds on the ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) can
be obtained by combining these two sets of bounds. Specifically, the treatment effect can be
no smaller than the difference between the lower bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] and the upper bound on



E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) , and it can be no larger than the difference between the upper bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] and


the lower bound on E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) . We thus obtain the following result:
Result 3.2.1 (Worst-Case Bounds). Suppose 𝑌𝑖 ∈ [𝐾 0 , 𝐾1 ] (bounded support). Then, worst-case
selection bounds on the average treatment effect of 𝑡 𝑘 versus 𝑡 𝑗 are given by







E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾0 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑡 𝑘 ] − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 − 𝐾1 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑡 𝑗
≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤







E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾1 · Pr [𝑇 ≠ 𝑡 𝑘 ] − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 − 𝐾0 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑡 𝑗 .
Because the worst-case bounds impose only that the outcome is bounded, they are typically
wide in practice. While we may be confident that these contain the true effect, the lack of further
restrictions makes it difficult for the worst-case bounds to be informative about the sign of the

114

ATE.5 To make progress on this front, additional assumptions are needed.

3.2.2

Monotone Treatment Selection

The assumption of monotone treatment selection is directly related to the problem of endogenous
selection. It is formulated as:
Assumption 3.2.3 (Monotone Treatment Selection). Suppose that, for any observed treatment levels
𝑡 and 𝑡 ′ such that 𝑡 > 𝑡 ′, it is the case that one of the following holds
(a) if there is positive selection into treatment (positive MTS), then

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≥ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′]
(b) if there is negative selection into treatment (negative MTS), then

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′]
for all levels of treatment 𝑡 𝑘 ∈ 𝒯 .
Each version of this assumption formalizes the familiar notions of positive and negative
selection, respectively. Positive MTS says that, on average, those with higher observed levels of
the treatment have weakly higher potential outcomes under any treatment level 𝑡 𝑘 . This means
that, if we have two individuals where one received treatment 𝑡 and the other 𝑡 ′, and 𝑡 > 𝑡 ′,
then we would expect the one who received 𝑡 to have a larger value of 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ). Negative MTS,
on the other hand, states the opposite: those with higher observed values of the treatment have
weakly lower potential outcomes under 𝑡 𝑘 on average.
In our first empirical application below for the impact of educational attainment on CES-D
scores, we impose the negative MTS assumption. Substantively, this says that, on average,
individuals with higher educational attainment have weakly lower values of both 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) for any
5 Often,

however, we may gain some information on the magnitude of the effect, as the worst-case bounds may
exclude either large positive or large negative effects. Put differently, the worst-case bounds may be wide, but they
are not necessarily centered at zero.
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level of education 𝑡 𝑘 . In other words, we assume that those with higher levels of education have
no higher latent scores on the depression index on average, versus those with lower observed
levels of education. One motivation for this assumption is that individuals observed with
higher education possess other characteristics that are also linked to better mental health. For
example, the association between an indivdual’s education and that of her parents’ may reflect
a healthier environment growing up (Mikkonen et al., 2020), which in turn may lead to fewer
latent depressive symptoms. Further, Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) and Gaviria and Raphael
(2001) find, respectively, that more education is linked to healthier lifestyles and healthier peers,
both of which may decrease the underlying probability of poor mental health.
We impose the opposite positive MTS assumption in our second application for the effect of
BMI on mental health. In that context, we assume that individuals with a higher BMI (among
the categories normal, overweight, obese, and severely obese) have no lower CES-D scores on
average, relative to those in a category defined by a lower BMI.6 A primary justification for
MTS would therefore be that individuals with obesity also have other traits related to a higher
risk of depression, such as physical health issues (Himes, 2000; Paolucci et al., 2018) and lower
socioeconomic status (Lorant et al., 2003). Generally speaking, MTS is likely to be satisfied
in many settings where “pre-treatment” characteristics are monotonically associated with the
treatment in the same direction as the selection assumption.
The implications of MTS for E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] can be seen by starting from its iterated-expectations
expansion

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] = E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ]
+ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]
where this time we separate treatment values 𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑡 𝑘 into 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 and 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 . For those with
observed treatments below the level of 𝑡 𝑘 , the maintained assumption of bounded support
implies that mean potential outcomes E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] for this group can be no lower than 𝐾 0 . Adding
6 We exclude those classified as underweight, as selection on mental health into very low BMI may likely be in
the other direction (de Wit et al., 2009).
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positive monotone treatment selection further restricts that this mean can be no greater than
that for those who received 𝑡 𝑘 , since this is a strictly higher level of the treatment than was
received by the group with 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 . So, we obtain the inequality
𝐾 0 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ]
For those in the group with observed treatment levels in excess of 𝑡 𝑘 , bounded support now
imposes that the mean potential outcomes E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] among the 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 group must be no greater
than 𝐾1 . Additionally, since any individual in this group received a level of treatment strictly
above 𝑡 𝑘 , positive MTS implies that this mean can be no less than the one for those with 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 .
This gives the inequality

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] ≤ 𝐾1
Combining the information from the previous two inequalities and substituting into the expanded
form of E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] yields bounds on the unconditional mean potential outcome of
𝐾 0 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] ≤

(3.3)

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾1 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]
when we invoke positive monotone treatment selection, and of

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾0 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] ≤

(3.4)

𝐾1 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ]
if instead the negative form of MTS is used. Note how these compare to the worst-case selection
bounds on the same object. Without an assumption regarding selection, the lower bound on
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E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] assigns 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) = 𝐾0 to all treatment levels 𝑇𝑖 ≠ 𝑡 𝑘 , regardless of whether it is a lower or
higher level of the treatment. Likewise, the upper bound assigns 𝐾 1 as the potential outcome to
all those receiving something other than 𝑡 𝑘 . By assuming MTS—here taking the case of positive
selection—the lower bound continues to assign those with 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 the potential outcome equal
to 𝐾 0 , while those with 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 are given the same conditional mean as observed for the 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘
group, which weakly exceeds 𝐾 0 . For the upper bound, the 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 group is still assigned 𝐾1
as their potential outcome, while those with 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 are now assigned E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ], which
is weakly below 𝐾 1 . Therefore, MTS bounds are tighter relative to worst-case bounds by a
simultaneous increase in the lower bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] and decrease in its upper bound.
Because corresponding bounds also apply to E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) , we can construct monotone treatment





selection bounds on the effect ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ), which are summarized in the following result.
Result 3.2.2 (Monotone Treatment Selection Bounds). Suppose 𝑌𝑖 ∈ [𝐾 0 , 𝐾1 ] and that there is
monotone selection into treatment (MTS). Then monotone treatment selection bounds on the average
treatment effect of 𝑡 𝑘 versus 𝑡 𝑗 are given by
(a) in the case of positive MTS,
𝐾 0 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ] − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑗 − 𝐾1 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑗













≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤







E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾1 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] − 𝐾0 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑗 − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑗
(b) in the case of negative MTS,







E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾0 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] − 𝐾1 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑗 − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑗
≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤
𝐾 1 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ] − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑗 − 𝐾 0 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑗
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3.2.3

Monotone Treatment Response

We may also tighten the worst-case bounds by placing a restriction on how individuals respond
to the level of treatment itself. This comes via the monotone treatment response assumption
(Manski, 1997; Manski and Pepper, 2000):
Assumption 3.2.4 (Monotone Treatment Response). Suppose that, for any observed treatment levels
𝑡, 𝑡 ′ ∈ 𝒯 such that 𝑡 > 𝑡 ′, it is the case that one of the following holds
(a) treatment response is weakly positive (positive MTR); that is,
𝑌𝑖 (𝑡) ≥ 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 ′)

(b) treatment response is weakly negative (negative MTR); that is,
𝑌𝑖 (𝑡) ≤ 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 ′)

for all individuals 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁.
Notice that this is an individual-level assumption—in contrast to MTS—which states (in
the case of positive MTR) that potential outcomes are weakly larger with higher levels of the
treatment. In plain language, one could say that—when higher values of the outcome are
desirable—this is an assumption that receiving a higher level of the treatment would make no
individual worse off than if she had received a lower level. If higher values of the outcome are
undesirable (as in our applications where the outcome is the CES-D score or an indicator for
depression), then positive MTR can be stated as no individual is better off with higher levels of
the treatment, relative to her counterfactuals under lower treatment levels. Importantly, positive
MTR also implies, for a fixed 𝑡0 ∈ 𝒯 , that E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡0 ] ≥ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 ′) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡0 ] for 𝑡 > 𝑡 ′.
In terms of the education and mental health application below, we impose a negative MTR
assumption: individuals’ potential CES-D scores are no higher with more education; or, to
reframe somewhat, increased education does not lead to strictly poorer mental health. This
is a particularly strong claim in this context, as the formulation in Assumption 3.2.4(b) must
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hold for each individual in the population. A major threat to this assumption is that the
relationship between education and mental health may be U-shaped, where increasing from
low to moderately high education is beneficial but very high levels of education can become
harmful to mental heath due to increased stress. For example, Barreira et al. (2020) find that
students in Economics Ph.D. programs suffer moderate or severe depression at over three times
the rate in the general population. However, this does not necessarily imply a violation of MTR
in all contexts.
First, while the highest levels of education can lead to worse mental health during the period
of study, the symptoms potentially may dissipate after finishing the program and moving on
to employment. Since the CES-D scores we use from Add Health in this chapter are measured
when participants are on average 29 years old, it is feasible that enough time has passed postschooling that mental health has “bounced back” due to reductions in stress and/or higher
incomes. In such a case, MTR would still be plausible in our application.
Second, we define the education treatment levels as high school dropout, high school
graduate, some college, and college graduate. MTR may therefore be a more tenable assumption
when the comparisons are made between these levels, especially in light of the preceding
paragraph.
In the second application of BMI and mental health, our assumption is that of positive MTR.
This requires that higher BMI does not strictly reduce potential CES-D scores for any individual.
Similar to the reasoning behind positive MTS, the association of obesity with physical health
issues and with potential social stigma (Puhl and Heuer, 2010; Kessler et al., 1999) make MTR
plausible in this setting, especially when those categorized as underweight are excluded. Again,
it is important to keep in mind for the plausibility of MTR in general that this assumption is more
demanding that MTS. If potential outcomes for a single individual respond to the treatment in
the opposite direction, then the entire assumption is violated.
To see how bounded support for the outcome combined with MTR can provide bounds
on treatment effects, start by applying the law of iterated expectations to the mean potential
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outcomes E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )]. Separating the treatment into levels below, above, and equal to 𝑡 𝑘 , we have

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] = E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ]
+ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]
Since the treatment space 𝒯 is finite and discrete, we can rewrite the terms involving treatments
𝑡 < 𝑡 𝑘 and 𝑡 ′ > 𝑡 𝑘 as

Õ

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡]

𝑡<𝑡 𝑘

and

Õ

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] ,

𝑡 ′ >𝑡 𝑘

respectively. This means the above expression for E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] can equivalently be written as:

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] = E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] +

Õ

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡]

𝑡<𝑡 𝑘

+

Õ

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] .

𝑡 ′ >𝑡 𝑘

Now consider the treatment levels 𝑡 < 𝑡 𝑘 . If we take the case of positive MTR (similar expressions
hold for negative MTR), then the combination of bounded support and MTR yields the following
inequalities for the conditional mean potential outcomes for each 𝑡 < 𝑡 𝑘 :

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≤ 𝐾1
E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≤ 𝐾1
where the second line follows from the fact that E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] is identified by the data.
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Similarly, for treatment levels 𝑡 ′ > 𝑡 𝑘 , bounded support and positive MTR implies that
𝐾 0 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 ′) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′]
𝐾 0 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′]
for each 𝑡 ′, and where the second line follows from identification of E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 ′) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] in the data.
Thus, the identifying power of MTR comes from establishing a lower bound on the conditional
means for those with observed treatment levels below 𝑡 𝑘 , and from establishing an upper bound
on the conditional means for those with treatment levels above 𝑡 𝑘 .
Making use of the inequalities for both 𝑡 < 𝑡 𝑘 and 𝑡 ′ > 𝑡 𝑘 , we are able to obtain the following
bounds on the mean potential outcome E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )]:

Õ



E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾0 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]

𝑡<𝑡 𝑘

(3.5)

≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] ≤
𝐾 1 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] +

Õ

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′]



𝑡 ′ >𝑡 𝑘

where the lower bound substitutes the leftmost terms of the inequalities into the expression
above, and the upper bound substitutes the rightmost terms. Notice that the MTR assumption
tightens the worst-case selection bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] in a different manner than the MTS
assumption. With positive MTS, the lower bound is tightened by the assumption’s impact on the
conditional mean potential outcomes among those with treatment levels above 𝑡 𝑘 , while those
with 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 are restricted only by bounded support. The assumption of MTR, on the other hand,
tightens the lower bound through its impact on conditional mean potential outcomes among
those with 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 , leaving only the bounded support restriction for those with levels of treatment
beyond 𝑡 𝑘 . The reverse relationship between the effects of the two different assumptions holds
for the upper bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )]. This complementary nature of MTS and MTR suggests that
the bounds can be further tightened by imposing these assumptions simultaneously; we will
return to this line of thought below.
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For convenience in writing the bounds on the treatment effects, note that the bounds on the
mean potential outcomes under positive MTR could be simplified to7

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] ·Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾0 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]
(3.6)

≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] ≤
𝐾 1 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ]

Subtracting the upper and lower bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] and E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) in the now-familiar way





then gives the MTR bounds on ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ), which we summarize in the following result.
Result 3.2.3 (Monotone Treatment Response Bounds). Suppose 𝑌𝑖 ∈ [𝐾 0 , 𝐾1 ] and that there is
monotone response to treatment (MTR). Then MTR bounds on the average treatment effect of 𝑡 𝑘 versus
𝑡 𝑗 are given by,
(a) in the case of positive MTR,







E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾0 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] − 𝐾1 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑗 − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑗
≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤
𝐾 1 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ] − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑗 − 𝐾 0 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑗













(b) in the case of negative MTR,
𝐾 0 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ] − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑗 − 𝐾 1 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑗













≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤







E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] + 𝐾1 · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] − 𝐾0 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑗 − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑗
Notice that, with 𝑡 𝑘 > 𝑡 𝑗 , the positive MTR assumption also implies that E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] ≥ E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) ,





meaning that the lower bound on the treatment effect is restricted to be non-negative. Likewise,
7 The rewritten lower (upper) bound in inequality (3.6) is obtained by iterating expectations for each E

[𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡]
(E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′]) term of the summation in the lower (upper) bound in inequality (3.5)—conditioning on 𝑡 < 𝑡 𝑘
(𝑡 ′ > 𝑡 𝑘 )—and then combining terms.
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the upper bound on the effect under negative MTR would be non-positive. In fact, with the
special setting of a binary treatment variable, these two bounds can be shown to be identically
zero.8

3.2.4

Monotone Instrumental Variable

The final assumption we consider uses a third variable 𝑍 𝑖 to tighten the worst-case bounds.
Given that it is similar in spirit to how a researcher would turn to an instrument to deal with
endogeneity, Manski and Pepper (2000) refer to this as a monotone instrumental variable (MIV).
Despite the similarity in name, the MIV assumption is considerably weaker relative to the
assumptions of a “proper” instrument. In particular, an MIV only requires that mean potential
outcomes are monotonic in the values of 𝑍 𝑖 —an MIV need not be randomly assigned, nor does
it need to satisfy an exclusion restriction. Formally, the MIV assumption is:
Assumption 3.2.5 (Monotone Instrumental Variable). For any values 𝑧 1 and 𝑧 2 of the monotone
instrumental variable 𝑍 𝑖 such that 𝑧 1 ≥ 𝑧 2 , it is the case that either
(a)

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 = 𝑧1 ] ≥ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 = 𝑧2 ]
when 𝑍 𝑖 is a positive MIV, or
(b)

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 = 𝑧1 ] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 = 𝑧2 ]
when 𝑍 𝑖 is a negative MIV,
for each treatment level 𝑡 𝑘 ∈ 𝒯 .
8 This also holds whenever 𝑡 is the largest possible value of the treatment and 𝑡 is the lowest. In general, the
𝑗
𝑘
expression for the lower bound in Result 3.2.3(a) is non-positive, and the expression for the upper bound in 3.2.3(b)
is non-negative. Therefore, the sharp lower bound under positive MTR and the sharp upper bound under negative
MTR are both equal to zero.
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This “weakening” of the traditional instrumental variable assumption provides for the
opportunity to still gain identifying power from genetic data, even when concerns of pleiotropy
seemingly invalidate its status as a proper IV. As an example, consider our two applications,
which both use CES-D scores as the outcome of interest. From the available genetic data in
Add Health, we have a polygenic score for a major depressive disorder. This mental health PGS
would hardly be considered as an IV for either education or BMI: by construction, this is directly
related to the incidence of depressive symptoms, clearly violating an exclusion restriction. In
contrast, this exact violation would establish a strong argument in favor of this PGS as an MIV. In
general, we therefore emphasize that variables related to the outcome of interest would typically
be stronger candidates for MIVs than variables related to the treatment. Because genetic data
often offers access to PGSs for outcomes, we therefore recommend to practitioners that these be
considered as MIVs over PGSs for the treatment variable of interest.
With a valid MIV in hand, we can again consider how the monotone instrumental variable
assumption may tighten bounds on our object of interest, ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ). To see this, start again
with an expansion of E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] using the law of iterated expectations. Rather than exploiting
the conditioning on observed treatment status, here we use the existence of the variable 𝑍 𝑖 .
For convenience, we first introduce some notation. Suppose the values of 𝑍 𝑖 , which may be a
continuous variable or discrete, can be placed into 𝐿 bins ℬ1 , . . . , ℬ𝐿 , which are ordered such
that 𝑧 ∈ ℬ1 and 𝑧 ′ ∈ ℬ2 implies 𝑧 < 𝑧 ′. With this convention, we can iterate expectations to
write

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] = E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬ1 ] · Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬ1 ] + · · · + E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬ𝐿 ] · Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬ𝐿 ]
=

𝐿
Õ

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] · Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

ℓ =1

Notice that, within each bin, the object E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] may be bounded using any of the
previous assumptions discussed above. That is, we can apply the worst-case, MTS, or MTR
bounds inside each of the bins ℬ1 through ℬ𝐿 . The addition of a monotone instrumental
variable along with one of these other assumptions then provides at least a weak tightening of
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the bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] relative to the corresponding assumption on its own.
This works in the following way. From the positive MIV assumption, the conditional mean

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] is weakly increasing as we move from the first bin to bin 𝐿. This has two
implications. One is that the lower bound on this conditional mean should also be non-decreasing
as we move to bins containing larger values of 𝑍 𝑖 . Without further information, the most we
are able to say given this is that the lower bound in bin ℓ must be the largest among all those in
bins 1 through ℓ . Letting LBℓ denote this lower bound, we write this MIV implication as



ℓ

1

2

ℓ −1

LB = sup LB , LB , . . . , LB

ℓ

, LB



= sup LB¯ℓ
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯

Likewise, the monotonicity of E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] implies that, as we move from bin 𝐿 with
the largest values of 𝑍 𝑖 down to bin ℓ , the upper bound on this conditional mean should weakly
decline. Thus, we can conclude that the upper bound in bin ℓ is equal to the smallest upper
bound among bins ℓ through 𝐿. If we denote this bound in ℬℓ as UBℓ , we can write



UBℓ = inf UBℓ , UBℓ +1 , . . . , UB𝐿



¯

= inf UBℓ
ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

To summarize, the availability of 𝑍 𝑖 as an MIV yields the bounds
LBℓ ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] ≤ UBℓ
for each bin ℬℓ , where the upper and lower bounds are defined as above. Plugging these into the
iterated expectations expansion of the mean potential outcomes provides the following bounds
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on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )]:
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

sup LB¯ℓ
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] ≤
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ¯

inf UB

ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

¯

The precise form of the bounds LB¯ℓ and UBℓ inside the respective supremum and infimum
operators will depend on which assumptions are used along with the MIV. If nothing else is
maintained beyond bounded support of the outcome, then each of these will be the worst-case
ℓ

bounds shown above. If we denote the worst-case bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] in bin ℬℓ as LB¯wc,𝑘 and
¯

UBℓwc,𝑘 , then bounds for ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) with 𝑍 𝑖 as a monotone instrumental variable are given in
the following result.
Result 3.2.4 (MIV Bounds). Suppose that 𝑌𝑖 ∈ [𝐾 0 , 𝐾1 ] and that the variable 𝑍 𝑖 is an MIV. Then the
“MIV-only” bounds on the average treatment effect of 𝑡 𝑘 versus 𝑡 𝑗 are given by,
(a) with a positive MIV,
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
sup LB¯wc,𝑘
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

inf

ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

¯
UBℓwc,𝑗

≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

inf

ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

¯
UBℓwc,𝑘



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1
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ℓ
sup LB¯wc,𝑗
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯

(b) with a negative MIV,9
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
inf LB¯wc,𝑘
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

¯
sup UBℓwc,𝑗
ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

¯
sup UBℓwc,𝑘
ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
inf LB¯wc,𝑗
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯

The MIV-only bounds can be tightened if the MIV assumption is invoked alongside either
monotone treatment selection or monotone treatment response. We begin with MTS and define
ℓ

¯

LB¯mts,𝑘 and UBℓmts,𝑘 to be the bin-ℓ -specific bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )], as in inequalities (3.3) and
(3.4) above. The resulting combined MIV+MTS bounds on the treatment effect then take on
a general form similar to the MIV bounds, with the caveat that there are four different ways
these assumptions can be brought together, depending on whether the researcher assumes
positive or negative selection into treatment and whether 𝑍 𝑖 is a positive or negative MIV. This
is summarized in the next result.
Result 3.2.5 (MIV+MTS Bounds). Suppose that 𝑌𝑖 ∈ [𝐾 0 , 𝐾1 ] and that the variable 𝑍 𝑖 is an MIV.
Assume also MTS. Then the MIV+MTS bounds on the average treatment effect of 𝑡 𝑘 versus 𝑡 𝑗 are given
by
(a) with a positive MIV,
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
sup LB¯mts,𝑘
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

inf

ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

¯
UBℓmts,𝑗

≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

inf

ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

¯
UBℓmts,𝑘



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

9 Notice

ℓ
sup LB¯mts,𝑗
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯

that, in effect, the only difference between the bounds under a positive MIV versus a negative MIV is
that the supremum operators have become infimum operators, and viceversa. This reflects that, with the negative
MIV assumption, the conditional mean E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] is non-increasing as we move to bins containing higher
levels of 𝑍 𝑖 . That implies the lower bounds must weakly decline as we move from bin 1 to bin ℓ (yielding the
infimum), and that the upper bounds must weakly rise as we move from bin 𝐿 to bin ℓ (yielding the supremum).

128

(b) with a negative MIV,
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
inf LB¯mts,𝑘
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

¯
sup UBℓmts,𝑗
ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

¯
sup UBℓmts,𝑘
ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

ℓ



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
inf LB¯mts,𝑗
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯

¯

The bounds LB¯mts,𝑘 and UBℓmts,𝑘 take the forms used in Result 3.2.2(a) under positive MTS, and the
forms used in Result 3.2.2(b) under negative MTS.
Next, we can derive bounds on the treatment effect when imposing MTR along with the MIV
ℓ

¯

assumption. Let LB¯mtr,𝑘 and UBℓmtr,𝑘 represent the bounds on mean potential outcomes within
bin ℬℓ when MTR is assumed, using the form of inequality (3.6) for positive MTR and a similar
inequality for negative MTR. The combined MIV+MTR bounds are given in the following result.
Result 3.2.6 (MIV+MTR Bounds). Suppose that 𝑌𝑖 ∈ [𝐾 0 , 𝐾1 ] and that the variable 𝑍 𝑖 is an MIV.
Assume also MTR. Then the MIV+MTR bounds on the average treatment effect of 𝑡 𝑘 versus 𝑡 𝑗 are given
by,
(a) with a positive MIV,
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
sup LB¯mtr,𝑘
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

inf

ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

¯
UBℓmtr,𝑗

≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

inf

ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

¯
UBℓmtr,𝑘



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1
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ℓ
sup LB¯mtr,𝑗
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯

(b) with a negative MIV,
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
inf LB¯mtr,𝑘
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

¯
sup UBℓmtr,𝑗
ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ

¯
sup UBℓmtr,𝑘
ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
inf LB¯mtr,𝑗
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯

¯

The bounds LB¯mtr,𝑘 and UBℓmtr,𝑘 take the forms used in Result 3.2.3(a) under positive MTR, and the
forms used in Result 3.2.3(b) under negative MTR.
Notice again that the combination of MTR with 𝑍 𝑖 as an MIV can lead to four different sets of
bounds, depending this time on whether the researcher assumes non-negative or non-positive
response to the treatment, and whether the MIV assumption restricts conditional mean potential
outcomes to be weakly increasing or decreasing over the bins of the MIV.
Another combination of assumptions involves the simultaneous imposition of MTS and
MTR. Recall from the discussion of MTR that these two assumptions impact the bounds on

E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] differently depending on the value of 𝑡: positive MTS tightens them from
above and positive MTR tightens them from below for treatment levels below 𝑡 𝑘 , while, for
𝑡 > 𝑡 𝑘 , positive MTS tightens the lower bound and positive MTR the upper bound. Therefore,
these can complement one another and result in tighter bounds.
Specifically, the separate MTS and MTR assumptions had yielded bounds of

𝐾 0 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ]

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≤ 𝐾1

(MTS)
(MTR)

for treatment levels 𝑡 < 𝑡 𝑘 .10 When we invoke the two assumptions together, we end up with
10 Note

that the middle term under MTS (the conditional expectation) has been rewritten to facilitate the
comparison.
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the intersection of these two bounds; that is,

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ]
In words, this says that, conditional on treatment levels below 𝑡 𝑘 , mean potential outcomes
under 𝑡 𝑘 are no less than the observed mean among those receiving 𝑡 and no greater than the
observed mean among those receiving 𝑡 𝑘 .
Likewise, among treatment levels greater than 𝑡 𝑘 , the assumptions separately imply that
(MTS)

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] ≤ 𝐾1

(MTR)

𝐾 0 ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′]

where 𝑡 ′ > 𝑡 𝑘 . Again, the combination of the two assumptions results in bounds which are the
intersection of the above:

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′] ≤ E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ′]
So, among the treatment levels above 𝑡 𝑘 , MTS and MTR together restrict the conditional mean
potential outcomes under 𝑡 𝑘 to be between the observed mean for those with treatments equal
to 𝑡 𝑘 and the observed mean for those with treatment levels of 𝑡 ′. Plugging each of these into
the iterated expectations expansion of the unconditional mean potential outcomes, we obtain
positive MTS+MTR bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] of

Õ



E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]

𝑡<𝑡 𝑘

≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] ≤

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] +

Õ
𝑡 ′ >𝑡 𝑘
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E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 ]
′

′



or, more succinctly,

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] +E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] ≤

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] +E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]
From a similar intersection of the negative MTS and negative MTR bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡]
we obtain also the negative MTS and MTR bounds11 on the mean potential outcomes under
treatment 𝑡 𝑘 , written as

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] +E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]
≤ E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] ≤

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] +E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ]
Subtracting from these bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )] with those on E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) bounds the average





treatment effect ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ). This is given in the following result.
Result 3.2.7 (MTS+MTR Bounds). Suppose that 𝑌𝑖 ∈ [𝐾 0 , 𝐾1 ] and that there is both MTS and MTR.
Then combined MTS+MTR bounds on the average effect of 𝑡 𝑘 versus 𝑡 𝑗 are given by,
11 One

may conceivably wonder about the combinations of postitve MTS with negative MTR, or negative MTS
with positive MTR. It turns out that neither of these can improve upon the bounds obtained with one of the
assumptions alone. As an example, consider the former pair for treatment levels 𝑡 < 𝑡 𝑘 . Here, both positive MTS
and negative MTR offer 𝐾 0 as the lower bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡]. As the upper bounds, positive MTS would give
E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ], while negative MTR would give E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡]. The intersection of these would give a lower bound
of 𝐾 0 and an upper bound equal to the minimum of E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] and E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡]. But this would be identical
to either positive MTS alone (if the former is the smaller of the two) or negative MTR alone (if the latter is the
minimum). Thus we focus only on the cases where MTS and MTR are in the same direction.
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(a) in the case of positive MTS and MTR,

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ]








− E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑗 − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑗
≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]








− E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑗 − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑗
(b) in the case of negative MTS and MTR,

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑘 ]








− E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑗 + E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑗
≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤

E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 < 𝑡 𝑘 ] + E [𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑘 ] · Pr [𝑇𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 𝑘 ]








− E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 𝑗 − E 𝑌𝑖 | 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑗 · Pr 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡 𝑗
Finally, we can use our MIV 𝑍 𝑖 along with both MTS and MTR to arrive at MIV+MTS+MTR
ℓ

¯

bounds on the treatment effect. Letting LB¯mtsr,𝑘 and UBℓmtsr,𝑘 represent the bounds on mean
potential outcomes within bin ℬℓ under MTS+MTR, we summarize in the following result the
identified set.
Result 3.2.8 (MIV+MTS+MTR Bounds). Suppose that 𝑌𝑖 ∈ [𝐾 0 , 𝐾1 ] and that the variable 𝑍 𝑖 is a MIV.
Assume also that there is MTS and MTR. Then the MIV+MTS+MTR bounds on the average treatment
effect of 𝑡 𝑘 versus 𝑡 𝑗 are given by,
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(a) with a positive MIV,
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
sup LB¯mtsr,𝑘
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

inf

ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

¯
UBℓmtsr,𝑗

≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

inf

ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

¯
UBℓmtsr,𝑘



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
sup LB¯mtsr,𝑗
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯

(b) with a negative MIV,
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
inf LB¯mtsr,𝑘
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

¯
sup UBℓmtsr,𝑗
ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ

≤ ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) ≤
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ

¯
sup UBℓmtsr,𝑘
ℓ¯ ≥ ℓ



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] −

𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
inf LB¯mtsr,𝑗
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯

¯

The bounds LB¯mtsr,𝑘 and UBℓmtsr,𝑘 take the forms given in Result 3.2.7(a) under positive MTS and positive
MTR, and the forms given in Result 3.2.7(b) under negative MTS and negative MTR.
For bounds which both impose monotone treatment response and use a monotone instrumental
variable—that is, the MIV+MTR and MIV+MTS+MTR bounds—MTR allows a further conclusion
beyond the content of Results 3.2.6 and 3.2.8. The assumption, which in the non-negative form
says 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) ≥ 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) whenever 𝑡 𝑘 > 𝑡 𝑗 , also implies that E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑧 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] ≥ E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) | 𝑧 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ , for





ℓ = 1, . . . , 𝐿, under the same condition. In words, the MTR assumption also applies at the mean
within each bin ℓ of the MIV. So, although the MIV estimator does not bound bin-specific average
treatment effects (as emphasized by McCarthy, Millimet, and Roy, 2015), the combination
with MTR does imply that these would, in principle, have to be non-negative as well. What
this also means is that the lower bounds on these hypothetical within-bin ATEs must be nonnegative, such that the lower bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 ) | 𝑧 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ] is no smaller than the upper bound on

E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) | 𝑧 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ . In practice, the estimation will thus set




LBℓmtr,𝑘

= max



LBℓmtr,𝑘 , UBℓmtr,𝑗



inside the MIV+MTR lower bound estimator, and likewise for the MIV+MTS+MTR lower
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bound.12

3.2.5

Discussion

We now provide further discussion regarding the above weak monotonicity assumptions and
consider some pointers for researchers making use of this partial identification strategy. At
the outset, we put out that, while MTS, MTR, and MIV are all weaker assumptions than
commonly used alternatives—and hence plausible in a wider array of circumstances—they
are not a panacea for all identification problems. The substance of each one must be carefully
considered in the context of a given application, and its use justified accordingly.
The MTS assumption is perhaps the assumption with the most intuitive appeal. The content
of monotone selection in either direction is precisely what is meant by positive or negative
selection. In this sense, MTS takes what would be an issue for applied research under stronger
assumptions and instead uses it to tighten the identified set.
It is important to also bear in mind that MTS requires a monotone relationship to hold in
the same direction for all levels of treatment. This may not be justifiable in some applications.
A recent meta-analysis (Jung et al., 2018) found that both underweight and obese individuals
had an increased risk of depression relative to individuals in the “normal” range. This suggests
that the relationship between BMI and depression is not monotonic over all weight classes. As
described above, the workaround we take is to drop the underweight observations from the
analysis, but note that changing the treatment space may also generally change the research
question as well.
The MTR assumption is based at the individual level and weakly assumes the sign of the
treatment effect. The plausibility of MTR again depends on the research question. Returning to
the context of education-mental health disparities, it is well documented that more education
is associated with better mental health. However, MTR holds at the individual level, and it may
12 In

the case when non-positive MTR is imposed, this implication instead affects the upper bounds on
the mean potential outcomes, to enforce a non-positive upper bound on the ATE. There, we set UBℓmtr,𝑘 =
min



UBℓmtr,𝑘 , LBℓmtr,𝑗



in the MIV+MTR upper bound estimator, and similarly for the upper bound under

MIV+MTS+MTR.
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be possible that more education worsens mental health for certain individuals. For example,
highly-educated individuals may have worse mental health if they have stressful jobs with long
working hours. There is also some evidence suggesting a possible causal relationship between
education and worse mental health. In particular, Avendano et al. (2020) use the increase in
the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16 in the UK as a natural experiment, and find
some evidence that education increased the prevalence of depression and some mental health
conditions for individuals in their 50s. They argue that this arises because the increase in the
minimum school leaving age forced young people who did not want to stay in school (but would
rather have gone to the labor market) to continue their education. These young people may
be negatively affected by being forced to stay in school, in a stressful academic environment
in which they are less likely to succeed compared to their peers. The MTR assumption in the
context of BMI and depression—that higher BMI does not lead to better mental health—may
also be problematic. For older adults, some studies (Palinkas et al., 1996; Zhang et al., 2016)
have found that obesity is associated with better mental health in line with the so-called jolly
fat hypothesis. However, given our focus on young adults in Add Health, this may be less of a
concern. In sum, the MTR assumption may be difficult to defend in contexts where the sign of
the treatment effect is theoretically and empirically ambiguous.
For candidate MIVs it is natural to consider situations where there is a variable that could
serve as an IV but for which there are doubts about the exclusion restriction. As long as it
is believed that the exclusion restriction is violated because mean potential outcomes are directly
affected (weakly) in a single direction by the variable, then the MIV assumption is valid. This specific
weakening of the exclusion restriction is a key advantage of the Manski-Pepper bounds for the
utilization of PGSs to aid in identification of causal effects. PGSs related to the treatment would
be used as traditional IVs, but PGSs related to the outcome are likely better candidate MIVs. For
example, the BMI PGS has been used as an IV to estimate the causal effect of BMI on depression
(Amin et al., 2020). It seems more justifiable, however, to use a PGS for depression as the MIV
in the context of BMI and depression, as we would more strongly expect potential CES-D scores
to be weakly increasing in higher values of the depression PGS. Finally, one should be careful

136

that, since the MIV (along with MTS and MTR) assumption is regarding potential outcomes, it
is inherently untestable. Providing evidence that observed conditional means are monotonic in
the proposed MIV is therefore not a sufficient condition for the assumption to hold.

3.2.6

Estimation and Inference

All of the bounds collected in the Results above are estimated by replacing expectations and
probabilities with their sample counterparts. The supremum and infimum operators in the
bounds which make use of the MIV assumption are replaced by maximum and minimum
operators, respectively.
Now, the presence of the minima and maxima in the MIV estimators generate two issues.
First, the resulting intersection bounds are biased in finite samples, in the sense that the widths
of bounds using an MIV are biased downwards (Manski and Pepper, 2000; Chernozhukov et al.,
2013; Flores and Flores-Lagunes, 2013). Absent correction, this results in bounds which are
narrower than the true identified set for the average treatment effect. Further, Hirano and
Porter (2012) demonstrated that there exist no locally asymptotically unbiased estimators in
settings where the parameters contain non-smooth functionals of the data (such as min or max).
The second issue is that the standard bootstrap will not be consistent for obtaining confidence
intervals on the ATE at the desired levels.
These issues are addressed by applying the procedure from Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen
(2013)—hereafter, CLR—for obtaining bias-corrected estimates and valid confidence intervals
for the parameters of interest using intersection bounds.13 We are careful to note that the CLR
procedure produces lower and upper bounds which satisfy a half-median unbiasedness property.
This means that the estimate of the lower bound falls below the true lower bound with a
probability of at least 0.5, and the estimate of the upper bound is greater than the true upper
bound with a probability of 0.5 or above. This property is desirable for the bounds involving
13 All

estimations—including the CLR procedure described in this section—are performed in Stata using the
package mpclr by Germinario et al. (2021). Though the CLR method is only strictly necessary for the MIV bounds,
it is also used to obtain confidence intervals for the sets of bounds that do not use an MIV. This is because the CLR
method is applicable both for intersection bounds and for bounds which do not contain maxima or minima (Flores
and Chen, 2018).
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MIVs: evidence from Germinario et al. (2021) shows that, for example, the CLR method captures
the true lower bound in 48% of simulations and captures the true upper bound in 97% of
simulations. In comparison, the uncorrected bounds have rates of 8.4% and 72.4% respectively.
To illustrate the method, consider, for example, the MIV+MTS+MTR lower bound on the
mean potential outcome E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )], which using Result 3.2.8(a) is written
𝐿 
Õ
ℓ =1

ℓ
max LB¯mtsr,𝑘
ℓ ≤ℓ
¯



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ]

after replacing the supremum with a maximum. Letting, say, 𝐿 = 3, this is equivalent to
max



LB1mtsr,𝑘



· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬ1 ] + max
+ max





LB1mtsr,𝑘 , LB2mtsr,𝑘

LB1mtsr,𝑘 , LB2mtsr,𝑘 , LB3mtsr,𝑘





· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬ2 ]

· Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬ3 ]

In the terminology of Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2013), we will create a set of bounding
functions to work with instead of using the expressions above directly. Essentially, using
bounding functions allows us to use the properties of the maximum (or minimum) operator to
rewrite the single summation as a set of multiple summations over which a single maximum
(or minimum) is taken. The intuition is that the bounding functions capture all of the possible
results from taking the maxima at each piece of the original form of the lower bounds. Thus,
with 𝐿 bins of the MIV, there are in principle 𝐿 factorial different bounding functions to place in
the set. In the example here, there would be 6:



max (𝑝1 + 𝑝2 + 𝑝 3 )LB1mtsr,𝑘 , (𝑝 1 + 𝑝 2 )LB1mtsr,𝑘 + 𝑝 3 LB2mtsr,𝑘 , (𝑝1 + 𝑝2 )LB1mtsr,𝑘 + 𝑝3 LB3mtsr,𝑘 ,
𝑝1 LB1mtsr,𝑘 + 𝑝2 LB2mtsr,𝑘 + 𝑝 3 LB1mtsr,𝑘 , 𝑝1 LB1mtsr,𝑘 + 𝑝 2 LB2mtsr,𝑘 + 𝑝3 LB2mtsr,𝑘 ,
𝑝1 LB1mtsr,𝑘

+

𝑝2 LB2mtsr,𝑘

where 𝑝ℓ ≡ Pr [𝑍 𝑖 ∈ ℬℓ ].

+

𝑝 3 LB3mtsr,𝑘



Recognizing that the maximum operator imposes some logical

consistency across the bins—for example, if the bound in bin 1 is the largest over the first
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two bins, then the bound in bin 2 cannot be the maximum over all three bins—two of these
possible bounding functions can be removed as superfluous. Thus, the use of 3 MIV bins
provides four bounding functions for the lower bound on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )]:14



max LB1mtsr,𝑘 , (𝑝1 + 𝑝 2 )LB1mtsr,𝑘 + 𝑝3 LB3mtsr,𝑘 , 𝑝1 LB1mtsr,𝑘 + 𝑝2 LB2mtsr,𝑘 + 𝑝3 LB2mtsr,𝑘 ,
𝑝1 LB1mtsr,𝑘

+

𝑝 2 LB2mtsr,𝑘

+

𝑝3 LB3mtsr,𝑘



A similar transformation of the MIV+MTS+MTR upper bound on E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) can be performed,





where properties of the minimum operator are used instead. Then the full set of bounding
functions for the lower bound on ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ) is obtained by exhausting the number of possible
subtractions of one term from the set of upper bounds on E 𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑗 ) from one term of the set of



lower bounds on E [𝑌𝑖 (𝑡 𝑘 )]. This yields a total of 2𝐿−1

2



= 16 bounding functions for each bound

on the average treatment effect in our example with three bins. For convenience, we borrow the

2

Chernozhukov et al. (2013) notation and use 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣) and 𝜃 𝑢 (𝑣), 𝑣 = 1, . . . , 2𝐿−1 , to denote these
bounding functions for the lower and upper ATE bounds, respectively.
The key aspect of the CLR method is that the procedures for obtaining the half-median
unbiased estimates of the bounds and for the valid confidence intervals are performed on
each bounding function 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣) and 𝜃 𝑢 (𝑣) prior to the evaluation of the associated maximum or
minimum. The technical condition required to do so is that there exist estimators of the 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣)
and 𝜃 𝑢 (𝑣) which are consistent and asymptotically normal. Given that the current bounding
functions are composed of sample means and sample proportions, this condition is satisfied.
Therefore, we proceed with a precision adjustment as follows, which leads to bias-corrected
estimated bounds and valid confidence intervals.
In general, the CLR precision-adjustment step first entails taking the product of a critical
value denoted 𝜅(𝑝) and the pointwise standard error of the bounding function estimator written
𝑠(𝑣). For upper bound bounding functions this product is added to the estimator 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (𝑣), and
it is subtracted from 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (𝑣) for lower bound bounding functions. The choice of 𝑝 in the critical
14 It

can be shown that, in general, if there are 𝐿 bins, then there are 2𝐿−1 bounding functions for each bound of
the mean potential outcomes, and for each of the four combinations of assumptions which involve an MIV.
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value governs whether the adjustment yields the median-unbiased bounding function (which
sets 𝑝 = 0.5) or yields the desired bound for the confidence interval (see below). In this way, the
CLR method has the advantage that the bias correction and inference is done within the same
procedure.
The precision-corrected estimators for the respective lower and upper bounds under each
set of assumptions are given by



ˆ𝑙

ˆ𝑙

𝑙

𝑙

ˆ𝑢

𝑢

𝑢

𝜃 (𝑝) = max 𝜃 (𝑣) − 𝜅 (𝑝) · 𝑠 (𝑣)



𝑣

and



ˆ𝑢

𝜃 (𝑝) = min 𝜃 (𝑣) + 𝜅 (𝑝) · 𝑠 (𝑣)



𝑣

where 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (𝑣) and 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (𝑣) are the unadjusted estimators of the bounding functions and 𝑠 𝑙 (𝑣) and
𝑠 𝑢 (𝑣) are their associated standard errors, defined below.
The critical values 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑝) and 𝜅 𝑢 (𝑝) are computed according to the following algorithm. Let
𝜸ˆ 𝑙 be a 4𝐿−1 -dimensional column vector of all the unadjusted bounding function estimators for
the lower bound, with 𝜸ˆ 𝑢 defined likewise for the upper bound. The first step obtains, using 𝐵
𝑙

b of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of
bootstrap replications, a consistent estimate 𝛀
√
𝒍

ˆ 1/2,𝑙 , we can thus define 𝑠 𝑙 (𝑣) ≡ ∥ b𝒈√(𝒗)∥ .
𝑁 𝜸ˆ 𝑙 − 𝜸 𝑙 .15 With b
𝒈 𝒍 (𝒗)′ the 𝑣 th row of 𝛀
Next, we simulate 𝑅 draws from a 𝒩(0, 𝑰) distribution, where 𝑰 is the

𝑁
𝐿−1
4
×

4𝐿−1 identity

matrix. The draws are labelled 𝒁 𝑟 , 𝑟 = 1, . . . , 𝑅, and are used to compute 𝑍 𝑟∗ (𝑣) ≡ b
𝒈 𝒍 (𝒗)′ 𝒁 𝑟 /∥ b
𝒈 𝒍 (𝒗)∥
for each 𝑟 and 𝑣. In each replication, we select the maximum over the set of 𝑍 𝑟∗ (1), . . . , 𝑍 𝑟∗ (4𝐿−1 ).
From the resulting 𝑅 values, we compute 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑐), which is defined as the 𝑐 th quantile of the values,
where 𝑐 ≡ 1 − (0.1/log 𝑁). This value 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑐) is used to construct the following set:



 𝑙

𝑙
𝑙
𝑙
𝑙
𝑙
𝑙
𝑙
ˆ
ˆ
b
𝑉 = 𝑣 ∈ 𝒱 : 𝜃 (𝑣) ≥ max 𝜃 (𝑣˜ ) − 𝜅 (𝑐) · 𝑠 (𝑣˜ ) − 2𝜅 (𝑐) · 𝑠 (𝑣)
𝑣˜ ∈𝒱 𝑙

where 𝒱 𝑙 is the indexing set for the lower bound bounding functions 𝜃 𝑙 (𝑣). Returning to the
15 From this point, we illustrate for only the estimate of lower bounds.
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The process for upper bounds is analogous.

values 𝑍 𝑟∗ (𝑣), we now take the maximum from each replication 𝑟, this time restricting the search

b 𝑙 . The CLR critical value 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑝) is then the 𝑝 th quantile of the resulting 𝑅 values, such
only to 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉
that 𝜅 𝑙 (0.5) gives the half-median unbiased estimate of the lower bound 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.5) on ATE(𝑡 𝑘 , 𝑡 𝑗 ).
Obtaining the lower bound on a (1−𝛼)·100% confidence interval requires one final adjustment
to account for the width of the identified set. Borrowing notation again from Chernozhukov
et al. (2013), define

b
Γ ≡ 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (0.5) − 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.5)
n o
b
Γ+ ≡ max 0, b
Γ
𝜌 = max 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (0.75) − 𝜃ˆ 𝑢 (0.25) , 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.25) − 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (0.75)



𝜏 ≡ 1/(𝜌 log 𝑁)




+
b
𝑝ˆ ≡ 1 − Φ 𝜏Γ · 𝛼
where Φ(·) is the standard normal CDF. The lower bound of a 95% confidence interval is based
ˆ which would use the critical value 𝜅 𝑙 (𝑝),
ˆ with 𝛼 = 0.05 in the expression for 𝑝.
ˆ
on 𝜃ˆ 𝑙 (𝑝),

3.3

Data

Add Health is a nationally-representative sample of 20,745 students in grades 7 through 12 (aged
12-21) in 1994-95 (wave 1). Adolescents were surveyed from 132 schools that were selected to
ensure representativeness with respect to region, urbanicity, school size and type, and ethnicity.
In wave 1, data were collected from adolescents, their parents, siblings, friends, relationship
partners, fellow students, and school administrators. The adolescents have been followed after
1 year (wave 2, 1996), 6 years (wave 3, 2001-2002), 13 years (wave 4, 2008), and 20 years (wave 5,
2016-2018).
We estimate the effect of BMI and education on mental health at wave 4 when respondents are
29 years old on average. Mental health is measured using the 10 item CES-D. The CES-D score
is created by summing responses (ranging from 0 to 3) from questions that asked respondents
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how often in the last week they (1) were bothered by things not normally bothersome; (2) could
not shake the blues; (3) felt like they were not as good as others; (4) had trouble focusing; (5)
were depressed; (6) were too tired to do things they enjoyed; (7) felt sad; (8) felt happy; (9)
enjoyed life, and (10) felt disliked. Hence, the CES-D score has ranges from 0 to 30, with higher
values corresponding to poorer mental health. Depression is defined as having a score of 11 or
higher (Suglia et al., 2016). Educational attainment is based on responses to the question “what
is the highest level of education that you have achieved to date?”
At wave 4 96% of participants consented to providing saliva samples. Approximately
12,200 (80% of those participants) consented to long-term archiving and were consequently
eligible for genome-wide genotyping.

Genotyping was done on two Illumina platforms,

with approximately 80% of the sample genotyping performed with the Illumina Omni1-Quad
BeadChip and 20% genotyped with the Illumina Omni2.5-Quad BeadChip. After quality control
procedures, genotyped data are available for 9,974 individuals (7,917 from the Omni1 chip and
2,057 from the Omni2 chip) on 609,130 SNPs common across both genotyping platforms. Using
this data, Add Health has released PGSs for 9,129 individuals. Of these 9129 individuals, 63%
(5,728 individuals) are of European ancestry. A limitation of this study is that we concentrate on
individuals of European ancestry because the GWAS we employ is for this population, and the
PGSs for other ethnic groups may not have the same predictive power (Martin et al., 2017). All
PGSs provided by Add Health are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation
of 1.
There are two different estimation samples for each application. First, for education and
mental health, respondents with missing values for education, mental health, or age are dropped
from the analysis, leaving a sample size of 5718 individuals of European ancestry. For studying
BMI and mental health, we additionally exclude those with missing information on BMI, birth
order, mother’s education, and wave 1 ability test scores.16 Finally, we exclude 68 respondents
with a BMI classified as underweight, in line with the reasoning for MTS and MTR in the
previous section. This results in a sample size of 4860 observations for the second application.
16 This

makes the sample consistent with the one in Amin, Flores, and Flores-Lagunes (2020), which used a PGS
for BMI as an IV to study this same question.
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Summary statistics for each sample are reported in Table 3.1. Both samples are 53% female
with an average age of 29 years. In the education sample, respondents have an average of 14.56
years of schooling, where 7% have a highest education level of less than high school, 16% are
high school graduates, 44% have some college, and 32% are college graduates. The average
CES-D score is 5.90.
For the BMI estimation sample, the average body mass index is 28.72. This is broken down
into 35% categorized as normal, 30% as overweight, 27% as obese, and 8% as severely obese.
The average score on the 10-item CES-D is 5.78, and 14.5% can be classified as depressed.

3.4

Application I: Education and Mental Health

It is well documented that higher educational attainment is correlated with better health. Higher
educational attainment can lead to better health through several pathways. These include:
increasing incomes, and thus enabling purchasing better health care (particularly in the US and
similar institutional contexts); improving one’s rank in society, which is associated with better
adult health and reduced stress and poor mental health related to actual and/or perceived
social deprivation (Rose and Marmot, 1981); increasing interactions with other more-schooled
peers, generating health spillovers (Fletcher, 2010); lowering discount rates and extending life
expectancies, thereby making individuals more patient and increasing their incentives to engage
in healthier behaviors (Becker and Mulligan, 1997); increasing productive efficiency to produce
more health from given inputs (Grossman, 1972); and increasing allocative efficiency through
selecting inputs better for health production (Grossman, 1972). Moreover, education is viewed
by some as a fundamental cause of health disparities because of the perception that schooling
embodies access to important resources and affects multiple health outcomes through several
mechanisms (Link and Phelan, 1995).
Although there are robust correlations between education and better health, these correlations
are likely biased due to unobserved factors affecting education and health, and reverse causality.
The two most common approaches used in the literature to estimate causal effects of education
are (1) IV, exploiting variation in educational attainment arising from changes in compulsory
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schooling laws and (2) twin fixed-effect models.17 The literature has mainly focused on effects
of education on mortality and physical health, with little evidence for mental health. This is
an important gap in the literature, because mental health is an increasingly important public
health issue. Serious mental illnesses cost $193.2 billion in lost earnings (Insel, 2008) and reduce
life expectancy by 10-20 years (Chesney et al., 2014).
A small number of IV and twin studies have estimated the effect of education on mental
health and found mixed results. Crespo et al. (2014) and Mazzonna (2014) both exploit changes in
compulsory schooling laws across several European countries and find that education reduces
the probability of depression for men in their 50s.18 Lorant et al. (2021) utilize changes in
compulsory schooling laws across European countries to estimate the effect of education on
suicide between ages 35-60, and find no evidence of a causal effect. Dahmann and Schnitzlein
(2019) find no protective effect of education on mental health for 50-85 year-olds based on a
reform that expanded schooling from 8 to 9 years in West Germany. Courtin et al. (2019) exploit
the 1959 Berthoin reform which increased the minimum school leaving age by 2 years in France.
They find that reform increased depressive symptoms for women in their 60s and did not affect
depressive symptoms for men. They explain their findings by noting that the reform was not
associated with an upgrading of women’s position in the labor market, potentially creating a
job-education mismatch detrimental for mental health. Lager et al. (2017) find that raising the
minimum school leaving age in Sweden had an adverse effect on emotional control for men at
the age of military conscription (about 18 years). Avendano et al. (2020) exploit the increase in
the minimum school leaving age from 15 to 16 in the UK, and find some evidence that education
increased the prevalence of depression and some mental health conditions for individuals in
their 50s. Both Lager et al. (2017) and Avendano et al. (2020) argue that the negative effects of
17 Hamad

et al. (2018) meta-analyzed 89 IV studies and found that an extra year of education reduces the risk of
obesity by 20% and has small reductions (1-5%) on the risk of mortality, smoking, and hypertension. However, a
meta-analysis of IV and twins fixed-effect estimates by Xue et al. (2021) found that there is practically no effect of
education on health after correcting for publication bias.
18 Both studies use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), where the
average age in their estimation samples is 58 years. Crespo et al. (2014) find that an extra year of education reduces
the probability of depression by 6.5% in a pooled sample of men and women. While Mazzonna (2014) also finds a
similar effect in a pooled sample of men and women, gender stratified IV regressions show a statistically significant
negative effect for men and a small positive but statistically insignificant effect for women. Crespo et al. (2014) do
not provide gender stratified IV estimates.
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education arise because the reforms forced young people who did not want to stay in school
(but rather go to the labor market) to continue their education. Twins fixed-effect estimates in
Fujiwara and Kawachi (2009) and Halpern-Manners et al. (2016) show no effect of education on
mental health for twins in their mid- 40s and 50s.19 In contrast, McFarland and Wagner (2015)
find that college graduates have fewer depressive symptoms than non-college graduates based
on a sample of 462 identical twins (average age of 28 years) from the National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health). The mixed results in the literature may
reflect heterogenous effects across countries, age groups, or differences in the mental health
measures.
Both IV and twins fixed-effect methods have limitations.

Twins fixed-effect estimates

represent causal effects assuming that within-twin pair differences in education are exogenous.
This assumption may be violated if education differences are due to twin-specific factors that also
affect mental health. Twin datasets may also be under-powered to detect statistically significant
effects and results may not be generalizable to the wider population. Causal inference in the
IV approach critically rests on the exclusion restriction—that compulsory schooling laws do
not directly affect mental health, but only indirectly through their effect on education. The
findings in Lager et al. (2017) and Avendano et al. (2020) suggest compulsory schooling laws
may affect mental health through other channels such as reduced labor market experience, thus
violating the exclusion restriction. The IV approach also identifies a local average treatment
effect (LATE) for compliers with the instrument. These are individuals who in the absence of
the reforms would not have stayed in school and likely come from the low end of the education
distribution. The IV results are thus uninformative about effects of education at the upper part
of the education distribution. The LATE also likely differs from the average treatment effect
(ATE), if the effects are heterogeneous.
Instead of these IV or fixed-effects methods, we follow the approach detailed in Section 3.2
and turn to the polygenic score for depression available in Add Health as an MIV. With our
outcomes being the 10-item CES-D score or an indicator for depression, we also consider the
19 Fujiwara

and Kawachi (2009) use a sample of 1378 (672 identical; 676 fraternal) twins from the Midlife in
United States Development Study, and Halpern-Manners et al. (2016) use a sample of 4038 identical twins from the
Virginia Twin Registry.
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negative MTS and negative MTR assumptions as discussed above. These respectively impose
that individuals observed with higher levels of education have, on average, no higher potential
CES-D scores (depression probabilities), and that higher levels of education do not lead to
strictly higher CES-D scores (depression probabilities) for any individual.
The results for the CES-D score are presented in Table 3.2. The OLS results in Column
2 are obtained by regressing the CES-D score on an education treatment indicator for each
of the comparisons in Panels A through E, with controls for age, sex, and genetic principal
components.20 The estimated coefficients show that high school graduates score on average 1.46
points (18%) lower on the 10-item CES-D relative to high school dropouts. The gap is even larger
at 3.55 points (43%) when comparing high school dropouts to college graduates. Additionally,
those with some college education score an average of 0.75 points (11%) lower than high school
graduates, college graduates score 2.09 points (31%) lower than high school graduates, and
college graduates score 1.34 points (22%) lower than those with only some college. If there were
no other unobserved confounders, these coefficients would identify a statistically significant
and negative ATE for each education comparison under a selection-on-observables assumption,
suggesting sizable improvements to mental health from increased education. However, there
are likely unobservables driving selection into education on mental health, making the OLS
results biased estimates of the effect.
All of the bounds in Columns 3-7 use as the outcome the residuals from a regression of
the CES-D score on age, sex, and the genetic principal components. Column 3 begins with
the worst-case bounds that impose only bounded outcome support. These are not particularly
informative with the residualized CES-D scores, as both the lower and upper bounds represent
effect sizes that would move the control means in Column 1 off the 0-to-30 scale. Adding MTS
in Column 4 results in strictly tighter bounds from both above and below. For comparisons
20 The

inclusion of the genetic principal components is to correct for population stratification, a situation
where the distribution of genes systematically differs by population subgroups (e.g., by ethnicity/race). If these
subpopulations also systematically have different health outcomes that are not due to genetic make-up, then this
could lead to a spurious correlation between genetic risk and health. Population stratification can be controlled
for by limiting analyses to ethnically homogenous samples (Cardon and Palmer, 2003) and by including principal
components from genome-wide SNP data as control variables, which account for genetic differences across ethnic
groups (Price et al., 2006). We include the first 20 principal components in the Add Health data to control for
population stratification and limit our analyses to individuals of European-ancestry.
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with high school dropouts, the bounds indicate that the causal effect of graduating high school
on the CES-D score ranges from a 7.78 point (95%) decrease to a 9.32 point (114%) increase;
becoming a college graduate would have an effect between a 3.55 point (43%) decrease and a
22.82 point increase (beyond the maximum score of 30). Completing some college beyond high
school graduation decreases the CES-D score by at most 4.97 points (74%) and increases it by at
most 11.35 points (169%). Becoming a college graduate decreases the CES-D score by at most
7.12 points (which would be below the minimum score of 0) and increases the score by at most
18.47 points (306%) compared to some college; relative to being a high school graduate, the
effect can range from a 3.86 point (57%) decrease to a 21.58 point (321%) increase.
Column 5 imposes the MTR assumption. Other than its impact of ruling out any increases
in the CES-D score, the resulting lower bounds are not informative as they represent decreases
that are not possible on the scale. Combining MTS and MTR in Column 6, however, can further
tighten the bounds. Relative to dropping out of high school, graduating high school leads to at
most a 2.47 point (30%) decline in the CES-D score, while graduating college can generate up
to a 3.55 point (43%) decrease. Completing some college education decreases the CES-D score
by up to 1.30 points (19%) compared to stopping after high school graduation. Graduating
college, meanwhile, decreases the CES-D score by no more than 1.62 points (27%) versus only
completing some college, and by no more than 2.20 points (33%) versus high school graduates.
All three assumptions are imposed together for the MIV+MTS+MTR bounds in Column 7.
For high school graduates and high school dropouts, finishing high school results in at most
a 2.59 point (32%) lower CES-D score. The identified set for the effect of some college versus
graduating high school is considerably narrower, with any decrease in the CES-D score limited
to 0.37 points (5%). Comparing college graduation to having finished only some college, we are
able to rule out that the CES-D score declines by more than 1.13 points (19%). In Panels D and
E, we are able to conclude from the 95% confidence intervals there is a statistically significant
decrease in the CES-D score for both the comparisons of college graduate and high school
graduate and college graduate and high school dropout. Relative to graduating high school,
graduating college results in at least a 0.11 point (2%) decrease and at most a 1.25 point (19%)
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decrease. Finally, graduating college lowers the score by at least 0.22 points (3%) and up to 3.64
points (44%) when compared to not finishing high school. Thus, we do find evidence under our
weaker assumptions that increasing education to the tertiary level has at least a small positive
impact on mental health, consistent with some of the compulsory schooling IV findings of a
protective effect.
Rather than using the full CES-D score, Table 3.3 uses the 11-point cutoff (Suglia et al., 2016)
to take the outcome as an indicator for an individual to be classified as having depression. The
estimated OLS coefficients in Column 2 again come from regressions which control for age, sex,
and the genetic principal components. Compared to finishing less than a high school education,
these show gaps of 10.2 and 22.5 percentage points, respectively, in the probability of depression
for high school graduates and college graduates. Those having some college have risks of
depression 4.3 percentage points lower than high school graduates, and college graduates
subsequently have an 8.0 percentage point lower risk of depression versus those with only some
college. Finally, there is a 12.3 percentage point difference in the depression probability for
college graduates and high school graduates. These do not reflect causal estimates, however, as
there is likely to be selection on unobservables.
As with the CES-D score above, the outcome variable for the bounds estimated in Columns
3-7 is the residuals from regressing the depression indicator on age, sex, and genetic principal
components. As a result, the worst-case bounds in Column 3 are not informative on the ATE
since the lower and upper bounds would each take the control means beyond the [0, 1] support
of probabilities.21 A similar situation arises for the MTS and MTR bounds in Columns 4 and
5 for many of the comparisons. The MTS+MTR bounds estimated in Column 6 can be more
informative. The causal effects on the probability of depression for high school dropouts of
graduating high school and of graduating college are non-positive by assumption, while the
former can be no larger than a 16.1 percentage point (54%) decrease and the latter no larger
21 Since

this is easier to see with an originally binary outcome, note that the lower end of the bounded outcome
support for the residualized outcome becomes the minimum residual in the sample (which is a negative number)
and the upper end of the bounded support becomes the maximum residual (which may exceed 1). Inspecting the
worst-case bounds in Result 3.2.1 reveals that this mechanically increases the width of the bounds, leading to the
lack of informativeness in the estimates. This impacts the MTS bounds and the MTR bounds as well, which also
directly make use of bounded support.
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than a 22.5 percentage point (75%) decrease. Completing some college can lower the risk of
depression by no more than 7.7 percentage points (39%) versus completing high school, and
graduating college can decrease the risk by no more than 9.7 percentage points (61%) versus
completing only some college. The effect of college graduation versus high school graduation
is at most a 13.1 percentage point (66%) decline in the depression probability.
The estimates in Column 7 employ the depression PGS as an MIV, and the bounds are
all weakly tightened relative to the ones obtained under MTS+MTR. The lower bound for the
effect of completing high school for dropouts remains the same, estimating the probability of
depression declines by up to 54%. Completing some college after high school graduation reduces
the likelihood of depression by no more than 2.4 percentage points (12%), and the 95% confidence
interval is able to reject the selection-on-observables point estimate. Graduating college can
reduce the depression likelihood by up to 7.2 percentage points (45%) compared with only
completing some college. Moving from a high school graduate to a college graduate decreases
the risk of depression by at least 0.4 percentage points (2%) and at most 7.9 percentage points
(40%), though the 95% confidence interval cannot statistically reject a null effect. Graduating
college reduces the depression probability by at least 1.2 percentage points (4%) versus dropping
out of high school, and it is reduced by no more than 75%. From the confidence interval, we are
able to conclude that this effect is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Overall,
use of the polygenic score for depression as an MIV allows us to identify positive causal effects
of education on mental health, particularly for increases from less than high school to college,
and for completing high school to completing college.

3.5

Application II: BMI and Mental Health

Continuing with our motivation for studying the drivers of mental health due to its increasing
public health importance, we are also interested in how an individual’s BMI may influence her
experience of depressive symptoms, and how genetic data may be useful to that end. A number
of studies have documented a positive correlation between obesity (a BMI in excess of 30) and
depression (for example, see: Carpenter et al., 2000; Luppino et al., 2010; Zhao et al., 2009), but
149

establishing causality is challenging due to unobserved confounding factors that drive both BMI
and mental health, as well as the potential that depressive symptoms are instead what lead to
subsequent weight gain.
The availability of polygenic scores for BMI was therefore particularly interesting to researchers
because of Mendelian randomization. Several studies have made use of BMI PGSs in an
instrumental variables framework: Hung et al. (2014) use a genetic risk score for BMI from
RADIANT (a large case-control study of major depression) as an IV in a sample of young
adults with European ancestry and find a small but statistically insignificant negative effect
on depression; Walter et al. (2015) study a sample of females from the Nurse’s Health Study,
also finding a small negative but insignificant effect from the IV estimates; Jokela et al. (2012)
examine a sample from the Young Finns prospective cohort study, obtaining IV estimates of a
positive and statistically significant effect of BMI on depressive symptoms; and Willage (2018)
uses the BMI PGS in Add Health as an instrument, finding a positive effect of BMI on suicidal
ideation, but no significant effect on the depressive symptom index. Finally, Amin, Flores, and
Flores-Lagunes (2020) also consider the PGS for BMI in an IV setting using Add Health, and
again find no statistically or economically meaningful effects.
It is, however, likely that the exclusion restriction is violated in these contexts due to the
concern of pleiotropy discussed throughout this chapter. Recognizing this issue, Amin et al.
(2020) also apply the “imperfect instruments” partial identification strategy of Nevo and Rosen
(2012) to estimate an upper bound on the treatment effect. One potential drawback on that
method is its reliance on a structural assumption for correlations of error terms, along with
other assumptions such as constant effects. By contrast, the approach suggested in this chapter
is nonparametric, appealing instead to the monotonicity assumptions discussed in Section 3.2.
This application is thus partly a follow-up to that work.
One change to note with respect to the genetic IV studies is that we choose the PGS for
depression as the MIV rather than the PGS for BMI. Since the depression PGS is specifically
constructed to be related to depressive symptoms, this would seem to more naturally satisfy the
monotonic relationship with the mean potential outcomes assumed with an MIV. Our results
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for the ATE of BMI on the CES-D score are reported in Table 3.4. Column 2 provides OLS
coefficient estimates obtained from regressing the CES-D score on a treatment indicator for the
relevant BMI category comparison, age, sex, and the genetic principal components. These reveal
that, controlling for those variables, individuals with a BMI classified as overweight have on
average a 0.21 point lower CES-D score than those classified into normal BMI;22 those classified
as obese score an average of 0.62 points higher on the CES-D than those who are overweight;
and that those categorized as severely obese have CES-D scores that exceed those who are obese
by 0.51 points on average. For the more extreme BMI comparisons, individuals in the obese and
severely obese categories have CES-D scores that are 0.41 and 0.92 points higher than those in
the normal category. Suspected unobserved confounders render these biased estimates of the
treatment effect.
For the bounds in Columns 3-7, we use as the outcome the residuals from a regression of the
CES-D score on the controls for age, sex, and genetic principal components. The lower bounds
under worst-case selection and MTS are therefore unable to be informative of any negative
ATEs, as noted in the previous section. The same is largely true of the worst-case upper
bounds, where only those for the normal-to-overweight, overweight-to-obese, and normal-toobese comparisons can rule out any feaslible ATEs. The MTS upper bounds in Column 4, on
the other hand, contain more information. These can rule out increases in the CES-D score of
more than 8.52 points (149%) when moving from the normal to overweight category; more than
5.34 points (99%) when moving from overweight to obese; and more than 6.20 points (102%)
when moving from obese to severely obese. The MTS upper bounds are most informative for
the normal-to-obese and normal-to-severely obese effects: this can be at most an increase of 2.31
points (40%) for the former, and at most 0.93 points (16%) for the latter.
Imposing MTR in Column 5 rules out any decrease in the CES-D from increasing BMI,
while most of the upper bounds can exclude extremely large increases.

Going from the

normal category to overweight can increase the CES-D score by up to 14.20 points (249%);
from overweight to obese by up to 19.34 points (358%); from obese to severely obese by up
22 Though

this is not the anticipated pattern, we note that this is not statistically significant and therefore not
necessarily contradictory of the MTS or MTR assumptions.
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to 23.59 points (389%, and very close to the maximum possible score); and from normal to
obese by up to 21.80 points (382%). The upper bound on the normal-to-severely obese ATE is
uninformative as it would exceed the highest possible score on the 10-item CES-D.
Combining MTS and MTR in Column 6 is able to substantially decrease the upper bounds.
Here, the normal-to-overweight effect cannot exceed 0.05 points (0.9%); the overweight-to-obese
effect is at least a 0.03 point (0.6%) increase but cannot exceed 0.59 points (11%); and the obeseto-severely obese effect cannot exceed 0.85 points (14%). Moving from the normal BMI category
to obese may cause at most a 0.46 point (8%) increase, while moving from the normal category
to severely obese can cause at most a 0.93 point increase (16%).
The PGS for depression is included as an MIV with the MTS and MTR assumptions in
Column 7. For the effect of going from overweight to obese, these bounds are somewhat
tightened, where the effect is estimated to be at least a 0.03 point (0.6%) increase in the CES-D
score and at most a 0.48 point increase (9%). The 95% confidence interval, however, does not
allow us to statistically reject a zero average effect. For all the other treatment comparisons,
adding the genetic MIV actually increases the width of the bounds, such that they are less
informative than MTS+MTR alone. This illustrates a potentially important point regarding
MIVs in practice. While the identification results imply that the MIV bounds must be weakly
narrower than the corresponding bounds without the MIV, it is possible that the MIV adds
statistical noise and results in estimated bounds that grow wider. This appears to be the case
here, and may hint that the genetic data does not add identifying power in this context.
Table 3.5 presents the alternative results for the probability of having a CES-D score above
11 and becoming classified as depressed. The estimates largely follow the pattern from using
the CES-D score directly. Column 2 contains estimated coefficients from a regression of the
depression indicator on the relevant treatment comparison dummy and the controls for age,
sex, and genetic principal components. These show that overweight individuals have a 1.3
percentage point lower risk of depression than those in the normal BMI category; that those in
the obese category have a 3.6 percentage point higher risk of depression than the overweight; and
that those in the severely obese category have a 0.2 percentage point higher risk of depression
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than the obese. The depression probability is 2.3 percentage points greater for those categorized
as obese versus those categorized as in the normal range, and those classified as severely obese
have a 4.3 percentage point greater chance of depression compared to those in the “normal”
range.
The estimated bounds are reported in Columns 3-7, where the outcome is the residualized
depression indicator. In Columns 3 and 4, the worst-case bounds are not informative on the
ATE in either direction, and the MTS bounds are not informative on potential negative ATEs.
The upper bounds under MTS are again more informative. We are able to rule out increases
in the probability from the normal-to-overweight treatment of beyond 32.2 percentage points
(229%); from the overweight-to-obese treatment beyond 23.0 percentage points (192%); and
from the obese-to-severely obese treatment beyond 27.0 percentage points (169%). Going from
the normal category to obesity can cause at most a 9.5 percentage point (68%) increase, and
going from the normal category to severe obesity can cause at most a 4.3 percentage point (31%)
increase.
The MTR lower bounds in Column 5 rule out any decreases in the probability of depression,
while only two of the upper bounds are informative on positive ATEs: moving from normal
to overweight can increase it by no more than 57.2 percentage points (409%), and moving
from overweight to obese can increase it by no more than 75.9 percentage points (633%). The
MTS+MTR bounds in Column 6 are greatly tightened. For the effect of moving from the normal
range of BMI to overweight, this can be at most a 0.1 percentage point (0.7%) increase. Moving
from overweight to obese can cause at least a 0.3 percentage point (3%) increase and at most a 3.3
percentage point increase (24%). The obese-to-severely obese effect is at most a 3.9 percentage
point (24%) increase, the normal-to-obese effect is at most a 2.4 percentage point (17%) increase,
and the normal-to-severely obese effect is at most a 4.3 percentage point (31%) increase in the
probability of depression.
Similar to the estimates with the CES-D score, adding the depression PGS as an MIV in
Column 7 widens most of the bounds compared to the MTS+MTR ones. The one exception is
for the effect of going from overweight to obese, where the lower bound is reduced somewhat to
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exclude anything greater than a 2.7 percentage point (23%) increase in the depression probability.
Additionally, although the MIV+MTS+MTR bounds are wider, the lower bound now indicates
at least a 0.8 percentage point (6%) increase in the risk of depression for the normal-to-severely
obese effect, but we cannot statistically reject a null ATE at conventional levels. In sum, our
estimated bounds are broadly consistent with the IV findings of no statistically-significant causal
impact of BMI on mental health. However, since the BMI PGS is likely an invalid instrument,
it is interesting that our potentially more credible MIV assumption yields a similar conclusion.
Additionally, many of the MTS+MTR upper bounds are relatively small and thus able to rule
out extremely large detrimental effects of BMI on mental health.

3.6

Summary

In recent years, researchers have been using polygenic scores—summary measures of genetic
predisposition—in genetic instrumental variable (IV) frameworks to identify causal effects.
While this began in epidemiological research, this strategy has also grown more common in
economics, where it has been used to study topics ranging from the impact of BMI on mental
health to the effects of birth weight on labor market outcomes. In this chapter, we reiterate
the concern of pleiotropy that has been noted in the literature: genes have multiple functions,
making it likely that the exclusion restriction required for a valid IV are violated because the
chosen PGSs can include genes that affect the outcome independent of the treatment variable.
Rather than using the genetic data as IVs, we instead propose that they may be more
appropriately viewed as monotone instrumental variables (MIVs) in the sense of Manski and
Pepper (2000). In contrast to a traditional IV, an MIV need not satisfy the exclusion restriction,
but only must be weakly monotonically related to mean potential outcomes. This means that a
PGS for a researcher’s outcome of interest is likely to serve as a valid MIV.
Weakening the IV assumption comes at a cost: using an MIV does not point identify the
average treatment effect (ATE). Instead, the MIV assumption can be combined with other
monotonicity assumptions to identify bounds on the ATE. In particular, potentially informative
bounds can be obtained under two further assumptions: (1) monotone treatment selection
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(MTS) and (2) monotone treatment response (MTR). Positive (negative) MTS states that, on
average, individuals observed with higher levels of the treatment have no lower (higher)
potential outcomes in any state of the world. Positive (negative) MTR is an individual-level
assumption that states potential outcomes are non-decreasing (non-increasing) under strictly
higher levels of the treatment. We emphasize that these are substantive assumptions about
counterfactual outcomes and so must be carefully considered in empirical settings.
We demonstrate the use of a PGS for a major depressive disorder as an MIV in two
applications with Add Health data.
attainment impacts mental health.

The first considers the question of how educational
The empirical literature interested in the causal effect

of education has typically relied on changes to compulsory schooling laws that generate
natural experiments, and the results have been mixed. We invoke the negative MTS and MTR
assumptions—those observed with higher levels of education have no more potential depressive
symptoms on average, and increasing education does not strictly increase potential depressive
symptoms—along with the depression PGS as MIV to estimate bounds on the effect. We find
that graduating college leads to at least a 2% decline in scores on the 10-item CES-D, and up to
a 19% decrease. In additional, moving from less than a high school education to completion of
college decreases the CES-D score by between 3 and 44%.
The second application studies whether increased BMI has a causal relationship with
depressive symptoms. Many studies have used a PGS for BMI as an instrument to identify
this effect, with most failing to find a statistically significant impact. Again, we note that the
BMI PGS is likely an invalid instrument, and turn to the PGS for depression as an MIV, along with
assumptions of positive MTS and MTR. In this context, the former says that those observed with
higher BMI do not, on average, have lower potential CES-D scores or probabilities of depression,
and the latter says that increased BMI does not strictly decrease depressive symptoms. In
contrast with the education application, the estimated bounds and confidence intervals do not
allow us to conclude that there is any statistically significant increase in either CES-D scores or
the risk of depression from increased BMI. On the other hand, the upper bounds are generally
able to rule out large detrimental effects on mental health: going from the normal range of BMI
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to overweight increases the probability of depression by at most 0.7% and going from the normal
range to obese increases the probability by no more than 17%. Another interesting finding is
that the depression PGS does not appear to have much, if any, identifying power in this setting,
where adding the MIV increases the width of most of the estimated bounds. This demonstrates
that, while the MIV assumption is quite versatile, it does not make estimates of identified sets
more informative in every context.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Education Sample

BMI Sample

Female

0.53
(0.50)

0.53
(0.50)

Age (wave 4)

29.01
(1.75)

28.95
(1.73)

Education (wave 4)

14.56
(2.19)

·
·

HS Dropout

0.07
(0.26)

·
·

HS Grad

0.16
(0.37)

·
·

Some College

0.44
(0.50)

·
·

College Grad

0.32
(0.47)

·
·

BMI (wave 4)

·
·

28.72
(7.08)

Normal

·
·

0.35
(0.48)

Overweight

·
·

0.30
(0.46)

Obese

·
·

0.27
(0.44)

Severely Obese

·
·

0.08
(0.27)

CES-D score (wave 4)

5.90
(4.71)

5.78
(4.65)

Observations

5,718

4,860

Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3.2: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of Education on the CES-D Score
(1)
Control Mean

(2)
OLS

(3)
No Assumption

(4)
MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

8.18
(5.50)

−1.461★★★
(0.305)

[-28.878, 27.313]
(-29.019, 27.516)

[-7.779, 9.324]
(-8.201, 9.578)

[-23.573, 0.000] [-2.473, 0.000]
(-23.703, 0.000) (-2.920, 0.000)

[-2.587, 0.000]
(-3.066, 0.000)

6.73
(4.91)

−0.753★★★
(0.186)

[-24.749, 19.875]
(-24.947, 20.132)

[-4.972, 11.346] [-21.080, 0.000] [-1.303, 0.000]
(-5.279, 11.551) (-21.261, 0.000) (-1.594, 0.000)

[-0.369, 0.000]
(-0.452, 0.000)

6.04
(4.85)

−1.335★★★
(0.131)

[-19.212, 20.254]
(-19.459, 20.482)

[-7.117, 18.465] [-13.711, 0.000] [-1.616, 0.000]
(-7.408, 18.676) (-13.913, 0.000) (-1.811, 0.000)

[-1.127, 0.000]
(-1.291, 0.000)

6.73
(4.91)

−2.088★★★
(0.189)

[-26.030, 22.197]
(-26.224, 22.452)

[-3.855, 21.577] [-24.373, 0.000] [-2.197, 0.000]
(-4.162, 21.831) (-24.585, 0.000) (-2.494, 0.000)

[-1.252, -0.109]
(-1.410, -0.006)

8.18
(5.50)

−3.548★★★
(0.275)

[-28.215, 22.817]
(-28.360, 23.076)

[-3.549, 22.817] [-28.215, 0.000] [-3.549, 0.000]
(-3.995, 23.076) (-28.360, 0.000) (-4.012, 0.000)

[-3.643, -0.218]
(-4.122, -0.133)

Panel A
HS Grad vs
HS Dropout
Panel B
Some College vs
HS Grad
Panel C
College Grad vs
Some College
Panel D
College Grad vs
HS Grad
Panel E
College Grad vs
HS Dropout

Sample standard deviations in parentheses in column 1. Robust standard errors in (.) in column 2. In columns 3-7 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding
95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999 bootstrap replications. Outcome is the residualized CES-D score to control for age, sex, and genetic principal
components. The PGS score for depression is used as the MIV with 5 bins.
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Table 3.3: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of Education on Depression
(1)
Control Mean

(2)
OLS

(3)
No Assumption

(4)
MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

0.30
(0.46)

−0.102★★★
(0.026)

[-1.220, 1.171]
(-1.227, 1.180)

[-0.475, 0.511] [-0.905, 0.000] [-0.161, 0.000]
(-0.512, 0.531) (-0.913, 0.000) (-0.200, 0.000)

[-0.162, 0.000]
(-0.209, 0.000)

0.20
(0.40)

−0.043★★★
(0.015)

[-1.020, 0.879]
(-1.030, 0.890)

[-0.253, 0.547] [-0.844, 0.000] [-0.077, 0.000]
(-0.276, 0.558) (-0.852, 0.000) (-0.100, 0.000)

[-0.024, 0.000]
(-0.031, 0.000)

0.16
(0.37)

−0.080★★★
(0.010)

[-0.839, 0.840]
(-0.850, 0.850)

[-0.296, 0.734] [-0.641, 0.000] [-0.097, 0.000]
(-0.312, 0.744) (-0.650, 0.000) (-0.113, 0.000)

[-0.072, 0.000]
(-0.083, 0.000)

0.20
(0.40)

−0.123★★★
(0.015)

[-1.096, 0.956]
(-1.105, 0.967)

[-0.188, 0.919] [-1.039, 0.000] [-0.131, 0.000]
(-0.211, 0.930) (-1.048, 0.000) (-0.155, 0.000)

[-0.079, -0.004]
(-0.090, 0.000)

0.30
(0.46)

−0.225★★★
(0.023)

[-1.180, 0.991]
(-1.187, 1.002)

[-0.225, 0.991] [-1.180, 0.000] [-0.225, 0.000]
(-0.262, 1.002) (-1.187, 0.000) (-0.264, 0.000)

[-0.226, -0.012]
(-0.273, -0.005)

Panel A
HS Grad vs
HS Dropout
Panel B
Some College vs
HS Grad
Panel C
College Grad vs
Some College
Panel D
College Grad vs
HS Grad
Panel E
College Grad vs
HS Dropout

Sample standard deviations in parentheses in column 1. Robust standard errors in (.) in column 2. In columns 3-7 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding
95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999 bootstrap replications. Outcome is the residualized indicator for depression to control for age, sex, and genetic
principal components. The PGS score for depression is used as the MIV with 5 bins.
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Table 3.4: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of BMI on the CES-D Score
(1)
Control Mean

(2)
OLS

(3)
No Assumption

(4)
MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

5.71
(4.60)

-0.212
(0.160)

[-22.037 , 22.667]
(-22.291 , 22.926)

[-19.216 , 8.520]
(-19.438 , 8.896)

[0.000 , 14.200]
(0.000 , 14.407)

[0.000 , 0.053]
(0.000 , 0.320)

[0.000 , 0.126]
(0.000 , 0.428)

5.40
(4.40)

0.619★★★
(0.171)

[-23.204 , 24.094] [-13.790 , 5.342] [0.000 , 19.340] [0.031 , 0.589]
(-23.461 , 24.347) (-14.027 , 5.625) (0.000 , 19.551) (0.000 , 0.864)

[0.027 , 0.478]
(0.000 , 0.680)

6.06
(4.75)

0.511★
(0.281)

[-25.834 , 28.944] [-9.904 , 6.199]
(-26.100 , 29.119) (-10.126 , 6.645)

[0.000 , 23.590] [0.000 , 0.845]
(0.000 , 23.731) (0.000 , 1.341)

[0.000 , 0.898]
(0.000 , 1.436)

5.71
(4.60)

0.407★★
(0.171)

[-22.135 , 23.654] [-21.458 , 2.314] [0.000 , 21.798] [0.000 , 0.457]
(-22.391 , 23.898) (-21.709 , 2.627) (0.000 , 22.052) (0.000 , 0.773)

[0.000 , 0.592]
(0.000 , 0.935)

5.71
(4.60)

0.917★★★
(0.269)

[-23.778 , 28.407] [-23.778 , 0.929] [0.000 , 28.407] [0.000 , 0.929]
(-24.050 , 28.583) (-24.050 , 1.394) (0.000 , 28.583) (0.000 , 1.458)

[0.160 , 1.015]
(0.000 , 1.595)

Panel A
Overweight vs
Normal
Panel B
Obese vs
Overweight
Panel C
Severely Obese vs
Obese
Panel D
Obese vs
Normal
Panel E
Severely Obese vs
Normal

Sample standard deviations in parentheses in column 1. Robust standard errors in (.) in column 2. In columns 3-7 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding
95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999 bootstrap replications. Outcome is the residualized CES-D score to control for age, sex, and genetic principal
components. The PGS score for depression is used as the MIV with 5 bins.
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Table 3.5: OLS Estimates and Estimated Bounds on the ATE of BMI on Depression
(1)
Control Mean

(2)
OLS

(3)
No Assumption

(4)
MTS

(5)
MTR

(6)
MTS+MTR

(7)
MIV+MTS+MTR

0.14
(0.35)

-0.013
(0.012)

[-0.874 , 0.893]
(-0.885 , 0.904)

[-0.753 , 0.322] [0.000 , 0.572] [0.000 , 0.001]
(-0.765 , 0.343) (0.000 , 0.582) (0.000 , 0.021)

[0.000 , 0.012]
(0.000 , 0.033)

0.12
(0.33)

0.036★★★
(0.013)

[-0.915 , 0.955]
(-0.926 , 0.966)

[-0.549 , 0.230] [0.000 , 0.759] [0.003 , 0.033]
(-0.562 , 0.248) (0.000 , 0.769) (0.000 , 0.055)

[0.000 , 0.027]
(0.000 , 0.044)

0.16
(0.37)

0.020
(0.022)

[-1.029 , 1.137]
(-1.040 , 1.145)

[-0.424 , 0.270]
(-0.440 , 0.304)

[0.000 , 0.039]
(0.000 , 0.078)

[0.000 , 0.056]
(0.000 , 0.096)

0.14
(0.35)

0.023★
(0.013)

[-0.875 , 0.934]
(-0.887 , 0.945)

[-0.846 , 0.095] [0.000 , 0.864] [0.000 , 0.024]
(-0.857 , 0.116) (0.000 , 0.875) (0.000 , 0.049)

[0.000 , 0.034]
(0.000 , 0.060)

0.14
(0.35)

0.043★★
(0.020)

[-0.948 , 1.114]
(-0.959 , 1.123)

[-0.948 , 0.043] [0.000 , 1.114] [0.000 , 0.043]
(-0.959 , 0.079) (0.000 , 1.123) (0.000 , 0.084)

[0.008 , 0.062]
(0.000 , 0.106)

Panel A
Overweight vs
Normal
Panel B
Obese vs
Overweight
Panel C
Severely Obese vs
Obese

[0.000 , 0.906]
(0.000 , 0.914)

Panel D
Obese vs
Normal
Panel E
Severely Obese vs
Normal

Sample standard deviations in parentheses in column 1. Robust standard errors in (.) in column 2. In columns 3-7 estimated bounds are in [.] and corresponding
95% confidence intervals in (.) are from 999 bootstrap replications. Outcome is the residualized indicator for depression to control for age, sex, and genetic
principal components. The PGS score for depression is used as the MIV with 5 bins.
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